TOTALITY IN PAUL

A Study in Semantics

by

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I INTRODUCTION

This is a study in semantics, that branch of knowledge which engages in an analysis of how language is utilized. The Bible has been interpreted with primary reference to content and apparent disregard to the structure of reality within which the content has been set. Such an emphasis upon content has resulted in a variety of interpretations on many biblical passages, particularly those that suggest the reality of wholeness.

For example, in Mark 1:5, the author describes John's audience thus: καὶ ἐξεπορεύετο πρὸς αὐτὸν πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία χώρα καὶ οἱ Ἱεροσολυμῖται, πάντες . . . . It does not take much imagination to realize the author was hardly literal in his statement. But, what does this mean for an interpretation of πᾶς, which is generally rendered as "all" or "whole"? Obviously the term is not used in a quantitative sense. On the other hand, πᾶς is not without a sense of enumeration. The Markan context suggests that additional investigation regarding the function of πᾶς in the sentence is required.

In the contrast of Adam and Christ in Romans 5:12-21 and 1 Corinthians 15:21, traditional exegesis has emphasized the relationship of sin and salvation, death and life. In these passages, however, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους or πάντες is found in both relationships of sin and death as well as salvation and life. If πᾶς is to be interpreted as referring to all men, then the logical deduction of all

men being involved both in sin and death as well as in salvation and life presents a puzzling phenomenon. Does this imply an inevitability of evil and good, of death and life? Or, does it suggest an inarticulateness by Paul? Is one part of the equation modified by necessity, i.e., only those who commit themselves to the Christ escape the terrors of death? On the other hand, are not all committed to die by the fact of birth? Is it possible, then, that Paul doe not use πᾶς in a quantitative meaning? Furthermore, the relationship of Adam and Christ per se, apart from the doctrines surrounding these passages, merit more attention than they have received.

Another way of focusing attention upon the aspect of wholeness is found in the Corinthian correspondence. The section of 1 Cor. 12-14 was addressed to a community to help quell the factious elements which attempted to fracture the young Christian fellowship. The analogy of the human body is employed to demonstrate the relationship of the many members to the one body. The many have diverse functions, yet they are fully manifest in the totality of the body. Such a general observation is inadequate. In what sense is the Church really an analogate of the human body? What does the oneness and wholeness of the Church mean over and beyond the general sense of good anatomical function?

In a current appraisal of the Church one is overwhelmed by the multiplicity and variety of denominations. Increasingly the emphasis has been, in the past century and a half, on the birth and independence of sectarian and church groups

because of manifold circumstances. Only recently have efforts been launched to analyze the predicament which faces modern man. He faces an incredible array of expressions of religious experience, many of which are within the Christian framework, and some of which are not. Within Christian grouping the differences are often minimal, if not trivial. This atomistic definition of the Church has produced a lack of clarity regarding the message and mission of the Church. The Church no longer confronts modern man as the Church from God, but as an inefficient and divided, if not insecure and uncertain, religious enterprise.

At the same time, in our day there is a tendency to move toward the unification of the Church. Our culture places a high premium upon efficiency and massive organizational power structures. Many contend that an outward unity must exist in order to make the affirmation of "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and father of all, who is above all and through all and in all." At best, the issue has not been resolved and needs intensive study.

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the controversial possibilities of interpretation surrounding the utilization of words which portray wholeness or totality.

The investigation is limited to the writings of the Apostle Paul because he, more than any other writer in the New Testament, has an analytical mind. That is to say, although he is a Hellenistic Jew he is much more reflective

and sophisticated in his writings than the other writers who are, more or less, naive and non-reflective. Paul consistently attempts to evaluate both his constituents and his message, modifying the content according to the particular need(s). The other writers, with the possible exception of the authors of the Fourth Gospel and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, present their material more in the forms of reports (e.g., the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts), liturgy (e.g., 1 Peter), etc. However, the volume and variety of Paul's correspondence, as well as his analyses, affords suitable data for an investigation into the structure of thought.

Biblical scholars are presently engaged in a comparison of biblical words with non-canonical terms.[1] This concern is not directed only toward the Qumran and Chenoboskion materials; it also is reflected in the popular dalliance between Greek and Hebrew influences upon the biblical, and especially New Testament, writers. One does not doubt the many values which accrue to such an investigation of possible antecedents and contemporary parallels, but one is also forced to admit that the influence of antecedents on words is often imprecise and conclusions, at best, tentative. Word comparisons enhance a study of the content with little attention to the structure which contains the words. As

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1 Cf. S. Sandmel, "Parallelomania," JBL, LXXXI(March 1962)I, 1-13.

important as etymology and philology, for example, are in their own merits, this investigation will be focused upon syntax, interpretation and semantics.

Two primary questions emerge: 1) Does the Bible, and Paul in particular, have anything to say regarding the structure of reality? 2) Is there an ontological principle of reality by which one can assess the nature of the Apostle's thought? In evaluating Paul's ideas about the nature and structure of reality, the contextual setting and functional employment of his language are our basic concerns. The wholeness of reality, including both the patterns of totality and particularity, is observed not only in what he says to the particular recipient(s) but from the manner in which Paul discusses his topics. It is obvious that the New Testament contains only a part of Paul's correspondence, in keeping with the partiality also expressed in the other canonical materials. This in itself speaks to the necessity of a careful research into the structure of the Apostle's thought and the principle of ontology inherent therein.

The next chapter, "Content and The Thought Structure of the Bible," contains an analysis of the historical studies of the relationship of the content to the thought structure, with particular attention given to recent semantic studies both within and outside the area of biblical studies. Chapter III concerns itself with a discussion of how Paul understands the nature of reality,

i.e., the ontological dimensions of God and the world. The following chapter is devoted to an evaluation of the way Paul interprets God as working purposefully in this world.

In Chapter V, attention is focused on an evaluation of man in the Pauline corpus. The relationship of man to God and to this world is the primary concern of the investigator, rather than an analysis of anthropological categories. In the sixth chapter, typology as a technique for understanding the significance of the person and work of Jesus the Christ is undertaken. Chapter VII presents the last of several aspects of totality in Paul, that of the salutory relationship between God and his creation. A brief summary of the findings of each chapter, along with conclusions therefrom, is the content of Chapter VIII.

It is the purpose of the writer to suggest that a more fruitful methodology for the study of Paul lies in an understanding of his structure of reality, and, specifically articulated in a pattern of totality rather than in a set of ideas. Secondary materials for this project are sparse inasmuch as most scholars have chosen to enunciate his teachings as doctrinal statements. The larger part of the work is in the primary data known as the Pauline corpus. No claim is made to include every reference at any point; the limitations of time and space prohibit the investigation of all the references which pertain to the principle of totality. It is hoped,

however, that enough examples are cited to illustrate clearly the point at hand, and to suggest further implications for future research. To accomplish only this is a contribution.

Indebtedness is expressed to Professor Otto A. Piper for an insightful understanding of the term "biblical realism." This study will reveal not only a dependence upon the implications of "biblical realities," but an effort will be made to distinguish them from the corollary "biblical categories," i.e., those frames of reference which reveal the realities described in the Bible.

The investigator used the twenty-fourth edition of Novum Testamentum Graece,[1] the eighth edition of Biblia Hebraica,[2] and the fifth edition of Septuaginta.[3] All translations are those of the writer unless otherwise noted.

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1 E. Nestle and K. Aland, eds., (Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1960).

2 R. Kittel, ed., (Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1937).

3 A. Rahlfs, ed., (Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1952, Volumes I and II).

II CONTENT AND THE THOUGHT STRUCTURE OF THE BIBLE

The history of the interpretation of the Bible is characterized by a plethora of various emphases which attempt to explain the similarities and differences contained within the Scriptures. Currently the similarities are often described under the rubric of "unity," while the differences are seen as "diversities." In assessing both "unity" and "diversity," attention has been centered on the content of the Bible. The contradictory interpretations have arisen because of this primary concern with content and the concomitant neglect of the thought structure. The differences in interpretation can largely, if not almost completely, be accounted for because of the different methods of study undertaken.

Since Luther's hermeneutical contribution of Christ being the person who gives validity to the truth embodied in the Scriptures, the investigations of biblical problems have taken devious routes. The seventeenth century, in a commendable undertaking at the outset, reflected the inadequacies of the old protestant orthodoxy, and <u>sola Scriptura</u> was propagated beyond Luther's contextual usage and seen as <u>expressis verbis</u>. Christian thought was codified in seemingly precise and systematized theological formulations. The spirit and genius of the Reformation was squelched, and a distilled system of logical, if not

literal, syllogisms arose as Christian dogma. That is to say, revelation of God had been completed; creativity was over. The Church retreated before the effects of geographical explorations and scientific discoveries. Belief and understanding, presumption and proof were equated; the Aristotelian logic inherent in Scholasticism was re-affirmed and remained in control of the thought world. Apart from the exegetical work of the Pietists, the dogmatic assertions on biblical matters were generally accepted by the Church. The proclamation of the Bible as the infallible Word of God offered little opportunity for variation on the themes of creation, salvation and eschatology, even though other disciplines were proffering alternative views. But it is evident that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries no differentiation was made between the content and the thought structure of the Bible.

The advent of the spirit of rationalism created an entirely different approach. Reacting to the hard line of biblicism, the so-called movement of historical criticism became evident in the middle of the last century. Originating in F. C. Baur and his disciples in Tübingen, historical criticism engaged in a critical and scientific study of the biblical data. Employing the Hegelian dialectical method and the technique of literary analysis, Baur concluded that much of the biblical material was spurious. This wholesale reaction not only eventuated in vehement protests

and disavowals; it also precipitated a painstaking analysis of the literature as well as a diligent re-evaluation of its basic content. Textual criticism provided helpful insights toward a more accurate text, on the one hand, while source criticism opened up possibilities of discussion concerning the origins and development of the data, on the other. The immediate results were negligible in theological circles, but the method of analytical study ushered in the trans-cultural movement of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule. Under the aegis of men as Hermann Gunkel (Genesis, 1902), W. Bousset (Kyrios Christos, 1913, 1921; Jesus der Herr, 1916) and R. Reitzenstein (Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, 1910), the biblical materials were compared - both in literary and content evaluations - with materials emanating from various cultic, ethnic, and religious milieu. The realities of life and death were universally expressed, though patently different, in most of the literature. This movement was deficient in that it assumed parallels of thought on similarity of expression, but it pared many of the insensitive and inadequate accretions from the biblical studies of the preceding centuries.

Form-criticism emerged as one of the most fruitful by-products of the emphasis of historical criticism. From M. Dibelius[1] to the present day, the study of the pre-

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1 Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums, 1919; E. T.,

literary forms of the Gospel narratives has provided additional insights into the complexities of the New Testament. It becomes readily apparent that, although much of the material reflects similar sources and usage, nevertheless, a stamp of individuality rests heavily upon each of the evangelists. Form-criticism helps one to see the grave danger of stressing the use of certain words, especially when it is difficult to ascertain what the words actually were originally.

The renascence of the movement called Biblical Theology has thrived on "word-studies."[1] In its emphasis upon the intrinsic unity of the Bible and the inner unity of both Testaments, key words and concepts have been identified as definitive of the essential message of the Bible. That is to say, a word has an intrinsic value-meaning which pervades its setting, no matter what its context. The word, whether Hebrew (or Aramaic) or Greek, is peculiarly distinctive with negligible influences affecting it from its contextual and syntactical relationships. It has been posited, further-

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From Tradition to Gospel, 1934; cf., for example, K. L. Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu, 1919; R. Bultmann, Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition, 1921; E. T. of 3rd German edition, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, 1963; M. Albertz, Die Synoptischen Streitgespräche, 1921; G. Bertram, Die Leidensgeschichte Jesu und der Christuskult, 1922; E. Fascher, Die Formgeschichtliche Methode, 1924; F. C. Grant, Form Criticism, 1934; Ibid., The Gospels: Their Origin and Growth, 1957; V. Taylor, The Formation of the Gospel Tradition, 2nd ed., 1933.

1 Cf. Ebeling's treatment of the historical background of the term "Biblical Theology" in JTS, N.S. VI (October 1955)2, pp. 210-225; reprinted in Ebeling, Word and Faith, pp. 79-97.

more, that the etymological and historical factors in their origin and development of the word are a dominant part of the essential quality of the word, glistening as an uncut diamond. The most auspicious example is Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Adopting "theological word-study" as their method, the editors have included both the interpretative principles of semantics as well as that of theological function as controlling factors. The normal procedure is to investigate primarily the Old Testament Hebrew use of the corresponding New Testament Greek word, the corollary Septuagintal usage, and its function in the New Testament. Citations from extra-canonical and contemporary usage are given when relevant as with the forerunner of the Wörterbuch.[1] It is not the purpose of this work to address itself to the Wörterbuch, which has been a boon to biblical studies, or to the weaknesses implicit in the movement of Biblical Theology. The latter has already been done.[2] It is relevant, however, to point out a common present fault of biblical studies, i.e., the linguistic features have been utilized incorrectly to connote religious concerns.

The problem facing us is not that of the difficulties involved in translating from one language to another,

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1 I.e., Hermann Cremer's Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek (4th Eng. ed., 1954; originally published in 1872).

2 Cf., for example, J. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language, 1960, passim; Ebeling, op. cit.; Henry N. Cadbury, lectures on "The Eclipse of the Historical Jesus," at Haverford College, April 21 and 28, 1963.

but, rather, determining 1) the structure of thought and 2) the ontological principle of the structure of reality. Words serve functionally to communicate certain concepts, and this is done most effectively within sentence and paragraph contexts. The structure itself and its principle regarding reality condition the word(s) significantly in its(their) usage. Cognizance of the various structures of thought and ontological principles of the structure of reality has been articulated in recent studies by semanticists. The problem adheres to the shift from one structure of ontology to another in that the meaning of the context takes on a particular, if not distinctive, nuance determined by the thought structure.

A number of studies on semantics has appeared mushroom-fashion in recent years.[1] Although this investigation is primarily interested in semantics as a branch of linguistics with particular reference to the writings of Paul, the considerable ferment in semantics as a branch of philosophy compels a brief purview, especially in its concern with religious language. The insights provided in non-biblical semantic studies provide the occasion for dialogue and learning in biblical semantics. No effort will be made to present a philosophy of language, but it appears necessary

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1 Cf., e.g., Das Problem der Sprache in Theologie und Kirche, W. Schneemelcher, ed., which contains papers read at a deutscher evangelischer Theologentag in Berlin in 1958.

to evaluate the use of language in religion and in religious language especially in terms of controlling pre-suppositions.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philosophers were concerned with knowledge, the knower and the known in terms of sense data and their association. From the time of Descartes the mind and its contents was the starting point for classical philosophy. Through the influence of Locke, Hobbes, Berkeley and Hume, the sense-data were interpreted as the evidence out of which the criteria of the real were formulated. The problems of subject and object, concept and precept, form and content were crystallized by Kant's new notion of the transcendental sources of experience[1] at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The dichotomous facets, instead of remaining in bi-foci ellipse, separated, empiricism rushing after the headlong advance of science, and transcendentalism meandering after religion. Instead of a healthy dialogue necessary to each other, each repudiated the very issues it needed to face.

Since August Comte, in general, and the Viennese circle, in particular, logical positivism has heavily influenced philosophers in their quests. Closely identified historically with science, philosophy in this century has begun to give less attention to the realities of the physical sciences and more to the meaning of the world in which we live. The

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1 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophical Sketches, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 54ff.

propitious change occurred under the able leadership of the brilliant but strangely assorted generation of Freud, Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, Cassirer, et al., succeeded by the generation of C. G. Jung, W. M. Urban, A. Korzybski, and A. J. Ayer, Susanne Langer, et al. Whitehead and Russell combined brilliant careers in mathematics with their philosophical interests, engaging fiercely in dialogue with the likes of Minkowski and Einstein. Wittgenstein, from whom seem to flow many weighty thoughts on language occupied in the minds of his and their students, is quite concerned about the relationships of language. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and Philosophical Investigations (1953), he suggests that all philosophy is a critique of language, learning well from Russell his teacher, ". . . that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real form."[1] With an amazing variety of copious examples, Wittgenstein illustrates analytically the possibilities and limitations of language. However, he points out that the verificational or experiential approach can do only that for which it is designed, i. e., it cannot exhaust the possibilities of language. Not only is language an expression of its user, but it is

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1 This has been reiterated often, e. g., Gilbert Ryle in 1931, observed painfully that the principal, if not only, task of philosophy is "the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconstructions and absurd theories" (p. 36; reprinted as "Systematically Misleading Expressions," Logic and Language, A. Flew, ed., pp. 11-36).

colored greatly by the response (or lack of it) to it as well as the purpose of it. The methods dealing primarily with the sensory experiences may reflect psychical or physical, logical or illogical, etc., categories, but the methods never grasp in toto the concept or meaning of language. At best, only an element of reality may be disclosed. The system of the logical empiricists is altogether a flagrant example of an over-simplified and tightly-arranged methodology.

In the same vein, Friedrich Waismann[1] advocates an "open texture" approach to the study of language. He contends that a term can only be defined by the sort of situation in which it is to be used (p. 122). Trained in mathematics, he asserts that an experiential statement cannot be conclusively verifiable 1)because of the existence of an unlimited number of tests, and 2)because of the open texture of the terms involved. In the first reason, observation and testing are always relatively incomplete, and in the second our knowledge of any term is rendered incomplete because of the possibility of unforeseen factors which may occur, e.g., a totally new experience such as a blind person seeing, or a new discovery such as electricity (p. 124). Thus, for Waismann, "real" and "reality" have a systematic ambiguity in that they are used on many different levels and with many different shades of meaning (pp. 134ff.).

> Reality, then, is not made up of facts in the sense in which a plant is made up of cells, a house of

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1 "Verifiability," Logic and Language, Flew, ed., pp. 117-144.

> bricks, a stone of molecules; rather, if you want a simile, a fact is present, in much the same sense in which a character manifests itself in a face. . . . Just as we have to interpret a face, so we have to interpret reality. The elements of such an interpretation, without our being aware of it, are already present in language - for instance, in such moulds as the nation of thinghood, of causality, of number, or again in the way we render colour, etc. Language, then, contributes to the formation and participates in the constitution [italics in source] of a fact; which, of course, does not mean that it produces [italics] the fact (p. 141).

An entirely different conclusion regarding language is reached by A. J. Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic, 1946), a logical positivist of the Moritz Schlick Viennese Circle group. Taught by Gilbert Ryle and influenced most, at his own admission, by Rudolph Carnap, Ayer relies substantially upon the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume as propagated through Russell and Wittgenstein. Verification is the only valid principle by which to evaluate reality, maintains Ayer. The function of the philosopher is ". . . to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them" (p. 32). The philosophical inquiry must reject speculative philosophy and metaphysics, and concern itself not with the question of empirical fact, but with the formal consequences of definition (p. 57). There is no a priori knowledge of reality, and any definition of reality must be assessed by its use. Truth cannot be ascertained; only the statement of valid propositions can be determined. All empirical propositions are tenable hypotheses which may or may not be confirmed in actual sense-experience. Truth

remains propositional rather than factual. Under this framework, all ethical and religious statements are rejected as fallacious, being only expressions of feeling which do not come under the category of verifiable truth or falsehood. In the problems concomitant with the relationships between rationalism and empiricism, realism and idealism, and monism and pluralism, Ayer sees an answer only in terms of experience empirically substantiated, if by analogy. Ayer's method rejects summarily any statement which is non-verifiable. The ensuing result is a highly systematized concept of sense-reality which allows neither for any other dimension of reality nor the possibility of any other acceptable methodology. In following the suggestions and methodology of Wittgenstein, he has failed to detect Wittgenstein's warning regarding the limitation of empirical language as well as the importance stressed in the concept rather than the precise word.

Empiricism has inherited a number of semantic issues. As Langer points out (op. cit., p. 55), "the concept of meaning, in all its varieties, is the dominant philosophical concept of our time. Sign, symbol, denotation, signification, communication - these notions are our stock in trade. The changing frame of scientific thought inspired the semantic shift from attributive to operational definition." It is not enough to be able to observe sense-data; it is much more important to define its meaning. Even

though observation has been supplanted by meaning as the basic emphasis of our day, it is significant to note that our sense-data are primarily symbols.

Whereas mathematics and the symbolic logic developed therefrom has been an active stimulus for semantics, the realm of the physical sciences has been the chief challenger to the study of semantics. "It is with regard to the sciences of nature that all the problems of reference [italics] arise; and these in turn entail epistemological questions of truth, fact, knowledge, and - coming full circle back to semantics - communication of knowledge."[1]

Discursive communication may require both a logical and linguistic articulation, but symbols pose additional problems peculiar to themselves. The heretofore mentioned generation of Freud, Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, Cassirer, et al., raised the issue of symbolic modes of communication. While this mode is not limited to language in that it may be well expressed in e.g., art and music, nevertheless, the employment of myth, analogy, and metaphorical thinking was rightly seen as heavily influencing the use of words. Modern psychology and modern logic have enjoyed phenomenal growths in divergent directions, both employing a complex system of symbols. And the symbol concept in science, especially physics, has also renewed substantial interest in symbols.

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1 Langer, op. cit., p. 56.

Cassirer (Language and Myth) understands the human mind to have prelogical concepts and expressions which culminate in reason and factual knowledge. The mental processes fail to grasp reality itself, but utilize symbols to represent it in any necessary way. In itself this always implies that the symbol tends to obscure that which it seeks to reveal. Concepts are formulations and creations of thought which, instead of giving us the true forms of objects, show us rather the forms of thought itself. Speech is little more than a suggestion of that which really is (p. 7).[1] The pattern of emergence manifested throughout his thinking stamps Cassirer's work as a positive contribution against the almost completely mechanistic thought represented in logical empiricism.

Cassirer equates the concept with the essence of the reality in question. Both language and myth are modes of expression which transfer thought from momentary experience to enduring conceptions, from sense impression to formulation. Not only are their roles similar in function, but verbal structures also appear as mythical entities with a mythical force in which all being and doing originate (pp. 43ff.). Cassirer opines that the great cultural religions always link the word with the Lord of creation, and particularly,

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1 This is illustrated in Cassirer's utilization of Usener, Götternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der Religiösen Begriffsbildung, (Bonn, 1896), pp. 301f., 325, 330, in the history of mythic ideas concerning deity. Deity is described functionally before Being in the evolution from momentary deities to special gods to personal gods (pp. 17ff.).

when a fundamental ethical contrast is posited, the spoken word becomes the primary agent to transform chaos into cosmos (pp. 45ff.).

Mythical imaginative thinking telescopes toward concentration upon the total impression. The word which denotes the thought content is merged with its object in an indissoluble unity and becomes reality. Discursive thinking tends toward expansion, implication and systematic connection, relating to the whole pattern of being and of process in ever-tightening strictures to that totality (pp. 56ff.). This leads to the hypostatization[1] of the word which is of crucial importance to Cassirer's theory. It is endowed as a substantive being and power before being comprehended as a functional instrument of the mind in the construction and development of spiritual reality (p. 62). As Langer, an ardent devotee of Cassirer, has observed[2], symbolism

> . . . has the great advantage of assimilating all mental activity to reason, instead of grafting that strange product upon a fundamentally unintellectual organism. It accounts for imagination and dream, myth and ritual, as well as for practical intelligence. Discursive thought gives rise to science, and a theory of knowledge restricted to its products culminates in the critique of science; but the

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1 Cf. a different evaluation of hypostatization by Barr, "Hypostatization of Linguistic Phenomena in Modern Theological Interpretation," JSS, VII (Spring 1962)1, 85-94.

2 Philosophy in a New Key. A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, (3rd ed., 1957), p. 143.

> recognition of non-discursive thought makes it just as possible to construct a theory of <u>understanding</u> [italics] that naturally culminates in a critique of art. The parent stock of both conceptual types, of verbal and non-verbal formulation, is the basic human act of symbolic transformation.

Out of the positivistic milieu which produced a rabid empiricism, Cassirer, as Freud, has departed into an area of productive analysis of human thought processes. Out of the areas of social psychology and cultural anthropology, the fruits of his perceiving an entity as a total expression apart from the effects of syllogistic logic have, nonetheless, suggested that formal logic and formal linguistic structures can accomplish only that which is appropriate to their structures. To say it differently, reality can hardly be equated with the descriptions of that reality even though hypostatization is necessary to Cassirer's system. The manner of conception and expression are part and parcel of the reality as far as the knower or observer is concerned. This in itself demands a broad definition of symbol for its employment in the physical sciences, mathematics, psychology, ethnology and philology. Not only is the symbol used for communication, but it also formulates experience as indicated by Kant in declaring

> . . . that the human mind puts its stamp on experiences, that it receives no raw data for its perceptions, but that everything humanly perceivable is already held in the mold of the humanly conceivable. The innate schema, however, is transcendental, common to all human consciousness; it furnishes no principle of conceptual advance, no phenomenal means of conception. . ..

Langer again follows Cassirer in defining a symbol as any device which transfers a meaning through and toward an object, but she adds the essential quality of symbolization is abstraction.[1] This emphasis on all human mentality arising out of some sort of symbolic transformation has pointed out well the one-sided dimension of logical empiricism.

The resurgence of interest in things semantic has created a raft of materials on the relationship of language to religious language. In a series of articles published under the title of New Essays in Philosophical Theology,[2] several British scholars have attempted to show that the philosophical inquiries are legitimate for theological matters. An engaging debate among Flew, R. M. Hare, B. Mitchell, and I. M. Crombie on "Theology and Falsification" begins with John Wisdom's famous parable of the two explorers in the jungle watching the "invisible gardener." Hare and Mitchell attempt to answer the riddle of the verification of God by the employment of riddles, neither of which are adequate but both of which are quite suggestive. The consensus that the Christian is already committed to a preferential use of language and logic is not surprising, and the reliance upon symbolic expressions is quite acceptable. That is to say, experience can be verified

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1 Philosophical Sketches, pp. 59f., 62f.

2 Edited by A. Flew and A. Macintyre, (London: SCM, 1955), pp. 96ff.

not only in the empirical sense but also as a basic attitude and commitment in faith. Therefore, the statement that religious language is capable of becoming significant affirmations of faith is a valid assertion. Verification or falsification, Crombie concludes (p. 125) may be a legitimate demand on two conditions: 1)the logical stipulation

> . . . is to the effect that nothing can be a statement of fact if it is untestable in the sense that the notion of testing it is precluded by correctly interpreting it. 2)The second is a communicational stipulation, and it is to the effect that nobody can fully understand a statement, unless he has a fair idea how a situation about which it was true would differ from a situation about which it was false (pp. 125f.).

Logically speaking, this is somewhat convincing. But the answer is so devoid of meaning that Crombie lists the three fortresses to which the Christian retreats upon the collapse of logic: 1)the resurrection of the dead suggests that all of the parts are not known; indeed some of the most important parts are unknown; 2)Christ is the verification and, in some sense, the specification of God's love; 3)the divine love may be encountered in the religious life of the community, if not that of his own.

This debate is characteristic of most of the efforts to evaluate the significance of religious language.[1] Ian T. Ramsey[2] has attempted to show how contemporary logical

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1 Cf. I. M. Crombie, "The Possibility of Theological Statements," Faith and Logic. Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology, B. Mitchell, ed., (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), pp. 48ff.

2 Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases, (London:SCM, 1957), p. 11.

empiricism can be developed so as to provide a novel inroad into the problems and controversies of theology. The controlling theme for Ramsey is that of "discernment-commitment," the kind of situation characteristic of religion. He opines that religious language possesses the characteristics both of impropriety and intelligibility. Language is inadequate to express completely any reality, whether it be God, worship, experience, or the Word of God. At best the stories contained in the Bible, and the explanations offered for clarification present only some qualifiers and models which are both adequate and inadequate, dependent upon the knower. I. e., any given approach may be readily acceptable to some, while others are quite impervious to that approach. The positivistic approaches reflect the scientific bias evident in the approach of historical criticism, which bias prevents the approach from being as intelligible as necessary. Ramsey points out that no attempt to make the language of the Bible conform to a precise straight-forward public language has ever succeeded (pp. 106f.). He suggests that inasmuch as the biblical situations are experiential in nature one should combine an empirical linguistic approach with the language which has been molded, if not created, out of the religious experience. Some experiences can be described and evaluated better upon observation than others. Whether in assessing and describing experience or in the process of communication, religious language faces the complexities of adequacy of expression, the nature (if

observable) of the reality, the conditions of the knower and the methodology employed. These factors both conceal and reveal elements of reality, the mystery always challenging and the knowable constantly changing. Ramsey's research has illuminated a direction which offers some possibility of accomplishment. He is to be commended for his clairvoyant treatment of the limitations of an empirical approach only, and to be encouraged in his efforts of evaluating the descriptions of religious situations. The "discernment-commitment" position is both positive and ambiguous, and one is puzzled as to whether "discernment" precedes "commitment" or vice versa.

Stephen Ullmann[1] contends that language is a vehicle of communication which must maintain some minimum standards of intelligibility, clarity and consistency (p. 14). In the eighteenth century a strongly normative bias toward language developed, only to be challenged through the new science of comparative philology in the nineteenth century which presented an historical orientation. In this century the reciprocity between psychologists and philologists has contributed significantly to our understanding of the function of language (pp. 16ff.). Ullmann follows Saussure's[2] distinction between the synchronistic or descriptive (concerned with systems) and the diachronistic or historical

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1 The Principles of Semantics (2nd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).

2 Cours de Linguistigne générale, (4th ed., Paris, 1949).

approach which concerns itself with single events. Within the synchronistic system, the context theory of the relationship of certain entities has become perhaps the most influential single factor in the growth of twentieth-century semantics (pp. 60ff.). The shift of any element (e.g., syntax, standards of style, etymology, etc.) in the semantic field causes a new and fresh arrangement, while the multiple meaning of words retains some essential continuity. Whereas synchronistic semantics revolves around the semantic relationship, single or multiple, diachronistic semantics is concerned with semantic change. A semantic change occurs every time a new name becomes attached to a sense or vice versa (p. 171). The change may be conscious or unconscious; a moral may retain one sense and acquire additional ones; its order of change might well be gradual and dissimilar as well as regular (pp. 174ff.). To classify such changes is a highly complex and controversial task, but Ullmann undertakes the arduous responsibility. He concludes his work with an analysis of general semantics (panchronism), founded upon the empirically expansive milieu of the present century.[1] Although he has a decided

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1 The leader of general semantics in America is generally acceded to be the Polish mathematician, A. Korzybski, who, with his Science and Sanity in 1933, pointed out numerous fallacies in the use of abstractions, emphasizing the possibility of countless enumerations. Among his disciples is Hayakawa, whose Language in Action produced considerable stimulation originally.

preference for Wittgenstein's "operational" approach ("the meaning of a word is its use"), he concludes that most semanticists are historians rather than descriptionists because of their training, inclination and application.

Ullmann has attempted to give both an historical development and functional definition of semantics, primarily from the linguistic approach to the problems of language. While recognizing the legitimacy of the approaches of psychology, epistemology, logic and science, he contends that linguistics as the study of language as an empirical fact is also valid. Drawing upon an amazing array of sources, the author analyzes the contributors and movements of the linguistic approach, concluding that the diachronistic bias has been predominant in recent years. The exceedingly complex problem of the relationship between semantics and linguistics has not been resolved, even with his weighty volume. A purely linguistic approach may not be able to take into account the significance of change of meanings; it may be limited only to the formal aspects of syntax. Again, the moot question in philosophy regarding relative merits of logic and language is still contestable. Language may be logical, but, inasmuch as it is a cultural phenomenon evident in crisis periods[1] as well as a communicative device, it may well produce systems which defy logic and remain a

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1 Cf. W. M. Urban, Language and Reality; The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of Symbolism, (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1939), pp. 22ff.

legitimate enterprise.[1]

Jules L. Moreau, in Language and Religious Language,[2] is concerned with the problems involved in translating religious truth from one culture or context to another through the medium of language. He contends that both the strength and weakness of language is the plurality of meanings attached to many words and phrases (p. 88). He rejects logical empiricism as the valid technique of evaluation because it is static if not mechanistic in its categories of definition. Moreau interprets the writers in the Bible as having given their own peculiar mythic interpretation of the events which they describe. Both the Old Testament and the New Testament assume a mythic stance peculiar to each, yet not dissimilar from contemporary expressions. In the myth of creation and the myth of the eschaton, both God and Christ, respectively, are depicted in terms of history and time without primary reference to temporal categories. The language of the Testaments is a reflective interpretation by writers to the significance of certain events. Neither deductive nor inductive reasoning is

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1 Cf. R. M. Estrich and Hans Sperber, Three Keys To Language, who manifest a psychologically-oriented evaluation of language. They attest, with myriads of examples, that every language has its history, not only of meanings and changes in meanings, but also it is tied to the cultural conditions which produced the situations which created the changes (pp. 337ff.). H. Kronasser's Handbuch der Semasiologie (Heidelberg, 1952), also reflects this psychological background of semantic changes, presented basically with a diachronistic slant.

2 Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961.

capable of coping with these events expressed as "singular" propositions, e.g., "they were in the wilderness forty years" (p. 135). And tautological statements, by definition, are unable to add new knowledge to the proposition. Moreau maintains that language best shows rather than says something in discursive fashion. The Christian message has its own myth which can best be expressed by the combination of process philosophy and existentialism, nurtured by linguistic analysis, on the one hand, and by the philosophy of symbolic forms, on the other. The teachings of the Church must be expressed for the Church and to the secular world. "Emergence" in process philosophy and the "self" in existentialism, sharply focused by linguistic studies, provide the philosophical milieu of our day to which we must speak, and the representations of reality as seen in the Bible is the content to be propagated.

Moreau's approach is timely and provocative, if not essential. He has shown that the historical processes of evaluating religious experiences are valid, and the significance to be found in the evaluation must be re-translated to every age. He has demonstrated effectively that the realities portrayed by religious language are not only religious realities described by language but, more importantly, a creation of a language of religion has occurred experientially. The ferment which produced a religious vocabulary may be re-activated in another age and culture with the concomitant necessity of another translation by

the Church to the world of that day.

Not unlike Moreau in approach, S. Laeuchli has evaluated the semantic dilemma of the Early Church in The Language of Faith.[1] In three major chapters, "Gnostic Language," "The Language of Post-Apostolic Christianity," and "The Language of Christian Theology," as well as an insightful epilogue, "The Language of Faith," Laeuchli concerns himself primarily with the second century of the Christian era. Constantly emphasizing the relational rather than the metaphysical nature of language, the author dramatizes the tension between the canonical and contemporary expressions - both expressions demanded in every age. Where Moreau leans heavily upon symbolic or mythical structure, Laeuchli emphasizes caution against symbolism which dehydrates the realism of the authors. He insists that the language of God and of man is to express man in communication with God (p. 89). Without reverting to a biblicism of words, the author asserts the need of a language which describes encounter and relationship realistically. The language of faith is the language within that community of faith, creating and being created constantly. It ". . . contains an eschatological tension; it describes the immediacy of the kingdom that has already come with Christ. . ." (p. 231). Laeuchli, as Ramsey and Moreau, illustrates the inability of religious experience to engage

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1 Nashville: Abingdon, 1962.

experientially apart from a vocabulary befitting the experience. Religious relationships can be verified with an appropriate methodology which seeks to ascertain both the reality and its description. Although the language of faith cannot produce the object of its faith, it can provide qualifiers and models by which one may relate to that reality. Speech is an art-form, uttered in beauty and imagination, whereby man truly becomes man (p. 231).

The relationship of contemporary linguistic philosophy to theological discourse has been aptly discussed by F. Ferré in his summary evaluation of the various attempts to describe this relationship.[1] Alternately stating the strengths and weaknesses of the logical systems of verificational analysis, functional analysis, analogy, obedience, encounter (existentialism) and theism, Ferré punctuates his arrangement with various discussions on "theological discourse." Acknowledging the precise articulation possibilities of verificational analysis, he finds it too restrictive toward theistic concerns. Functional analysis focuses attention on the meaning of language derived from its use. The logic of analogy is effective in relating two disparate analogates, but is deficient in the determination of the meaning or equation of the analogates. The logic of obedience provides a functional linguistic vocabulary for discourse, but is hampered by its obvious inarticulateness

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1 Language, Logic and God, (New York: Harper, 1961).

of "objectivity." The logic of encounter guarantees an experiential foundation, but the nature of encounter and its descriptive symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Language purports to signify a "fact" of some kind, a state of affairs, or "something is the case" ("signification-situation," p. 146). Three unavoidable factors always present are syntax, interpretation and semantics. Inextricably related, any separate one of them would be an abstraction. The language of a living religious faith must be judged by internal language-norms (p. 151), display the bi-polarity of the effect language has on its user as well as the circumstances under which one uses the language (pp. 155ff.), and reflect the nature of "metaphysical facts" in its definition of reality (pp. 160ff.). Ferré concludes that the validity of theological language can best be expressed in terms of a metaphysical system based on a conceptual synthesis, i. e., a consistent and coherent scheme capable of illuminating some (practically) or all (theoretically) experience without distortion.[1] Theological language on its semantic dimension functions as metaphysical language, Ferré asserts. It projects a model (Jesus Christ in Christianity, and God in systematic

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1 Pp. 162ff.; cf., for example, the current debate as expressed in JSSR, I(October, 1961)1, 42-60, where Paul Holmer distinguishes between "language of religion" and "language about religion"; ibid., II(Fall 1962)1, 18-24, where Binkley defends religious language as having more than an emotive and nonsensical use, and Hick's rejoinder that religious language should have a metaphysical use in order to ascertain its cognitive or non-cognitive character.

theology) of immense responsive significance, drawn from the "facts" (conceptual entities within our own sense-experience of whatever day), as the key to its conceptual synthesis. Such a notion of reality deems that the metaphysical models of personal activity will best survive any demanded tests (pp. 163f.).

It is evident that the philosophical interest in language has shifted from a purely empirical approach to a conceptual or metaphysical stance within the decadent postivistic framework. In the reshaping of methodologies used to evaluate reality and statements regarding that reality, it has become apparent that most methodologies suffer from the tendency to safeguard self-interests. Irreducible, however, is the consistent demand for the truth or falsity of any assertion made of any element of reality. This demand has produced an interest - here deemed necessary - in matters of syntax (the formal relation of signs to each other), interpretation (the effect of the user of the signs to those signs actively and passively), and semantics (the contextual definition of the signs). The balance of these three criteria of evaluation is delicate, as indicated in the evaluations of the efforts made in the study of language. Philosophical interests have been predominantly concerned with the formal relationships, with an awakening to symbolic interpretation. Theological pursuits have concentrated in the area of

interpretation and logic, with the evident purpose of eliciting meanings and arranging them systematically. Semantics, until recently,[1] has been neglected both in matters philosophical and theological.

The above survey has been noticeably devoid of any interest in biblical semantics, with the possible exception of Moreau's work. The most important work in biblical semantics is that of J. Barr, Semantics of Biblical Language.[2] As the title suggests, Barr has written not to discuss . . . the relation of religious

> thought generally to religious language, but the question whether there is a relation between the religious structures found to exist within one particular linguistic group and the linguistic structure of the language of that group; and further, the question of whether and how the transference of religious structures and thoughts to another linguistic group is affected by the change of linguistic structure involved in the use of a new language (p. 1).

The author is not concerned with postulating a philosophy concerning the possibilities of religious language, but on the contrary, he seeks to examine materials which are already on deposit in order to evaluate the ". . . the meaning of expressions which have actually been used" (p. 1). In his broad interest of how translation [illegible]

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1 Cf., however, Glatstein's reference to Augustine's de Magistro in his brief article on "Semantics, Too, Has a Past," QJS, XXXII(February 1946)1, 48-51.

2 Cf. also his Biblical Words For Time (Studies in Biblical Theology #33, 1962).

and transculturation take place, Barr begins from the accepted premises of the movement of Biblical Theology that there is a weighty, albeit controversial, contrast between the Israelites and the Greeks, and that the Bible is understood as a unity (pp. 4f.). A major part of the book is negative in character, reflecting Barr's concern about both the lack of careful distinction made between Israelite thought and that of the Semitic mind in general, and about the excessive emphasis placed on the contrast between Hebrew and Greek thought allegedly inherent in the linguistic features of each group. The authors of several articles in Kittel's Wörterbuch and T. Boman in Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek[1] have been the chief goads for Barr's deictic labors.[2] Barr effectively illustrates the prevalent tendency of many to place undue stress upon the unique character of Hebrew vocabulary stocks as opposed to the intrinsic features of Greek linguistic patterns by his insistence against any selective analysis which supports the disparities. That is to say, it is difficult to determine the "normative" Greek patterns inasmuch as certain periods of Greek life are different from others. And the

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1 Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen, (2nd ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954; E.T., SCM Press, Ltd., 1960).

2 C. Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, 1960, discusses quite capably many important features of the relationship of biblical materials to their alleged sources, with particular emphasis upon the Hebrew influences in creation and history. Primarily a conceptual study, which reflects interest in the way creation is described, it avoids most

Old Testament structures represent a given period of life within the Semitic world which also had its distinctive as well as syncretistic features. More specifically, Barr has shown - and that rather conclusively - that the key to understanding biblical materials is not the word or words studied in isolation, but, on the contrary, the words studied in relationship, i.e., the sentence (pp. 233, 249f.). Words in isolation, whether selected at random or with some sense of unity, cannot connote the essential meaning of the author.[1] Linguistic studies (for example, syntax, etymology, philology, etc.), must be mastered and employed as tools for the study of the word-combination or sentence in quests for theological considerations. Barr's contribution on linguistic analysis needs to be balanced with an emphasis as in Laeuchli who illustrates both the active and passive features of a language in use, which features make difficult a precise analysis of any linguistic expression.

It is evident that the philosophical and linguistic interests in language have much to say to one another. We have been warned against the improper modus operandi which seeks to appropriate a thought structure from features in its linguistic structure. We are now aware that most -

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of the tension evident in the Wörterbuch and Boman, and occasionally in Barr.

1 Cf. also the two concluding chapters in his Biblical Words For Time.

if not all - methods devised to evaluate the significance of assertions and statements have serious fallacies inherent tautologically. We know that a difference exists between the efforts of describing elements of reality and the reality per se, even though this is often confused by the technique of hypostatization. We visualize the inadequacy of any pursuit calculated to assist in deriving the meaning out of linguistic structures in themselves. It becomes clear that serious attention must be focused upon the way in which reality is presented before the meaning of the statements concerning reality can be ascertained.

The formal relationship of syntax, its necessitating corollary of interpreting the relationship of the words, and the meaning and changes in the meanings of words will occupy most of the investigation. Psychological, logical and epistemological references will be made when appropriate, especially when particular attention is focused upon the pattern of Paul's thought. Wittgenstein's operational theory that the use of language suggests its own meaning will be, in general, accepted, although without the full import of the empiricism which was his heritage. That is to say, there is a valid religious language which cannot be dismissed as merely emotive or tendential in nature. The language used to describe religious ideas may be expected to conform, more or less, to the criteria utilized when evaluating language describing any other reality. But the language of religion - inventory of words, idioms,

phrases and clauses which are an inextricable part of the religious genre - by its very use changes the semantic field and requires a somewhat different set of measures.

Semantics is not yet an exact science. The philosophical type is characterized by a logic and symbolism that is different from the linguistic type. Semantics is being defined and re-defined according to the approaches undertaken in the evaluation of the use of language. The above-named philosophers, theologians and biblical scholars who have taken special interest in the meaning of words have emphasized the distinction between the apparent logical form of the proposition and the real form of the object. With intensity they have argued, on the one hand, for an openness in the study of language, suggesting that there are too many imponderables to be considered in the use of any word to arrive at an exactitude of the meaning of that word, and, on the other hand, they have presented their brief for a rigid and mechanical use of words which would only be appropriate for clarifying the proposition regarding any reality. The former approach allows for the possibility that any given proposition may contain in itself a facet of the reality being described, whereas the latter denies any such possibility. The difference lies substantially in the degree of acceptance of empiricism as the controlling factor inasmuch as the empirical aspect is inescapable in any analysis of language.

Cassirer has shown well that linguistic structures are by no means merely formal. They change from place to place and age to age, the attributive characteristic giving way to the operational. Symbols have a way of revealing and obscuring at the same time. They have a tendency to equate the concept with the reality, but, at the same time, they emphasize the form of the concept. The attraction to hypostatization may not necessarily eventuate into a complete identification of form and reality; it may also provide a framework of models and qualifiers by which one is guided in one's interpretation of the linguistic structure and that toward which it points.

It seems, to the investigator, that any linguistic pattern is of necessity inadequate to express completely any reality. This is particularly true with biblical language. There is a sense in which biblical language is transcendent. The biblical writers were concerned to show how God acts, not a description of who he is. The language which they employ is calculated not to portray the essential character of the language and its possibilities per se, but to indicate their stance in relationship to God. Paul, no less than any other writer, accommodated himself to this approach. He used the language of the common people, a language familiar to most of his contemporaries, and he chose linguistic features which would suggest specific thoughts regarding God and, in particular, Jesus Christ. His asser-

tions and affirmations betrayed the fact that there was nothing sacred about his language, despite the controversy between the Hebraists and the Purists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That controversy has been rendered obsolete by Deissmann, although he himself neglected the influences of the Septuagint and the Christian community upon the translation and use of the terms.

A purely linguistic approach (i.e., grammatico-historical) may be inadequate in a study of biblical language because it often neglects the transcendental feature of pointing beyond the linguistic structure itself to the reality being depicted. It neglects to take into account the possibility of a significant change of the meaning of that structure. Paul regularly presents Jesus the Christ in terms appropriate for many groups who were not disposed either religiously or as Christians. Yet he gives a reflective interpretation of the significance of certain events - at the risk of changing the Sitz im Leben of the paradosis or being misunderstood by his contemporaries. At the outset this involves the possibility of using linguistic structures to denote religious experience and the creation of a language of faith, i.e., the formation by usage of a technical religious vocabulary.

A semantic study of Paul's writings must proceed by way of exegesis. Although it is a study in linguistics, it cannot be a study only in a syntactical evaluation of the linguistic structures, nor should it be merely an effort to find out what terms the Apostle uses. One must evaluate

the categories in their setting, and look beyond them to the realities to which they point. This implies that, although the linguistic patterns are all we have from Paul, we must neither equate the truth with their forms, on the one hand, nor disregard his writings as being of no particular value, on the other.

III TOTALITY IN PAUL: ONTOLOGY

The ontology of the Bible is complex. A mere study of יָהָוָה and εἶναι , for example, would not sufficiently reveal the nature of being and existence as expressed by the biblical writers. The authors focus primary attention upon God as the source of all being - the Ultimate in whom being is grounded and defined. Rather than engage in a study of Paul's use of εἶναι , an exegetical study which seeks to understand the meaning not of biblical ideas but of basic words which portray the meaning of ontology is necessary.

This aspect of biblical reality described as ontology does not concern itself with a set of optional possibilities by which one comes to know the nature and meaning of being. Modern efforts to define authentic existence by an understanding of the self are inadequate because they fail to grant any true objectivity outside the self. Ontology in Paul is presented in at least three specific relationships which give serious attention to the objectivity of being. Although other insights could be presented if time and space permitted, the following observations give a fair and adequate presentation of the Apostle's concern regarding the meaning of being.

There is a tendency to say that the ontological material in Paul is not very important. This is, no

doubt, true because of the emphasis of Christ and his soteriological activity throughout the Pauline corpus. This in itself, however, does not obviate the framework within which the Apostle describes the significance of Jesus Christ. It appears that he is quite interested in the structure of this world, and the ministry of the Redeemer is couched within the structure of a cosmos which originates in and is sustained by God. The dimension of reality is defined in the affirmation that all true or authentic existence proceeds from a personal God.

The Apostle registers his concern about the ontological structure of the relationship between God and the cosmos by interpreting God as the Creator or Originator in whom everything exists. In 1 Corinthians 8:6 (ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ) he asserts that there is really only one God the Father and one lord Jesus Christ for the Christian as over against many other gods and lords (καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ εἰσὶν λεγόμενοι θεοὶ εἴτε ἐν οὐρανῷ εἴτε ἐπὶ γῆς, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί 1 Cor. 8:5). This distinction seems to be a theoretical concession to polytheism which is quite

contrary to the sense of 8:4 (καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς). Héring[1] points out that the employment of θεοί to refer to beings other than the Creator is unusual in Christianity, and distinctively Pauline and traceable to the influence of Jewish angelology.[2] He interprets Paul as denying the existence of pagan gods, but admitted the reality of angelic powers which are not to be worshipped, irrespective of any name(s) given to them.[3]

The two parallel statements with three phrases each in 8:6[4] compare and contrast the technically theological and christological affirmations:

εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ		ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός
ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα	καὶ	δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα
καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν		καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ

The reference to the one God, whose name is ὁ πατήρ as in the Gospel tradition[5] reminds one of the expression found in Deut. 6:4:

יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד׃

κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν κύριος εἷς ἐστιν. Both the

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1 The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, (London: Epworth, 1962), pp. 68f.

2 Cf. the Hebrew texts of Psalms 81(82):1, 97:7, 138:1, and Clement of Alexandria's reference in Stromata, V.xi.77, where angels are called lords.

3 Op. cit., p. 69.

4 Cf. J. Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, p. 223.

5 Cf. also Rom. 8:15, Gal. 3:26, 4:6.

Deuteronomist and Paul assert that their lord is one and his name is Yahweh.

Stauffer[1] has commented that "εἷς ist im NT nur selten als alltägliches Zahlwort gebraucht (zB 2 P 3:8), meist bedeutet es einzig, einmalig, einzigartig oder alleingültig, auch einheitlich, einstimmung, und wiederum einer von zweien oder vielen (cf. Mk. 14:10 ὁ εἷς τῶν δώδεκα), nur einer" [italics]. The theological sense, he further observes is defined in the frequent formula of εἷς θεός as proclaimed in Deut. 6:4. There is no God except him (Mk. 12:29, 32). In his detailed study of the εἷς θεός formula from the slant of an epigraphical, form critical, and comparative religions approach, Erik Peterson observes "die εἷς θεός - formel ist akklamation, aber nicht Glaubensbekenntnis."[2] It consistently appears in the syncretistic milieu of pre-Christian and Christian eras. To the Christians it referred to Yahweh and him alone.

The affirmation that God is one for us and we exist for him (ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς θεός . . . καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν) is set in parallelism in the second phrase. As Stauffer indicates[3] in the one God is found the origin and goal of the world, and in Christ the history (Geschichte) and holy history (Heilsgeschichte) for the purpose of unity. The Early Church accentuated neither the individualistic nor

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1 "εἷς," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, referred to as TWNT hereafter, II, p. 432.

2 ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΣ, 1926, p. 302.

3 Ibid.

the collectivistic aspects of its life, but the organic. The will of God was not judged out of the particular individual or the mass as such, but out of the determined and determining member of a communally unified group (Gruppeneinheit) - of the homes, the folk, mankind, creation (Rom. 8:19ff.). The one and the many - the lead principle of organic thought - are bound inextricably together. "Der Eine wird nicht nur "bekehrt" oder "gerettet" um seiner selbst willen; er wird berufen um der Vielen willen."[1] This is explicated in the New Testament primarily in Adam-Christ typology[2] and in the destiny of mankind - unity of the Church discussion.[3] More than a representation of organic thought is involved. In the oneness of God are the many. The fact of creation finds both its idea and expression in him.

The phrase ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα raises many problems. Philosophically speaking,[4] it could denote a type of

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1 Ibid., 433, Gal 1:15ff., 1 Cor 15:9f.

2 Infra, Chapter VI.

3 Infra, Chapter VII.

4 Cf. Philo de cherubim, paragraph 125 πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τινος γένεσιν πολλὰ δεῖ συνελθεῖν· τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τὸ ἐξ οὗ, τὸ δι' οὗ, τὸ δι' ὅ. καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὑφ' οὗ, τὸ αἴτιον, ἐξ οὗ δὲ ἡ ὕλη, δι' οὗ δὲ τὸ ἐργαλεῖον, δι' ὃ δὲ ἡ αἰτία
. . . . paragraph 127 εὑρήσεις γὰρ αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεὸν ὑφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ὕλην δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν συνεκράθη, ὄργανον δὲ λόγον θεοῦ δι' οὗ κατεσκευάσθη, τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς αἰτίαν τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιούργου.
cf. de providentia, paragraph 23. Die stoische Lehre Diog.

emanation in creation consistent with the Hellenistic religious categories of the first two centuries of the Christian era. From another vantage point, the phrase could be interpreted as an epistemological idea of the absoluteness of God. Traditionally since the days of scholasticism, the propositional affirmations about the absoluteness of God have followed this pattern. It seems possible, however, to interpret the phrase yet another way in the notion of God being the source or origin of creation so that ἐκ points out an ontological relationship. This means that out of God himself all that is has come into being; he is the originator of all things.

This in itself poses problems as to the methodology of creation. Preciseness is lacking in the accounts in Genesis and the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament, on the one hand, and in the Greek concepts of creation, on the other. In Gen. 1:1-2 (בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים
אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ. וְהָאָרֶץ הָיְתָה תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ
וְחֹשֶׁךְ עַל־פְּנֵי תְהוֹם וְרוּחַ אֱלֹהִים מְרַחֶפֶת עַל־פְּנֵי הַמָּיִם.
Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν
ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα
Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος.), the writer records the

Laërt. VII.134 δοκεῖ δ'αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν Θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀίδιον διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Weiss, op. cit., p. 224, note 1.

creation of the cosmos out of the formless pre-existent matter. Yet, in the Wisdom of Solomon 9:1

(θεὲ πατέρων καὶ κύριε τοῦ ἐλέους
ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ σου)

and in Psalm 33(32):6

(בִּדְבַר יְהוָה שָׁמַיִם נַעֲשׂוּ וּבְרוּחַ פִּיו כָּל־צְבָאָם)

τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν
καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν),

and also in verse 9 of the psalm

(כִּי הוּא אָמַר וַיֶּהִי הוּא־צִוָּה וַיַּעֲמֹד)

ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶπεν, καὶ ἐγενήθησαν,
αὐτὸς ἐνετείλατο, καὶ ἐκτίσθησαν),

the idea of creatio ex nihilo seems to be presented,[1] which is, more or less, the accepted statement of creatio ex nihilo in classical Christianity.[2] Creation out of formless pre-existent matter, on the one hand, and creation out of nothingness, on the other, suggest a lack of clarity, if not ambivalence, on this matter. But it must be remembered, that these writers were hardly speculative concerning the objectifiable matters of creation. Their primary interest lay in the direction of articulating the divine origin of all reality rather than the schedule or operation of the process.

The ontological relationship of ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα

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1 This may also be seen in John 1:3 (πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν.)

2 Cf. Heb. 11:3.

is paralleled in the Jewish Kabbalah,[1] where it is stated that God created the universe by taking from himself all the elements of creation, which are expressed in the Sephiroth, emanations of himself (the En Soph). Héring[2] sees such a parallel as helpful, in that it would indicate, on the one hand, ". . . an active creation brought about by the wisdom and will of God and not by some simple quasi-natural process," and, "on the other, creatures receive a measure of independence irreconcilable with emanationism, but such as is presupposed by both Jewish and Christian doctrines of the world." His comments are intriguing, but the somewhat non-personalistic emanations from God are, although not dualistic in nature, closely paralleled to Gnostic thought and perhaps related to classical Greek thought on the notion of the creation of the cosmos.[3] There is no doubt that the biblical literature presents God as the Creator of this world and that Paul stands solidly within this tradition; the differences lie in the details.

The presentation is somewhat different in Greek

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1 Cf. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, (New ed.; New York: Schocken Books, 1946), pp. 12ff.; C. D. Ginsburg, The Essenes; The Kabbalah, (2nd ed.; London: Routledge & Paul, 1955), pp. 102ff.

2 Op. cit., p. 70.

3 Cf. Weiss, op. cit., p. 224; note, however, Bultmann's discussion of this verse in "Faith in God the Creator," Existence and Faith, S. Ogden, ed., pp. 171-182, where the whole creation is seen as "nothingness" in contrast to the Creator.

literature. Plato places on the lips of Cratylus[1] the idea that the earliest gods were the elements of sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky - all moving and running in their courses, becoming known as gods because of their running nature. This Homeric type of presentation of irresponsible and arbitrary gods, for example, who chose sides, some for the Greeks and others for the Trojans (Iliad, I), was little more than the carefully reasoned out ultimate cause or the chief of a Pantheon. Zeus was subject to every kind of human weakness, instability, and vulnerability common to the weakest man.

Between the days of Homer and Plato, the Greek gods became more responsible than the Olympian gods. They became representatives and patrons of man's social institutions, especially the city-state, and the virtues they require. They were regarded as the spiritual forces of moderation and purpose, order, law and beauty. In short, the deity represents and personifies the city.[2]

The universe cannot be the object of pure thought nor scientifically investigated. The true must be distinguished from the likely or probable. Plato's theory of ideas is the affirmation that every abstract general notion of the human mind is also, in some fashion and place, made to

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1 15-16. 397C-D; all references are from the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise indicated.

2 Cf. Plato, Apology, 26C.

be an objective entity outside the mind. The most important and well-known images which symbolize the concept of "good" (τὸ ἀγαθόν) are those of the sun and the cave (Republic, 508A-509B). The idea of good is portrayed as the ideal of social nature in the Republic, and as a teleological principle in the Timaeus (47B-C). The true being (οὐσία) of the Universe which neither comes into being nor passes away is discernible only in the sensible world (Republic, X, 596A-C).

The cosmos came into existence, for it was visible and tangible, and had the definite structure of a body (Timaeus, 28B; Gorgias, 507e-508a). It was a sensible being, and could be apprehended by sensations. The cosmos was a well-ordered and harmonious whole, beautiful, good and rational, coming into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul (ἔμψυχον) and reason (ἔννουν) due to the providence of God (Timaeus 29E-30C). The Living Creature embraces and contains all the intelligible living creatures (νοήτα ζῷα), just as this cosmos contains both us and all the other visible living creatures (ὁρατά) he [God] has brought into existence.[1] The latter or sensible world proceeds from the intelligible through "imitation"; the former shadows the latter. The true being is seen in the general specificity of the tangible cosmos of becoming. But that which becomes - has come into existence - is never to be understood as that which

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1 Ibid., 30C-D.

really is.

Plato and Aristotle assumed the duality of matter and reason in the creation of the world. The four basic elements of fire, water, air, and earth constituted the wholeness out of which the cosmos was created. The constructor (ὁ ξυνιστάς) or demiurge left out no part of any of the elements, with the intent that the cosmos might be

> a Living Creature, perfect and whole, with all its parts perfect; and next, that it might be One, inasmuch as there was nothing left over out of which another like Creature might come into existence; and further, that it might be secure from age and ailment, since He perceived that when heat and cold, and all things which have violent potencies, surround a composite body from without and collide with it they dissolve it unduly and make it to waste away by bringing upon it ailments and age. Wherefore, because of this reasoning, He fashioned it to be One single whole, compounded of all wholes, perfect and ageless and unailing (Timaeus, 32C-33a).

Plato here follows Anaxagoras in believing that the mind (νοῦς) is separate from matter and acts upon it. The demiurge is not a creator; he imposes order and system on the pre-existing chaos.[1] He works through intermediaries rather than as a direct agent to effect his primary task of constructing the World-Soul. Plato went beyond Anaxagoras in establishing upon this separation a universal distinction between the real and the phenomenal. God, the divine power mythologically described, was regarded as being outside the

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1 Aristotle, On the Heavens, III.ii.300b17ff., disagrees with Plato's assertion that the elements were in disorderly motion before the creation. Nevertheless, he, too, maintains that there was pre-existence before creation, even if it were enforced or natural.

world, and the world was in its origin only potential being (τὸ μὴ ὄν). The action of God upon the world was that of a craftsman, shaping or molding the existing parts. These operations were marked by a rational purpose; indeed, the demiurge seems to be an intelligence, and the ideas are objects of intelligence.[1]

This notion of the World-Soul co-existing with Being who exercised his judgment and action upon the pre-existent chaos seems to be a more speculative generalization about creation than found in some portions of the Old Testament. Perhaps, the most distinctive difference lies in the somewhat impersonal Greek presentation as over against the personal relationship implied and stated in the biblical accounts.

In Romans 11:36a (ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα), which has no Old Testament parallel, Paul concludes his section on the relationship of the Jews and Gentiles to the Church with an affirmation that God is the source, the primary agent[2] and the goal of all his creation.[3] Despite the general agreement of 1 Cor.

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1 It appears that reason is a species of soul, or a part of soul (Republic, IV, 435Eff.). The extremities of the cosmos were interwoven to its center for the purposes of duration and intelligence (Timaeus, 36E).

2 As contrasted with the intermediary agent of Christ in 1 Cor. 8:6; cf. Heb. 2:10 . . . δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα καὶ δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα . . .).

3 Cf. 1 Cor. 12:6b ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεὸς ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ; Eph. 4:6 εἷς θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ; compare the references taken from the Index of W. Kranz on the Pre-Socratics, 2 473, presented in Norden, op. cit., p. 242, note 2.

8:6, Rom. 11:36a, 1 Cor. 12:6b and Eph. 4:6, the disparity between the agents of creation should guard us against dogmatic schematization, as Lietzmann[1] helpfully points out. While there is probably no serious sense of conflict in Paul's thought at this point, i. e., God manifested himself through Christ, nevertheless, his option of explanations to various folk and their Sitz im Leben suggests that the basic framework of the reality of creation stems from his understanding that God is the Creator of the universe. The oneness of reality lies in the relationship of God and the universe, not in the universe itself which cannot explain its own existence. For Paul, the universe is always object and never subject; the totality of all existence comes from God, ultimately or specifically.

To pose the possibility that God created the world out of himself, i.e., that he is the source of all being, is not the same as affirming that man partakes of the divine in creation. The Apostle seems to indicate at all points that the human never takes on the quality of the divine. Although Paul accommodated himself to the religious categories of his day, this in itself does not imply the transfer of ὕλη or deity to those categories. The world created by God is distinct from him, and Jesus Christ assumes the role in Paul of a revealor of God who also redeems (in contradistinction to the Heavenly Revealer as seen in the

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1 An die Korinther I-II, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament (HBNT hereafter),9 (Tübingen:J.C.B. Mohr, 1931), p. 37.

Gospel of Truth). God is completely beyond and other than man, and yet, paradoxically, personal and knowable.

In the second place, Paul shows an awareness of the structure of this world in the way he describes God becoming known in the world. There can be little doubt that the Old Testament contains a consistent manifestation of a God who is interested and acts in his world. Doubt does arise, however, when the Old Testament picture is presented as being the "normative" or "general" Hebrew caricature, or when the linguistic stocks transporting the thought are found to be inherently dynamic and not static.[1] Comparisons with Plato and Aristotle, for example, are quite easy to make, but at least two problems appear. 1)Although the finest age in Greece is represented in Plato and Aristotle, it is by no means representative of all Greek periods. To make a valid comparison one should a)assume that the Old Testament is the best representative of Hebrew thought, and b)select the best of the Old Testament commensurate both in time and content with that of Plato and Aristotle. 2)The other bothersome factor for our study is the chronological disparity between Paul and the Hebrew-Greek comparisons of earlier centuries, the complexity of both Greek and Hebrew thought from the second century B. C. to the second

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1 Boman, (op. cit., pp. 27-73), attempts to show that essentially the Hebrew framework of thinking and its language, to some degree, is dynamic as opposed to the static quality of Greek thought. But, see Barr's (op. cit., passim, especially pp. 46-88) protestations against such an employment of language.

century in the Christian era, and the ambiguous possibilities of Paul's sources which often employ the same vocabulary stocks.

Perhaps, the way to get behind these difficulties is that of examining the way God makes himself known to his world. In Romans 1:20 (τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους), Paul attests that God has been disclosing himself in the created order, and it is now man's responsibility to respond. In subsequent verses (1:21ff.) it is stated that much of mankind has rejected God[1] in its inability to understand its relationship to the Creator. It is instructive to notice that "his eternal power and deity" is the way in which τὰ . . . ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ have been seen. In Col. 1:16 (. . . τὰ πάντα ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, εἴτε θρόνοι εἴτε κυριότητες εἴτε ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἐξουσίαι) the Hebraic "heaven and earth" and Greek "visible and invisible," parenthetical idiomatic expressions for the entirety of creation, are defined in the categories of "thrones, dominions, principalities and powers."[2] As Beare[3] has observed, these terms are borrowed

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1 Cf., e. g., Hooker, "Adam in Romans i," NTS, 6(July 1960)4, 297-306.

2 Cf. Eph. 1:21.

3 The Interpreter's Bible, XI, pp. 165f.

from the Oriental astrological theosophy of Iranian and Babylonian origins. He interprets Paul as appropriating the terms from his opponents and applying them to some type of supernatural potentates. However, C. F. D. Moule[1] follows Bishop Lightfoot and suggests that the reference probably refers to the occupants of the thrones which, in apocalyptic imagery, surround the throne of God. Both Beare and Moule see an intrinsic relationship between Paul's use of the terms and their alleged Hebraic-Iranian parallels.[2] The more important concern, however, is not their source but their semantic function of portraying cosmic features which do not transcend this world.

H. Schlier[3] interprets the principalities and powers in the New Testament as being variously described,[4] but

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1 The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, pp. 65f.

2 The terms are used popularly both in the canonical and non-canonical writings. For example, Ethiopic Enoch 41:9 ("angel," "power"), 61:10 ("all the angels of power," "all the angels of principalities"); Slavonic Enoch 20:1 ("dominions," "governments," "thrones," etc., in the seventh heaven); Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Levi 3:8 (θρόνοι, ἐξουσίαι); Ascension of Isaiah 7:21 (ἄγγελοι, ἀρχάγγελοι, κυριότητες, θρόνοι); Acts of John 79, 98, 104, 114). Also the commentators have used the terms in the same sense: Origen (de Principia, 1.5.3, 1.6.2); Ephrem Syrus (Opera (Rome, 1937), i, p. 270 (on Deut. 1:13); Basil of Seleucia (Orat. 39:207); Theodoret, in loco, and several of the Fathers, interpret θρόνοι as the cherubim (or winged, gryphon-like creatures which supported God's throne in Eze. 1), and the κυριότητες, ἀρχαί, and ἐξουσίαι as the guardian angels of the nations (cf. Dan. 10:13, 20).

3 Principalities and Powers in the New Testament, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961).

4 E. g., ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι, δυνάμεις, κυριότητες, θρόνοι, ὀνόματα, ἄρχοντες, ἄγγελοι, κύριοι, στοιχεῖα, δυνάμεις, βουλή, etc.

reflecting substantially the same reality. That is to say, these terms refer to personal and hidden powers which pervade the entirety of creation, always hostile to God and to Christ. They invest men and the universe, after tempting and seducing men to misrepresent themselves in this world of death which they depict. Originally creations of God, they have now become autonomous and self-centered, rebelling against God and his universe. In the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ the victory - although the consummation is yet to be realized - over the principalities has been accomplished, and believers participate in the victory through baptism. Schlier takes seriously the reality of cosmic powers, although he groups all of them into one functionally satanic mold which is opposed to God. It appears that ἀρχαί and ἐξουσίαι refer to human authorities in Romans 13:1,[1] Titus 3:1, and Luke 12:11 (cf. 20:20), and to some unusual or unearthly (supernatural?) entity in Romans 8:38, 1 Cor. 15:24, Col. 2:10, Eph. 3:10, 6:12.[2] Clinton Morrison[3] is more exegetical and less doctrinaire than Schlier in his more balanced appraisal that ἐξουσίαι "were powers, human and spiritual, divinely appointed to particular responsibilities in the cosmic order" (pp. 102f.) without specificity of evil association and/or direction.

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1 But see O. Cullmann, The State in the New Testament, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), pp. 93-114.

2 Cf. 1 Cor. 2:8, John 14:30, Lk. 4:6.

3 The Powers That Be, (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1960).

He sees, in Romans 13:1-7, an inseparable relationship between earthly rulers and demonic powers, between the spiritual and material in the one cosmos. Both dimensions are seen within the framework of God as the Creator who sustains the cosmos, utilizing non-divine cosmic powers to serve his purposes.

Functionally distinct, all of the various powers in the New Testament are servants of God, but they are never portrayed as being divine as is the Son. The Graeco-Roman world view necessitated a cosmic orientation of the Christian faith. Faith was related both to history and the cosmic order; "the state exists to allow the Church to carry out its mission."[1] The material and the spiritual bow in subservience and obedience unto God.

When Paul indicates that the powers which come from God are also expressed in images and/or forms, he is affirming his interest in the cosmological structures. For Paul power is not inarticulate, but every power works in a specific way. No power is absolutely free; it is always expressed within its suitable form. The powers that come from God are structured under the sovereignty and within the purpose of God.

In 2 Cor. 4:4 (. . . εἰς τὸ μὴ αὐγάσαι τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ) and Col. 1:15 (ὅς [Jesus] ἐστιν

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1 Morrison, op. cit., 122.

εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως[1]

Paul portrays Jesus Christ, not as the mere, but as the true representative of God in this world. God who cannot be seen per se manifests himself in the world in Jesus Christ, as reported in John 14:9-10 (λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· τοσοῦτον χρόνον μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωκάς με, Φίλιππε; ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα· πῶς σὺ λέγεις· δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν πατέρα; 10 οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί ἐστιν; τὰ ῥήματα ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ὑμῖν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ οὐ λαλῶ· ὁ δὲ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοὶ μένων ποιεῖ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ.) and Heb. 1:2-3 (ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων ἐλάλησεν ἡμῖν ἐν υἱῷ, ὃν ἔθηκεν κληρονόμον πάντων, δι' οὗ καὶ ἐποίησεν τοὺς αἰῶνας· 3 ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, καθαρισμὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ποιησάμενος ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς). Jesus Christ as the image of God is the reality of God in this world. The εἰκών of God gives expression in the universe as to what God, the creator of the universe and all therein, is like. This likeness, although described anthropomorphically, is not a physical characteristic but the heavenly Son of God who transcends the cosmos. Consistently in the New Testament Jesus Christ is depicted both as revealing and redeeming, disclosing the person and work of God. In the category of εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ Paul makes a real and functional

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1 Cf. Rom. 1:23, Acts 17:29.

distinction between God and the Son. Ontological relationships functionally described are distinguished from ontological identity. The oneness of Jesus and the Father in John 14:9-10 is not metaphysical, but a semantic reflection that God is best seen and heard through his divine Son.[1]

In Exodus 20:4[2] (as also in Deut. 5:8) the Hebrews are exhorted to refuse images as a possibility of knowing God. The images of idols are meaningless because they, constructed out of the materials of this world, indicate cosmic features which do not transcend the cosmos. Authority is resident in the person of God and not in the created order. Authority and power are articulated in this world in Jesus Christ and in none other.[3]

Paul points out the transformation of believers into the likeness of Christ in 1 Cor. 15:49: καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου.[4]

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1 A parallel is seen in the recurrent designation of the beast and its image in the Apocalypse of John (13:14, 15, 14:9, 11, 15:2, 16:2, 19:20, 20:4) where the beast and its distinctive mark on its forehead are not separated, nor yet the same per se.

2 לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה-לְךָ פֶסֶל וְכָל-תְּמוּנָה אֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁמַיִם מִמַּעַל וַאֲשֶׁר בָּאָרֶץ מִתָּחַת וַאֲשֶׁר בַּמַּיִם מִתַּחַת לָאָרֶץ

οὐ ποιήσεις σεαυτῷ εἴδωλον οὐδὲ παντὸς ὁμοίωμα, ὅσα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἄνω καὶ ὅσα ἐν τῇ γῇ κάτω καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς.

3 Cf. Paul's sermon in Acts 17:22-31.

4 Cf. 2 Cor. 3:18: ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος; Rom. 8:29: ὅτι οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, and Col. 3:10 καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν.

The power of the Christ is experienced in the earthly life, and produces a different kind of life which has its origin outside man and the universe. The believers are the true representatives of the power of the Christ; the kingdom has come on earth and in heaven.

This seems to be the import of the Priestly writer in Gen. 1:26f., where man is described in the image of God:

וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ
וְיִרְדּוּ בִדְגַת הַיָּם וּבְעוֹף הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל־הָאָרֶץ
וּבְכָל־הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל־הָאָרֶץ׃ וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם
בְּצַלְמוֹ בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה בָּרָא אֹתָם׃

S. V. McCasland suggests[1] that "the priestly writer of Genesis evidently believed that man is by natural endowment like God; not that he naturally acts like God, always choosing truth and right; but that he has the natural capacity to make those choices." However, this does not seem to be the case in Paul who sees man as receiving from God through the Christ the power to choose and follow the Christ. This is not a natural and automatic phenomenon but one which is controlled either by the power of God or the power of this world.[2]

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1 "The Image of God According to Paul," JBL, 69(1950),90.

2 Cf. e. g., 1 Cor. 1:18-25, Eph. 2:1-10. The theological debate concerning the status and relationship of the image of God and his likeness has been lively and inconclusive, and does not seem to be relevant to this discussion. A. Strucker, Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen in der Christlichen Literatur der ersten zwei Jahrhunderte, 1913, and E. Larsson, Christus als Vorbild, 1962, present historical and exegetical details respectively, of the subject. von Rad ("εἰκών," TWNT, II, 388f.), has succinctly expressed the dilemma: Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit

It is probable that the writer of the Fourth Gospel, the writer to the Hebrews, and Paul were drawing on ancient categories, common to their century and expressed particularly in Alexandrian thought which had been applied in pre-Christian thought to a personified divine attribute. The use of εἰκών in Col. 1:15-17 seems to parallel the use of λόγος in John 1:1-3 (Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 2οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. 3πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν.) and υἱός in Heb. 1:2-3 in that the special function of creating and upholding the universe is ascribed to Christ under these three titles.[1] Christ is not <u>made</u> after the image of God as was man in Gen. 1, but he <u>is</u> the image of God. Here he is given dominion over the universe as man over the created things in Gen 1.[2]

It is instructive to note that the only occurrences

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liegt weder in der "Persönlichkeit" des Menschen noch in dem "freien Ich" noch in der "Worde des Menschen" noch im "freien Gebrauch der moralischen Anlage.". . . Deshalb ist auch der Streit, ob die Gottesebenbildlichkeit sich auf das geistige oder auf das leiblich Wesen des Menschen beziehe, wenig aussichtsreich. Soll schon mit einer Alternative geistig/leiblich gearbeitet werden, so muss man sich allerdings entscheiden, die Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen wornehmlich leiblich zu verstehen. Freilich nicht im Sinner eines rückläufigen Spekulierens über Gottes Gestalt und Leiblichkeit, aber doch im Sinn eines Hinweises auf die dem Menschen eignende Elohimnatur.

1 Cf. M. Dibelius, <u>An die Kolosser, Epheser und an Philemon</u>, (<u>HBNT</u> 12, pp. 6ff.).

2 Cf. Beare, "Colossians," <u>The Interpreter's Bible</u>, XI, p. 164.

of μορφή in the New Testament are found in Phil. 2:6-7b[1] and in the spurious ending of Mark,[2] in each case referring to Jesus Christ[3] who reveals the μορφή of God. In the pre-Christian hymn appropriated for his use,[4] Paul depicts Jesus Christ as one who has humbled himself and been exalted by God.[5] The differentiation between ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ and μορφὴν δούλου λαβών has emphasized the what Jesus gave up (the so-called "kenotic theory" which attempts to explain ἐκένωσεν in 2:7) as much as the significance of his death and exaltation. It is not inappropriate to speculate on the metaphysical or relational possibilities,[6] but the kind of a suggestion which neglects the purpose of Jesus' human identification must be reconsidered.

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1 ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ⁷ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος . . . .

2 16:12 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δυσὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν περιπατοῦσιν ἐφανερώθη ἐν ἑτέρᾳ μορφῇ πορευομένοις εἰς ἀγρόν.

3 Cf. συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ in Rom. 8:29, and τέκνα μου, οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν in Gal. 4:19.

4 Cf. E. Lohmeyer, Kyrios Jesus. Eine Untersuchung zu Phil. 2:5-11; J. Jeremias, "The Servant of God in the New Testament," The Servant of God (SBT 20), p. 97: E. Käsemann, "Kritische Analyse von Phil. 2:5-11," ZTK, 47(1950), pp. 313-360.

5 Cf. E. Schweizer, Lordship and Discipleship (SBT 28), pp. 61-64.

6 Cf., for example, a generally overlooked parallel comment in 2 Cor. 8:9.

From Homer, μορφή is used in a religious sense to indicate a divine revelation or the epiphany of a supra-natural being as a concrete phenomenon.[1] The Philippians' hymnic passage does not differ substantially from the general usage in Greek literature. The contrast between the godly and the human aspects is often explained in the temporal category of pre-existence, earthly sojourn and heavenly return. Behm (op. cit.,p760) contends, and rightly so, that the popular philosophical idea of μορφὴ θεοῦ being synonymous with οὐσία or φύσις does not influence Paul. "Der Apostel steht mit seiner paradoxes Formel μορφὴ θεοῦ zwar nicht terminologisch aber sachlich ganz im Bereich der biblischen Gottesanschauung. . .: Ebenbild Gottes ist Christus, die μορφὴ θεοῦ ist das Gewand, das sein gottgleiches Wesen zu erkennen gibt." This interpretation is definitive of a tangible manifestation of God. While that is true, nevertheless, it seems that the Philippians' context says more. Μορφὴ points up the mode of action of Jesus who, as μορφὴ θεοῦ , acts as a sovereign king.[2] As μορφὴ δούλου he assumes a mode of life which makes him dependent upon other wills than that of God, non-sovereign wills which portray ontic existence as distinctive from sovereignty. Jesus is the son of God for Paul, a divine being who has acted both in

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1 Cf. J. Behm, "μορφή ," TWNT, IV, pp. 754-756.

2 I am indebted to O. A. Piper for this insight.

sovereign (creation) and non-sovereign (earthly life) relationships.

The transformation (μεταμορφοῦσθαι) of Jesus in Mark 9:2-13//Matt. 17:2-13 links the earthly and heavenly existences briefly. The eschatological reality becomes both an anticipation and guarantee in this experience of Jesus. In 2 Cor. 3:18 (ἡμεῖς . . . κατοπτριζόμενοι τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, ...) and Rom. 12:2 (καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθε τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, ...), Paul speaks of a distinctively new mode of action for the Christian. In the first example, the Spirit of the Lord is the source of the power which initiates the new modus operandi, and, in the Romans' passage, the mercies and will of God are the context for the new direction emanating from the renewal of the mind. In the larger contexts, both passages are set within the framework of the significance of the person of Jesus. As Behm[1] has succinctly stated: "Vor allen Dingen: was Paulus unter Verwandlung versteht, ist kein eigenständiges immanent-mystisches Geschehen, sondern ein Vorgang, bei dem die transzendent - eschatologische Heilswirklichkeit bestimmend hereinwirkt in das irdische Leben der Christen."

In the disclosure of himself, God utilizes the created powers which function in various capacities. The whole system is summed up in the person of Jesus Christ, whom

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1 Op. cit., p. 766.

Paul regards as the divine Son of God. All of the manifestations of God are viewed by the Apostle within the framework of an ontological system which pervades the entirety of creation and is grounded in God, not the universe.

Paul evaluates the structure of reality not only in terms of 1)God being the Creator of all that is, and 2)in the fact that he reveals himself to his creation through powers, but also 3)in the phenomenological world the reality of God is known. Although differentiated from the phenomenological world, God is not isolated nor separated from the world. The most frequent and obvious designation in the Pauline corpus which refers to the world of things is τὰ πάντα . Of its thirty-six occurrences in the New Testament, τὰ πάντα is found in the writings of Paul or a Paulinist[1] twenty-eight times. Its primary sense of the wholeness of creation is clearly illustrated in the aforementioned Col. 1:16 (Cf. Eph. 1:10-11, Heb. 1:3, 2:10) and 1 Cor. 8:6 (Cf. Rom. 11:36, Apk. 4:11, Eph. 3:9), In 2 Cor. 5:18 (τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ καταλλάξαντος ἡμᾶς ἑαυτῷ διὰ Χριστοῦ καὶ δόντος ἡμῖν τὴν διακονίαν τῆς καταλλαγῆς) and 1 Cor. 11:12b(. . . τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ) all things are interpreted as originating in God. But, more importantly, in both passages, τὰ πάντα refers to

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1 The investigator is aware of the problems connected with the authorship of the Pastorals and Ephesians. Perhaps an investigation of them from the methodology employed in this work would provide additional insights to the discussion which has bogged down in a mechanical counting of words and exactitude of syntactical expressions. Ephesians is accepted as basically Pauline, the attractive theories of

significant relationships. In 2 Cor. 5:17b the substitution of new for old things (τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἰδοὺ γέγονεν καινά) describes τὰ πάντα , and in 1 Cor. 11:12 even the relationship of ἀνήρ to γυνή is subsumed under τὰ πάντα . A corollary description of the reconciling work of the Christ is presented in Col. 1:20 (καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτόν, εἰρηνοποιήσας διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ αὐτοῦ, δι' αὐτοῦ εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς), where the entire creation is subjected to the work of the Christ. Closely related are those passages which speak of all things being placed under the subjection of Christ.[1]

The use of τὰ πάντα to refer to the totality of createdness poses a problem as to its basic meaning. Does πᾶς connote the sense of a literal and quantitative enumeration? That is to say, if τὰ πάντα really means every created thing is subject to Christ, one finds it difficult to escape attributing specific evil acts to God. Various efforts to understand this subjection have eventuated in ascribing the actual fulfillment to a futuristic eschatalogy, on the one hand, and an acknowledgement that evil is not really evil but only the absence of good, on the other. It appears that all attempts to interpret πᾶς in a quantitative sense are fraught with numerous and inconclusive results. For example, in Mark 1:5 onereads καὶ ἐξεπορεύετο

Goodspeed and Knox, notwithstanding, and the Pastorals are evaluated at the least as containing genuine Pauline materials.

1 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:27,28, Phil. 3:21, Eph. 4:10, Heb. 2:8.

πρὸς αὐτὸν πᾶσα ἡ Ἰουδαία χώρα καὶ οἱ Ἱεροσολυμῖται πάντες, καὶ ἐβαπτίζοντο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ .... Certainly the Judaean countryside was not moving as a giant landslide toward the Palestinian cleft! Nor is it conceivable that every resident of Jerusalem (Josephus estimates the population of Jerusalem to be about 500,000 at this time!) could find a place to stand, sit or parade in line. Or again, when Paul writes πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ in Romans 3:23, is he making an assertion about every individual? That is, has every particular person been checked out as to being in that precise condition described? Obviously, these statements make an assertion which cannot be demonstrably proved. From an empirical point of view, they must be rejected summarily. Before dismissing the statements as wholly untrue, one must assess the value of πᾶς more thoroughly.

In antiquity, the anarthrous adjective πᾶς is used functionally in at least three various syntactical relationships. As a collective, it has the sense of "all" when used of a number of objects.[1] The notion of "all" is often strengthened by the use of adverbs.[2] To connote the idea of "all" or "allness," it is characteristic of πᾶς to be found

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1 Cf. Homer, Iliad, 8.5, πάντες τε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναι , Odyssey, 1.11, πάντες ὅσοι . . ., Cf. Plato, Republic, 566D, πάντας ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ for ὅσοις ἄν .

2 E. g., Homer, Iliad, 24.253, ἅμα πάντες , Odyssey, 5.216, πάντα μάλα .

often in the plural. Secondly, πᾶς is used in the singular of one object only to denote the sense of "all" or "the whole."[1] Thirdly, where several persons in a group are indicated, πᾶς is used in the sense of "every."[2]

With the article, πᾶς denotes the sense of "all" or "the whole." When the substantive is to be strongly specified, πᾶς is placed in the predicative position.[3] Many abstract nouns require the article to complete the sense, as in Herodotus 7.59 (τὰς νέας τὰς πάσας). To denote totality, πᾶς is placed in the attributive position.[4]

In Romans 3:19 (. . . ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ) Paul uses πᾶς in two distinctly different ways. In the first instance (πᾶν στόμα) where πᾶν is used before an anarthrous substance, the sense is "every mouth," not "each mouth" (ἕκαστος) but "any mouth."[5] The second example (πᾶς ὁ κόσμος) emphasizes the substantive as "all the cosmos" or "the whole cosmos." In both

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1 E. g., Plato, Phaedrus, 240A, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη 249E, πᾶσα ἀνθρώπου ψυχή , Homer, Odyssey, 11.507, πᾶσα ἀληθείη .

2 Δ' ἄλλιμον ἦτορ ἔλοντες . . . πᾶς πέτεται , Homer, Iliad, 16.265; cf. Odyssey, 13.313.

3 E. g., Herodotus, 1.214, πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν , Xenophon, Anabasis, 3.1.20, τἀγαθὰ πάντα .

4 E. g., Xenophon, Anabasis, 5.6.7, οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι , 1.80 τὴν πᾶσαν ἵππον (cf. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, II, (new ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 1345.

5 Blass-Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, section 275.3.

examples, the emphasis is not to be placed upon the specific individual mouth or the sum total of all parts of the universe; on the contrary, both illustrations portray the functional, not quantitative, aspects of reality.

In 3:20 (διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ . . . .) a different method of evaluation is necessary. The negative οὐ goes with the verb,[1] but this construction is a Hebraism (לֹא . . . . כָּל).[2] This usage is comparable to the employment of οὐδείς (-θείς) or μηδείς (-θείς), and the sense of the Romans' passage is "nobody" or "no one shall be justified." The general principle, when negated, becomes particular.

The Semitism has been transported from the Old Testament through the LXX. In the LXX, πᾶς is found in the excess of 6000 times, second only in frequency to κύριος, which appears approximately 8000 times.[3] In the vast majority of instances, πᾶς translates כֹּל,[4] which occurs in the excess of 5000 times.[5] Never appearing in the plural, כֹּל is used almost exclusively as a substantive.

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1 Cf. Mk. 13:20//Matt. 24:22 οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ, 1 Cor. 1:29.

2 Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., section 302.1

3 G. Bartram, "πᾶς," TWNT, V, p. 889.

4 Hatch and Redpath, A Concordance to the Septuagint, II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897), pp. 1073-1102.

5 S. Mandelkern, Concordance on the Bible, I, (new ed.; New York: Shulsinger Brothers, 1955), pp. 563-583.

Most often the word is used with a following noun in the construct state, in order to make determinate an indeterminate nominative. This is the normal process of the Hebrew language replete with synonyms to compensate for the paucity of adjectives. For example, in Genesis 2:1

וַיְכֻלּוּ הַשָּׁמַיִם וְהָאָרֶץ וְכָל-צְבָאָם

και συνετελέσθησαν ὁ οὐρανὸς και ἡ γῆ

και πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν

the author refers to all the component parts of which the heavens and earth consist as constituting an organized whole, i. e., the modern "world" or "universe."

Another example of the totality term כֹּל is found in Deut. 32:45: וַיְכַל מֹשֶׁה לְדַבֵּר אֶת-כָּל-הַדְּבָרִים

הָאֵלֶּה אֶל-כָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל

και συνετέλεσεν Μωυσῆς λαλῶν πάντι Ἰσραήλ.

It is obvious, from the contextual reference to the elders and leaders in 31:28, that Moses did not speak in 32:45 to every individual person in Israel. The totality of Israel is expressed in the particulars of the elders and leaders. This is much the same as the current idea of the President of the United States addressing the nation. Although a great majority of the people neither hear him nor read his statement, nevertheless, the nation is the recipient of his message.[1]

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1 Cf. also Deut. 6:5, 10:12, 11:13, 13:4, 26:16, 30:2, 6, 10; Josh. 22:5, 23:14; I Kings 2:4, 8:48 (parallel to II Chron. 6:38), II Kings 23:3 (parallel to II Chron. 34:31), 25; II Chron. 15:12; Jeremiah 32:41, for similar expressions.

There are many examples where כֹּל , denoting entirety, introduces collectives without either a following article or the construct state, inasmuch as כֹּל includes a determinative sense.[1] This usage occurs frequently in the Priestly Creation accounts, e. g., Gen. 1:21 (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הַתַּנִּינִם הַגְּדֹלִים וְאֵת כָּל־נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה הָרֹמֶשֶׂת אֲשֶׁר שָׁרְצוּ הַמַּיִם לְמִינֵהֶם וְאֵת כָּל־עוֹף כָּנָף לְמִינֵהוּ וַיַּרְא אֱלֹהִים כִּי־טוֹב

καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὰ κήτη τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ζώων ἑρπετῶν, ἃ ἐξήγαγεν τὰ ὕδατα κατὰ γένη αὐτῶν, καὶ πᾶν πετεινὸν πτερωτὸν κατὰ γένος. καὶ εἶδον ὁ Θεὸς ὅτι καλά.).[2]

It is obvious from these examples that some of the Hebrews did not differentiate in their simple evaluations of reality. Nevertheless, this does not mean they were stupid. Their conception of all reality may be described as seeing the totality of all existing things being held by God, even though they appeared to be chaotic and atomistic in nature.

In the Iliad (5.60; cf. Odyssey, 4.417; Herodotus 3.157) πάντα in the neuter plural refers to all kinds of things as it does in the LXX and somewhat in Paul. In the neuter singular, τὸ πᾶν indicates either the whole[3] or the

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1 Gesenius, Hebrew Grammar, (2nd English ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), section 117c; Cf. Isa. 9:16, Gen. 7:15.

2 Cf. 1:25, 26, 28, 30, 2:19, 8:21, Deut. 2:34, 2 Kings 25:9, Psalm 10:5. For examples of the distributive "each" or "every," see Gen. 2:9, 16. In the sense of entirety before anthropological terms, cf. Isa. 1:5, 9:11, Eze. 36:5, Jer. 32:27, 2 Kings 23:3, Gen. 7:15.

3 Plato, Phaedrus, 235E,

universe.[1] The important and distinctive emphasis to be made here is not that of the source of Paul's thought regarding the created things of this world, but the manner in which he relates τὰ πάντα to other realities. His frame of reference, like that consistently although not unanimously seen in the Old Testament, is God. The things are not interpreted as the self-sufficient parts of the universe which is the whole,[2] but God is bringing all things into the proper relationship (1 Cor. 15:28 . . . ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, Col. 3:11 . . . ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός). This world is not static; creation is still occurring by the hand of God.[3] Eternality is not posited as an essential characteristic of τὰ πάντα. The world of things is not self-sufficient, but is operative ἐν θεῷ, a modus operandi and not a system of orders.

These examples are sufficient to indicate that Paul interpreted the entire creation as the work of God. The universe is not an entity co-existing with God, nor is it an unrelated and accidental object to mankind. The creation is transitory, and is described in categories which depict it as object and not subject. The transitory is inconsequential in and of itself, but is directed toward its

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1 Plato, Timaeus, 28C, 30B.

2 Cf., e. g. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V. xxvi.

3 1 Cor. 12:6. . . ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεὸς ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, cf. Rom. 8:32, 1 Cor. 12:19, 2 Cor. 4:15, 12:19, Gal. 3:22, Eph. 4:15, 5:13, Phil. 3:8, Col. 3:8.

true destiny by the powers of God. The creating and redeeming work of the Christ is couched within the active ontic concern of God. True existence is seen in him and not in that which he has created. τὰ πάντα are manifestations which illustrate freedom, not deity, in the world,

As a Hellenistic Jew, Paul is indebted both to the Hebrews and to the Greeks for their ontological and cosmological terms and influences. God is always personal to Paul, and the whole structure of reality begins and ends with God. It appears that Paul's basic ontology is that of totality, and not generality or a differentiated set of religious ideas to which he ardently subscribed.

IV TOTALITY IN PAUL: TELEOLOGY

The meaning of teleology is difficult to assert. In general, teleology is defined as the fact or character of being which is directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose. For example, in nature teleology has an intrinsic design or goal which is apparent tautologically. That is to say, the vitalist principle of life is primarily responsible for the phenomena of life and growth. In this chapter, however, teleology is defined not as the inevitability of the end or purpose shaping the process or movement, but it is described as the particular manifestation of the purpose of God. Among the varied expressions which portray this aspect of biblical reality in Paul, τελεῖν and its cognates, πληροῦν and its cognates, θέλημα, δόξα, ἐλπίς, and νυνὶ δέ are presented.

The relationship of earthly realities in submission to God implies a divine teleology. God not only is a God in whom all things exist and from whom all things come into being; he is a God who acts but acts with a purpose. An explicit teleology is contained in the statement, for example, of Romans 10:4: τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι. The equation of τέλος and Χριστός points not only to an identification of the person with τέλος; it also describes the significance of the Χριστός. In the context, Paul is attempting to indicate how the righteousness of God may be realized in Israel as well as in the nascent

Gentile Church. Israel has rejected this righteousness and sought her own understanding of it, but Paul points to the Messiah as being the one who has filled full the law in the direction of genuine righteousness. The Christ is not the terminus of the law in the sense that the law has been abrogated, but in the sense that the significance of the law has been embodied in the Christ, and righteousness is a present reality. This verse complements Rom. 3:21 (Νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται, μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν). The law has become integrated in the Christ and hence is acceptable to God. The old is completed and made final in the new. The law finds its best expression in the Christ (cf. Gal. 3:24ff.). Both the criterion of attainment unto righteousness and the highest realization of the intrinsic nature of righteousness is now personified in Jesus Christ. Allen Wikgren[1] has observed that "in him [Jesus] the τέλος not only has been fulfilled but also empirically demonstrated for the faithful in terms both of present potentiality and ultimate realization."

In Romans 6:21, 22 τὸ τέλος . . . θάνατος is contrasted with τὸ . . . τέλος ζωὴν αἰώνιον . As slaves of sin the people faced only the prospect of shame and death, but as slaves to God the probabilities were holiness and eternal life. In 6:21 the parallel members

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1 "Patterns of Perfection in the Epistle to the Hebrews," NTS, 6(Jan. 1960)2, 167.

of καρπὸν . . . ἐποιοχύνεσθε and τέλος . . . θάνατος are contrasted with the parallel members in 6:22 (καρπὸν . . . ἁγιασμόν and τέλος ζωήν). While αἰσχύνη and ἁγιασμός may not be the technically opposite members, nevertheless, in this sequence each is made distinctive over against the other as are θάνατος and ζωή, with the introductory καρπόν and τέλος found in the proper order in both phrases. The fruition and degradation of sin is expressed in the destruction and annihilation of the person. His terminus and final realization is characterized by mortality. Not only does he arrive at the end of the road, but he also appropriates the full and final relationship of that which is dispossessed of life. On the other hand, the fruition and goal of the one who is enslaved to God is that of holiness and meaningful life. Paul sees both a worthy goal and an intrinsically better kind of existence in the relationship of one who, paradoxically, in freedom has become a slave to God.[1]

The writer of 1 Timothy (1:5 τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας ἐστὶν ἀγάπη ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας καὶ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς καὶ πίστεως ἀνυποκρίτου) sets forth the goal of his ministry as love which comes out of a pure heart, an intrinsically good conscience and non-hypocritical faith in contrast to heterorthodoxy and speculative concerns in which others engage. The accent on the goal as qualifying

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1 Cf. Phil. 3:18ff., 2 Cor. 3:13.

the type of desired ministry suggests a definite teleological principle which has crystallized firmly in the author's mind, i. e., ἀγάπη becomes both the context and modus operandi of the ministry (cf. James 5:11, Job 42:12ff.).

These example are sufficient to suggest that the goal and purpose of life are calculated within the dominion and sovereignty of God. The affairs and movements of this world do not have an intrinsic teleology but are characterized by a divine destination illuminated best in Jesus Christ. It is God manifesting himself in Jesus Christ which gives focus and depth to τέλος in Paul.

The term τέλος is found frequently elsewhere, with a variety of nuances. Derived from τέλλω, τέλος is often found in classical Greek with the general meaning of coming to pass, performance, or consummation, as in the Odyssey (εἰ γάρ ἐπ' ἀρῇσιν τέλεσι ἡμετέροισι γένοιτο 17.496) or in Hesiod's Opera et Dies (ἐν [θεοῖς] τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶν ἀγαθῶν τεκαεῖν ,669). This general sense may be used concretely as result or product (τέλος εὐπετφίης αἰγικτικῆς πιμελὴ καὶ στέαρ , Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 672a4), or as a supreme or deciding power (Sophocles, Oedipus Colosseus, 423, ἐν δ' ἐμοὶ τέλος αὐτοῖς γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης περί'). The versatility of τέλος is further explicated in its use as services due the gods (Aeschylus, Persae, 204, δαίμοσιν θῦσαι θέλουσα πέλανον, ὧν τέλη τάδε), or the dues exacted by the state (Aristophanes, Acharnenses, 896, ἀγορᾶς τέλης, for example). This functional employment of τέλος

illustrates both the being and purpose of various aspects and facets of societary life which emphasize the essential characteristic of the execution of the assigned or required responsibility.[1]

The qualitative idea of completion is seen, for example, in Plato[2] or expressed as completeness or finality with τέλος in adverbial phrases, e. g., διὰ τέλους (Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus, 275), and ἐπὶ τέλος (Galenus, 19.183).[3] Death as the end of life is portrayed by Demosthenes (Private Orations, 57.27): πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις τέλος τοῦ βίου θάνατος. These examples of τέλος emphasize more the aspect of completion or maturity than the goal. It provides a frame of reference by which the activity or goal can be evaluated. Contrast between the lesser and greater accomplishment is sharpened. The end result is depicted primarily not in terms of the essential worth of the goal, but in light of its own intrinsic teleology. It is true to say, however, that τέλος also can have primary reference to the achievement of the goal. The portrayal of this idea varies from

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1 Cf. Liddell and Scott, op. cit., pp. 1722ff.

2 Symposium, 186A, τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ.

3 Cf. this use in the papyri (Moulton and Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1929), pp. 630f.), and in the LXX, especially in the titles of Pss. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 (11), and 44 others, etc.

runners in a race[1] to the chief good τὸ ἀγαθόν.[2] Τέλος in these illustrations is the goal to be reached, that by which the activity is determined.

The use of τέλος outside the New Testament may be summed up thus: 1)it has reference to a criterion of measurement, and 2)it is culminated in terms of a goal. The former statement can be exemplified by references to the accomplishment and fruition desired and realized in numerous strata of society. Certain expectations for all were articulated, and failure to comply not only resulted in a failure to achieve but a penalty to the intrinsic integrity of the system/movement. The second conclusion is seen in the climactic fulfillment of the activity in its goal. The nature of the entity is determined by the goal which is to be reached, and the teleology is manifested both in the achieving and the final realization.

It is apparent that τέλος means substantially the same for Paul as for the ancient Greek authors. It is both the criterion of measurement and the final goal to be reached. The difference lies in the way the Apostle relates τέλος to the Christ who is both the one who determines life as being significant and the final goal in whom all things are brought to their destiny. The

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1 Plato, Republic, 613C, εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες, cf. Pindar, Olympian Odes, 10(11).67; Isthmian Odes, 1.27.

2 Nicomachean Ethics, 1097a21; Zeno, Stoicism, 1.45.

origin and end of teleology are transcendant, i. e., it is God who wills to bring the cosmos to its goal, seen most clearly in the divine Son.

The intensive form of τελειοῦν[1] and its cognates are more precise than τέλος. The verb is found only once in Paul's letters (Οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον ἢ ἤδη τετελείωμαι, διώκω δὲ εἰ καὶ καταλάβω, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ κατελήμφθην ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ Phil. 3:12). It is used by Luke[2] to denote the completion of time in regard to specific occasions, but most often by John to refer to the accomplishment by Jesus of the ministry given him by the Father,[3] the consummation of the disciples into one totality (John 17:3), scripture achieving its goal (John 19:28), and the intensive accomplishment of ἀγάπη.[4] In James 2:22 faith attains its goal through the assistance of works. In Hebrews, the word is regularly employed[5] with particular reference to Jesus.

In its classical usage, τελειοῦν is used in the 1)primary sense of making perfect or complete of things or acts;[6] 2)to bring to perfection or consummation;[7]

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1 Lit., "having reached its end"[τέλος].

2 2:43, 13:32, Acts 20:24. The writer is aware that "Luke" may only be a pseudonym, and particularly so in the Acts.

3 John 4:34, 5:36, 17:4.

4 1 John 2:5, 4:12, 17, 18.

5 As are all other members of the τελει- family.

6 E. g., πάντα ἐτέλεωσε ποιήσας Herodotus, 1.120.

7 E. g., τελειῶσαι λόγον Sophocles, Oedipus Coloneus, 1089.

in the intransitive, it is used to bring fruit to maturity or to come to maturity.[1] In legal papyri, τελειοῦν is commonly used in the sense of the execution of a deed or will.[2] In the LXX the intensive τελειοῦν is used less than the cultic τελεῖν and τέλος. Often the verbs are synonymous in usage as in 1(3) Kings 7:22 (תָּמַם qal), 14:10, 2 Chron. 8:16 (שָׁלַם), Neh. 6:3, 16(עָשָׂה niph.). But as Hatch and Redpath[3] indicate and Westcott[4] comments, the liturgical texts of the fifth century B. C. employ τελειοῦν in a technical usage of anointing a priest[5] i. e., an act of consecration.[6]

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1 Aristotle, Of The Generation of Animals, 757b24.

2 Oxy. Papyri, III. 483.20 (dated c. A. D. 108) τελειῶσαι τὸν χρημα[τισμὸν] ὡς κεθήκει, Moulton and Milligan, op. cit., p. 629.

3 Op. cit., p. 1343.

4 The Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 63.

5 "Filling his hand" into the exercise of the office - יָדוֹ מִלֵּא אֶת.

6 Cf., e. g., Lev. 21:10, 8:33, Exo. 29:9, 29, 33, 35, Num. 3:3. Somewhat analogous is the use of πληροῦν τὰς χεῖρας in Judg. 17:5, 12, 1 Kings 13:33, 2 Chron. 13:9, 29:31, Sir. 45:15. In the Apocrypha the sense of completion or entirety is evidenced in, for example, Judg. 10:8 (τελειῶσαι τὸ ἐπιτήδευμά σου. Cf. Wisdom 4:13 τελειωθεὶς ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἐπλήρωσε χρόνους μακρούς, Sir. 7:32 ἵνα τελειωθῇ ἡ εὐλογία σου, cf. 4 Macc. 7:15 ὦ μακρίου γήρως καὶ τερπνῆς πολιᾶς καὶ βιοῦ νομίμου, ὃν πιστὴ θανάτου σφραγὶς ἐτελείωσεν, where it is used in connection with martyrdom, as well as in Eusebius (H.E., iii.35, vii.15) who used τελειοῦσθαι (and τελείωσις) in a general application to the death of the Christian, and especially of the death by martyrdom in which the effort of life was completed.

Paul's use of the verb in Phil. 3:12 indicates that his life has not yet been brought to its end. There lies before him the serving of God in the name of the Lord Jesus, the goal of his life. In degree, this is not unlike the consecration of a mystery religion initiate, also described by this term. The difference lies in the definition of the τέλος. While there is nothing in the context which necessarily suggests martyrdom, the context does not detract from that possibility, especially in light of both the choice of verb and the use of the perfect tense.

Paul uses the adjective τέλειος more than any other New Testament writer. In the first Corinthian letter, he attempts to articulate the nature of the Christian life to this community beset with problems. To do this effectively, he contrasts the folk of the community in 1:18-2:16:

οἱ σωζόμενοι (ἡμεῖς) (1:18)
οἱ ἀπολλύμενοι (1:18)
οἱ πιστεύοντες (1:24)
Ἰουδαῖοι σημεῖα αἰτοῦσιν καὶ Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν (1:22)
οἱ κλητοί (1:24)
οἱ σοφοὶ τοῦ κόσμου (1:27)
σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ (2:7)
σοφία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου (2:6)
οἱ τέλειοι (2:6)
οἱ ἄρχοντες (2:6)
εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν (2:7)
καταργούμενοι (2:6)
ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν (2:10)
οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχόντων ... ἔγνωκεν (2:8)
οἱ ἀγαπῶντες αὐτόν (2:9)
οἱ τὸν κύριον ἐσταύρωσεν (2:8)
τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ (2:10)
τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου (2:12)
ὁ πνευματικός (2:13, 15)
ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος (2:14)
νοῦς κυρίου (2:16)
μωρία [τῶν ἀνθρώπων] (2:14).

In Corinth there might be - and apparently was! - considerable hesitation to accept the implications of Paul's pragmatic analysis, but there could be little possibility of misunderstanding the sharp edge of his thinking. Jesus Christ as τέλος was known to them as the Risen Lord; he was the origin and the goal of their great confidence.[1] The mature Christians (τέλειοι) are no longer beginners (οἱ ἄρχοντες); the work of the Christ has been wrought in them, and his life now characterizes their life. The Church is exhorted to orient its life toward God from whom comes σοφία , ἀγάπη and πνεῦμα . Maturity is realized to the degree that their lives are related to their origin and goal.

The adjective is widely used outside Paul. In ancient Greek literature, the notion of totality is found in texts calling for or proclaiming cultic fitness of sacrificial animals and objects.[2] Plato uses it in the sense of full-

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1 An effective contrast and continuity between τέλος and ἀρχή is exhibited in the relationship of Melchizedek and Jesus as sacrificial priests in Heb. 7:3. Clearer samples, however, are seen in the Apocalypse of John 21:6 and 22:13, where the Risen Christ is majestically presented as τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὰ τέλος and τὸ ἄλφα καὶ τὸ ὦ, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος , respectively, as the beginning and the end, the first and the last, the source and the goal - the one in whom all of reality genuinely finds its meaning.

2 **Iliad**, 1.66 ἀρνῶν αἰγῶν τε τελείων.

grown maturity of horses,[1] or human beings as adults,[2] or persons who are accomplished in having reached their goal.[3]

In the papyri[4] τέλειος is used in three primary functions: 1)"full grown" or "mature" a)of persons (Oxy. Papyri, II.237.vii.15 περὶ τοῦ τὰς ἤδη τελείας γυναῖκας γενομένας ἑαυτῶν εἶναι κυρίας, εἴτε βούλονται παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν μένειν εἴτε μή and b)of animals (BGU iv. 1067.12 ἀλεκτόρων τελείων τεσσάρων); 2)"in good working order or condition" (Tebtunis Papyri, II.406.12 λυχνεία τελεία); 3)"complete" or "final" (Oxy. Papyri, VI.902:11 εἰς τελείων γὰρ ἀνατροπὴν καὶ εἰς αἰχάτην ποινῶν (read εσχάτην ποίνων) ἀφορισάστην).

In the LXX τέλειος and ὁλόκληρος are used to express fitness for ritual purposes. Although synonyms, there is a distinction between τέλειος, which suggests the full development of that which is, and ὁλόκληρος, which suggests completeness in the sense of nothing lacking or being wanted, i. e., everything is present that should be present (cf. 1 Thess. 5:23 and James 1:4). Τέλειος is used much more frequently than ὁλόκληρος, but, apart

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1 Leg. 8.834C.

2 Ibid., 929C.

3 Cratylus, 403E; cf. Phaedrus, 269D, Timaeus, 30D, Leg. 647D, 678B; Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 972, 1054; Xenophon, Institutio Cyri, 1.2.4. Cf. Metaphysics, IV.16.1021b.12ff.

4 Moulton and Milligan, op. cit., p. 629.

from Psa. 138(139):22 where the Masoretic text has תַּכְלִית the same two Hebrew stock forms, שָׁלֵם [1] and תָּמַם [2] lie back of each of the examples of τέλειος .

In Judges 20:26B (וַיַּעֲלוּ עֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים לִפְנֵי יְהוָה ... καὶ ἀνήνεγκαν ὁλοκαυτώσεις καὶ τελείους ἐνώπιον κυρίου) שָׁלֵם is used of a specific offering brought before the Lord to express the harmony between man and God. The basic sense of שָׁלֵם is evident in 1(3) Kings 15:3: וְלֹא־הָיָה לְבָבוֹ שָׁלֵם עִם־יְהוָה אֱלֹהָיו כְּלֵבַב דָּוִד אָבִיו ... καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἡ καρδία αὐτοῦ τελεία μετὰ κυρίου θεοῦ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡ καρδία Δαυὶδ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. Wholeness and integration of the total person in harmony with God is portrayed, although stated negatively. Where the members within a person or persons among themselves express שָׁלֵם, there health and wholeness abide. The verb תָּמַם may be illustrated in the following passages: the Temple is conceived as "being completed" or "finished" in 1(3) Kings 6:22(וְאֵת כָּל־הַבַּיִת כִּלָּה ... καὶ ὅλον τὸν οἶκον περιέστελεν χρυσίῳ σὺν τελείᾳ πάντὸς τοῦ οἴκου. cf. 7:22), and in Joshua 4, the children of Israel are commanded to erect a memorial of stones at the place where they crossed over the Jordan. In verse 10, the priests stood in the river bed until everything that

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1 Judg. 20:26(21:4), 1(3) Kings 8:61, 11:4, 15:3, 14, 1 Chron. 28:9, Jer. 13:19.

2 Gen. 6:9, Exo. 12:5, Deut. 18:13, 1 Sam. (2 Kings) 22:26, 2 Esdras 2:63, Cant. 5:2, 6:8(9).

Yahweh had commanded "was finished/fulfilled" (. . .
עַד תֻּם כָּל־הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה יְהוָה
אֶת־יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כֵּן דִּבֶּר אֶל־הָעָם . . .
. . . ἕως οὗ συνετέλεσεν Ἰησοῦς πάντα, ἃ
ἐνετείλατο κύριος ἀναγγεῖλαι τῷ λαῷ . . .).
These examples[1] illustrate the basic notion of an accomplishment of sacred projects.[2]

It seems that τέλειος in its pre-Pauline use refers not to a state of perfection as the absence of moral turpitude, but to the subject reaching its object. The τέλος has been realized, grasped, attained; the subject has taken on the character of the τέλος or, to say it differently, the τέλος is now part and parcel of the subject (τέλειος). Apart from the τέλος there can be no τέλειος , no completeness, no wholeness, no sense of accomplishment, no reality of entirety. In Paul the τέλος is Christ who creates τέλειοι , disciples who are mature, complete, and whole.

The same sense of accomplishment in the realization of the τέλος is apparent in 1 Cor. 14:20 (Ἀδελφοί, μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε, ταῖς δὲ φρεσὶν τέλειοι γίνεσθε) and in Eph. 4:13 (μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἑνότητα τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον, εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ). In the former

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1 Cf. Psa. 73:19, Num. 17:28, 2 Kings 22:4, Jere. 44:12, 18, 27.

2 The adjective תָּמִים occurs in a predominantly

verse παιδία are contrasted with τέλειοι , both being qualified by ταῖς φρεσίν , a phrase which accentuates the judgmental or evaluative abilities of the Corinthians (cf. the contrasting evaluative concerns in Rom. 8:5, 11:20, 12:3, 16, 1 Cor. 13:11, Gal. 5:10, for example). Here Paul silhouettes metaphorically the judgmental ability of a child against the prowess of an adult, i. e., moral innocence as opposed to discretional maturity. In the Ephesian passage ἄνδρα τέλειον is distinguished from νήπιοι (4:14) within the context of the emphasis that all the diversification of gifts are under the same God (4:6), and are directed toward the Christ as head, in whom all the parts adequately and properly fit (4:15), and who gives true definition to the Christian community (4:16). Through the unity of faith and knowledge of the Son of God the Christian folk are exhorted to present a solidarity against the surging and tempestuous forces and doctrines which assail them.[1]

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cultic sense, illustrating wholeness, integrity, and entirety of knowledge (Job 36:4), the way of God (Psa. 18:31, 2 Sam. 22:31), periods of time (Lev. 25:30), etc. It is generally used (at least 52 times) in the requirements of sacrificing animals, and is translated in the LXX in every instance by ἄμωμος except Exo. 12:5, where τέλειος is found (du Plessis, ΤΕΛΕΙΟΣ : The Idea of Perfection in the New Testament, p. 94).

1 Other writers similarly utilize τέλειος to connote completeness or maturity instead of incompleteness or immaturity. Cf. e. g., Matthew 5:48 (Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν), which sums up the paragraph of 5:43-47 by pleading for mankind's manifestation of indiscriminate love as exemplified in the sun shining and the rain falling upon the

The complete is contrasted with the partial in 1 Cor. 13:10 (ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται), and τέλειοι with the imperfect in James 1:4 (ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι, ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι) and the provisional in Heb. 9:11 and James 1:25.

The remaining two Pauline references of τέλειος in Phil. 3:15 (Ὅσοι οὖν τέλειοι, τοῦτο φρονῶμεν· καὶ εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἀποκαλύψει) and Col. 1:28 (ὃν ἡμεῖς καταγγέλλομεν νουθετοῦντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον καὶ διδάσκοντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ, ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ) are more difficult to assess. As in 1 Cor. 2:6, these passages reflect gnostic or mystery religion influence.[1] The Philippians' reference is Paul's summary statement of the paragraph of 3:2-16 in which he exhorts his readers to know Jesus Christ and to understand the significance of this relationship, whether it be in sufferings or in the upward calling. Whatever the local coinage of τέλειοι, the term struck the highest value possible. In Colossians 1:28 the Apostle is convinced that proclamation and instruction of Jesus Christ in wisdom will eventuate in the fit presentation of the whole of mankind before the Christ. It is probable that the proximity of Colossae to Phrygia would suggest an influence

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just and unjust; cf. 19:21: Heb. 5:14, James 3:2, 1:17, 1 John 4:18.

1 At least there is a strong similarity in usage.

of an esoteric mystery cult background, with or without its cultic adumbrations. However, it must be remembered that ἐν χριστῷ controls the kind of life of the mature man in this reference. Wholeness and entirety have superseded partial and provisional realities; totality and integration become the characteristic pattern for the Christian life.[1]

Paul writes ἐπὶ πᾶσιν δὲ τούτοις τὴν ἀγάπην, ὅ ἐστιν σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος in Col. 3:14. In the paragraph of 3:5ff., the Apostle describes the nature of the old life as contrasted with the new life in Christ. The old categories of distinctiveness, e. g., circumcision, uncircumcision, Greek and Jew, barbarian, Scythian, slave man, free man (3:11), have no intrinsic quality which accrues merit to their behalf. On the contrary, the characteristics of the old life (3:5-9) are superseded by a new kind of life (3:10) which results in a different pattern of behavior (3:12f.). All of these Christian virtues are summed up in ἀγάπη (3:14), ὅ ἐστιν σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος. Σύνδεσμος literally is that which binds or fastens together two or more objects.[2]

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1 In the post-apostolic generation, baptism was interpreted as τέλειοι by Athanasius (Ar. i.34, ii.42), Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. xl; In Bapt., 44), and Clement of Alexandria (Strom. vi.60), where the baptized believer who is admitted to the full privileges of the Christian life is called τέλειος.

2 Cf. Thucydides, 2.75; Moulton and Milligan, op. cit., p. 604, cite Aristeas 85 (τοῦ θυμώματος δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ συνδέσμων κατὰ πὰς φλέας). Metaphorically, the σύνδεσμος

But, what is the relation of τῆς τελειότητος to the sentence? Abbott[1] sees it as a possessive genitive, the "link of perfection." Lightfoot interprets it as an objective genitive, "the power which unites and holds together all those graces and virtues which together make up perfection." On the other hand, the subjective genitive analysis suggests "the tie forged by τελειότης ." van Leewven treats it as a qualitative genitive, "perfect bond" (du Plessis, op. cit., pp. 200f.). The last possibility is comparable to that of a typical Hebrew construct relationship between two substantivals.[2]

Col. 3:14[3] is a description of the perfect unity of

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is a bond of union that keeps together anything, e. g., the state (ὁ σύνδεσμος τῆς πόλεως , Plato, Republic, 520A). In the LXX τελειότης translates תֻּמִּים in Judg. 9:16,19 (...וְעַתָּה אִם־בֶּאֱמֶת וּבְתָמִים עֲשִׂיתֶם καὶ νῦν εἰ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἐν τελειότητι ἐποιήσατε... and...אִם־בֶּאֱמֶת וּבְתָמִים עֲשִׂיתֶם καὶ εἰ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τελειότητι ἐποιήσατε. . . , respectively). Jotham and the men of Shechem are put "on the spot" as regards the integrity of their motive in making Abimelech king. Did they act out of "genuineness" and "wholesomeness," or did they have treachery in mind all the while? (cf. Wisdom 6:15, 12:17).

1 A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, p. 288.

2 It should be noticed that a textual problem further complicates the issue.

3 Cf. Heb. 6:1 where the elementary (ἀρχή) doctrine of Christ is contrasted with the most complete view of Christ (ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα φερώμεθα). The Epistle to the Hebrews contains all the words of the τελει-family except τελείως (1 Pet. 1:13). Although several references have been made to the Epistle, a more thorough study needs to be made of the significance of these ideas. Bishop Westcott's able but old commentary, The Epistle to

the Church, grounded in and guided by love. The plethora of racial, social and cultural factors of the Colossian and our days produce many divisive factors, factors which the Church must face but factors which in themselves are not the criteria of the Church. Love overcomes all the forces mustered to sequester the Church; the diversified Church (3:11) manifests itself in the common characteristics of the Christian life (3:12f.). There may be neither unanimity of wills nor uniformity of folk, but there should not be any discrimination within the confines of the redeemed and redeeming people of God. This does not suggest that love is a self-sufficient bond which truly unites the Church. On the contrary, the Apostle sees love being governed by the person and work of the Risen Christ. The teleology of Paul is focused toward and empowered by the Risen Christ who makes God known in this world.

Teleology in Paul is presented also in the sense of fullness and wholeness, with particular reference to the filling up or out with content. For example, in Rom. 15:13 (ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς ἐλπίδος πληρώσαι ὑμᾶς πάσης χαρᾶς καὶ εἰρήνης. . .) and 2 Thess. 1:11 (. . .ἵνα ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσῃ τῆς κλήσεως ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν καὶ πληρώσῃ πᾶσαν εὐδοκίαν ἀγαθωσύνης καὶ ἔργον πίστεως ἐν δυνάμει. . .), Paul asserts

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the Hebrews, contains a succinct statement (pp. 63ff.) and weighty comments in loco on the terms which are concentrated more here than elsewhere: τέλειος (5:14, 9:11); τελειότης (6:1); τελειοῦν, both of Christ (2:10, 5:9, 7:28) and of men (10:14, 11:40, 12:23); τελειωτής (12:2, unique); τελείωσις (7:11, elsewhere only Lk. 1:45). Cf. A. Wikgren, op. cit., for a recent but too brief article.

that God will fill his people with a life which expresses itself virtuously. One is reminded of the use of πλήρης (not found in Paul!) and in John 1:14 (. . . καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας)where both δόξα and πλήρης are complementary appositives to λόγος , explaining both the person of the revelation and the event of the revelation (Delling, op. cit., 284). In the Acts of the Apostles,[1] πλήρης is associated with the Holy Spirit or the works produced by the Spirit. To be full of the Holy Spirit or of wisdom or of good works, e. g., does not suggest a "pouring in" but, on the contrary, a kind of life in which the Holy Spirit or wisdom or good works thoroughly and consistently operates.[2] In Eph. 4:10 (ἵνα πληρώσῃ τὰ πάντα), the descending and ascending Christ has filled all of creation - heaven and earth. The divine Son represents the all—pervasiveness of God.

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1 Πλήρης describes the qualifications of the seven (6:3 πλήρεις πνεύματος καὶ σοφίας), the man Stephen (6:5 ἄνδρα πλήρη πίστεως καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου , 6:8 πλήρης χάριτος καὶ δυνάμεως , 7:55 πλήρης πνεύματος ἁγίου . Cf. Eph. 5:18 which is in a word-play with καὶ μὴ μεθύσκεσθε οἴνῳ , . . . ἀλλὰ πληροῦσθε ἐν πνεύματι , instrumental use of ἐν , Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 195.2. Cf. also Dorcas of Joppa (9:36 πλήρης ἔργων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐλεημοσυνῶν), Barnabas (11:24 πλήρης πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ πίστεως), Elymas the magician (13:10 πλήρης παντὸς δόλου καὶ πάσης ῥαδιουργίας cf. Rom. 1:29), and the artisans in Ephesus in response to Demetrius' speech (19:28 πλήρεις θυμοῦ).

2 Cf. Phil. 1:11 and Col. 1:9, of which both statements contradict the interpretation of Moulton and Milligan's (op. cit.,p519) "full payment"; cf. Rom. 15:14, 2 Tim. 1:4.

J. A. Robinson[1] interprets the Christ as the ". . . Divine Fulfiller, to whom it appertains in the purpose of God to fill all things with their appropriate fulness: to bring the universe to its destined goal, its final correspondence with the Divine ideal" (cf. Jer. 23:24, Eph. 1:10). The Heavenly Redeemer is not simply revealing; he is assisting the creation to fulfill its destiny. His role is essential for the divine teleology. He is not simply restoring a fading Jewish splendor (2 Cor. 3:4ff), but is fulfilling the divine plan by bringing the totality of creation into relationship with God.

In Eph 3:19 (ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ) and 1:23 (τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου) the fulness of all things finds its origin in God. This term is found outside Paul only once in Matt. (9:16) and John (1:16), and three times in Mark (2:21, 6:43, 8:20). Delling indicates that it connotes the sense of the fulness of content and completeness, whether of unbrokenness or of unitedness ("πλήρωμα," TWNT, VI, p. 297). And in classical Greek it emphasizes the complete realization and representation of the potential, and connotes a full company or complement in the papyri.

The term is frequently employed in Gnostic thought[2]

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1 The Epistle to the Ephesians, p. 96.

2 Cf., e. g., Libellus 12:15b of the Corpus Hermeticum

and refers generally to the whole system of aeons.[1] The fulness of being - the whole ontological framework - is contrasted with emptiness by Epiphanius[2] as seen also in Phil. 2:7 and in Mark 6:43 and 8:20 in the feeding of the hungry folk. (Cf. Acts 2:2, 5:28, John 12:3, Matt. 13:48, Luke 3:5 for similar use of πληροῦν .)

Πλήρωμα is related to a number of different entities in the Pauline corpus. In Rom. 11:25 (... ὅτι πώρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους τῷ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν ἄχρι οὗ τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰσέλθῃ) the "fulness of the Gentiles" suggests Gentiles of every sort and kind, i. e., all types of paganism. In the aforementioned Eph. 3:19, πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ θεοῦ contextually does not imply that God has been empty and is now filled by Christ and the saints. Rather, all things find their totality in God, not in his attributes or properties. God is God, and not a summary of all that is good and noble; he is not simply life raised to its highest power.

In Eph. 4:13 (. . . εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ) the mature man (εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον)

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in W. Scott, Hermetica, I(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 232f.: ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος, ὁ μέγας θεός, καὶ τοῦ μείζονος εἰκών, καὶ ἡνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ φυλάσσων τὴν τάξιν κατ[ὰ τὴν] βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς . A. D. Nock, Corpus Hermeticum, I, p. 180; C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935), p. 127; Reitzenstein, Poimandres, p. 25, n. 1; p. 238, n. 12.

1 Cf. Epiphanius, Haer., 31.10.13, 31.13.16; Hippolytus, Ref., VI.29.6; Irenaeus, Haer., I.1.1.; Philo, V Moses, II.62, Spec. Leg., I, 272.

2 Haer., 31.16.1.

is favorably compared with the measure of maturity, the fulness of Christ. Again, this is not Christ "all filled up and brimming over," but Christ as the one who gives gifts to mankind (4:7-13), stabilizes man amid the viccissitudes of life (4:14), and exhorts man to express himself in love as a total being (4:15-16). The fulness of divine love and power work and reign through the Christ, as evidenced in Col. 1:19 (ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι). The plenitude of God - the totality of the divine manifestations, i. e., rather than attributes or aeons,[1] - is visible in Jesus Christ (cf. Eph. 3:17).

These and other examples[2] suggest that τὸ πλήρωμα is not a constituent fullness quantitatively measured, but rather, that by which something is able to act in its own characteristic manner despite the diversity of manifestations. The fact that the term also performs technically in the Gnostic systems does not necessarily detract from or add to its luster in Paul's writings. In his correspondence, the pleroma is not seen as the apex of all the

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1 Cf., for example, de Faye,E., Gnostiques et Gnosticisme. Etude critique des documents du gnosticisme chrétien au IIme et IIIme siecle, 2me ed. augmentée, 1925; Dupont, J., Gnosis. La Connaissance Religieuse dans les Epitres de St. Paul, 1949; Quispel, G., Gnosis als Weltreligion?, 1951; Sagnard, Francois-M.-M., La gnose valentinienne et la témoignage de Saint Irénée, 1947, for apt descriptions of the gnostic systems.

2 Rom. 15:29, ἐν πληρώματι εὐλογίας Χριστοῦ , 13:10 πλήρωμα οὖν νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη , Gal. 4:4 τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου.

aeons of the created order, but, on the contrary, it portrays the intrinsic manner of action characteristic to any reality. That is to say, τὸ πλήρωμα is not a system of orders, but an expression of totality germane to the reality.

Delling[1] in his five-fold analysis of πληροῦν in the New Testament, observes that the verb is often used in reference to accomplishment. In Col. 4:17 Paul writes to Archippus[2] that he should pay serious attention to his ministry in his expression of it to the community. In Rom. 15:19b[3] Paul is concerned to carry the gospel of Christ from Jerusalem around the Mediterranean shore to Illyricum. To visit the important centers is Paul's methodology to spread the gospel unto all of the areas (cf. Col. 1:25). Further, he urges the accomplishment of the completion of his joy by the Philippian Christians.[4] The teleology implicit in these examples are consistently similar to that already observed with τελεῖν and its cognates.

The Apostle conceives his ministry to be an essential facet of the purposeful work of God. He opens six of his letters with the affirmation that it is because of τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ that he is an apostle entrusted with

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1 Op. cit., pp. 290ff.

2 Βλέπε τὴν διακονίαν ἣν παρέλαβες ἐν κυρίῳ, ἵνα αὐτὴν πληροῖς.

3 ὥστε με ἀπὸ Ἰερουσαλὴμ καὶ κύκλῳ μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ πεπληρωκέναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

4 (2:2 πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαρὰν ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, cf. 2 Cor. 10:6.)

a ministry among them.[1] In Rom. 12:2 (ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον), Col. 4:12 (ἵνα σταθῆτε τέλειοι καὶ πεπληροφορημένοι ἐν παντὶ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ), and 1 Thess. 4:3 (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ ἁγιασμὸς ὑμῶν, ἀπέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας), Paul relates the Christian life to the three communities in various but appropriate categories. The reality of renewed life stems from the divine will at work among them. It is also called the will of Christ (Eph. 1:5, 9, 11, Col. 1:9) in that he reveals the divine plan for this world.[2] Paul's ministry was "staked off" for the purpose of continuing to proclaim the good news of God now seen particularly in Jesus Christ.[3] The attacks made upon Paul were not only against him, but they were outbursts against the divine teleology within which he was operating.[4] This was not his ministry; it was under the direction of τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ , and he had been designated as a δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ and κλητὸς ἀπόστολος (Rom. 1:1).

A sharply defined illustration of the full manifestation

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1 Rom. 1:10, 1 Cor. 1:1, 2 Cor. 1:1, Gal. 1:4, Eph. 1:1, Col. 1:1.

2 Cf. 2 Cor. 8:5, Eph. 6:6, 1 Thess. 5:18.

3 ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ , Rom. 1:1; cf. Gal. 1:15.

4 Cf. 2 Cor. 11:16ff., Phil. 3:2ff., Gal. 1:6ff.

of God's purposeful work is seen in 2 Cor. 3-4, where the glory of Moses' countenance on Mt. Sinai is contrasted with the present glory of God. The contrast of the Mosaic ministry with the ministry of the Spirit focuses attention on the fading splendor of the Mosaic heritage with the concomitant illumination of the new life in Jesus Christ. The glory of God is not the classical Greek notion of opinion or meaning as much as it is the weighty import (כָּבוֹד) of God.[1] That is to say, δόξα is not man's isolated opinion or conclusion; in this context it is the full manifestation of God's whole work.[2] The sacred example of Moses' glorious encounter on Mt. Sinai is dull and almost non-existent in the face of God's glory in the Christ.

The δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ is not conceived in terms of human wishes or accomplishment, but in the real quality of God. Paul alludes to this in 1 Cor. 15:40-43 where he discusses δόξα as the resurrection life over against ἐπιγείων , and the brilliance (Shekinah) of the luminaries which are only suggestions toward the life beyond the earthly sojourn. All honor and praise is to be given

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1 Kittel ("δόξα ," TWNT, II, pp. 236ff.) observes that the Greeks used the term in its etymological sense of meaning or subjective meaning as rooted in δοκεῖν . von Rad (op. cit., pp. 240ff.) points out the semantic shift from its etymological rootage to a notion of respect (Ehre) to that of weight or importance (Gewichtige) (cf. Pss. 19, 63, 66:2, 79:9).

2 Cf. e. g., Col. 1:11, 27, Phil. 4:19, Eph. 1:6, 12, 14, 17, 18, 3:16, 1 Thess. 2:12.

the divine δόξα,[1] whose glory is incomparable (Rom. 8:18). Those who receive ἡ δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ have been "staked out before"[2] and subscribed to the divine action of the Son who is God's true representative;[3] God has chosen, called, justified and glorified them.[4] Yet this δόξα is not completely futuristic. For example, in 1 Cor. 6:20 (δοξάσατε δὴ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν) Paul urges the saints at Corinth to use their bodies for the purpose God had given them, i. e., as sanctuaries of the Holy Spirit (6:19), not as prostitutes.

The last example opens up an important consideration of the relationship between God's present work and future fulfillment. This life <u>is</u> meaningful even though the philosophy of <u>contemptuous mundi</u> has demurred. Dodd's contribution of "realized eschatology"[5] has called our attention to the emphasis found in the New Testament that the future is already present in the experience of faith. Jesus Christ is the eschatological act of God; his redeeming power is at work in this world.

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1 Cf. Phil. 1:11, 2:11, 3:19, 4:20, Apk. 4:11, 5:12, 13.

2 Rom. 8:29, προώρισεν.

3 Rom. 8:29, συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ.

4 Rom. 8:30 ἐδόξασεν, cf. 2 Cor. 9:13.

5 <u>The Parables of the Kingdom</u>, rev. ed., 1961.

The paradoxical statement regarding Abraham in Rom. 4:18[1] indicates that the fullness of God's promises were not realized during his lifetime. Conficence arises out of the idea of ἐλπίς in the future fulfillment of those promises (1 Cor. 15:19). Not even death dims the possibility of life; our hope is in the fact that God is still raising his people from the dead (2 Cor. 1:10). We stand before God in his grace, and the ground of our effrontery is based upon the hope of the glory of God.[2] Even the disharmonious creation has hope (Rom. 8:20ff.), and in the hope of redemption of the creation and our body we are restored to a harmonious relationship with the Creator.[3] The Christian characteristically rejoices (Rom. 12:12 τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες), and the heathen is depicted as μὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα (1 Thess. 4:13). Both conditions are the result of a relationship or lack of it with πίστις.[4]

The believer is involved in a process that is not merely a direction; something decisive has already happened in the events centered in the person of Jesus. This implies, at the same time, that a process has been set in motion from

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1 ὃς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον.

2 . . . καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ Rom. 5:2; cf. 5:4, 5.

3 τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν Rom. 8:24.

4 Cf. Bultmann, "ἐλπίς," TWNT, II, pp. 528ff.; cf. 1 Cor. 13:13, 1 Thess. 1:3, Rom. 15:13.

the time of Jesus in which now the believer is set. Hope is much more than a wish; it is the realization that the God who was manifested in Jesus is also leading his people toward their goal appointed by him. In a sense, the eschaton has been realized partially; however, it has not been realized with finality.

Paul presents the teleological nature of the created things in his distinction between the old aeon and the new. In Rom. 3:21 (νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται,..), for example, the Apostle characterizes the new aeon of the righteousness of God as manifested apart from the law and focused in Jesus Christ. The old aeon is under the dominion of Satan (Rom. 12:2, Eph. 1:21, 2:1ff., 1 Cor. 1:20, 2:6, 8) who prevented things from reaching their goal despite an intrinsic teleology implicit in them. The new aeon implicit in the νυνὶ δέ construction is signified by χωρὶς νόμου (cf. Rom. 7:6) and δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται. The new aeon is under the dominion of the Christ who assists the created things to reach the destiny for which they have been made. The power of sin which thwarts the intrinsic teleology of an entity is destroyed by the power of the Christ. We are no longer in bondage to sin but are slaves to God (Rom. 6:22, 7:16, 11:30); we who were distant and strangers have been brought to God (Eph. 2:13). Just as the signification of the new age is the resurrection of Christ (1 Cor. 15:20), so also we share in the new aeon (Col. 1:21) in being designated members of

Christ's body (1 Cor. 12:18) and exhibiting evidences of the age (Col. 3:8).

A world apart from Christ can never reach its goal even if it possesses its own teleology implicit with the order of things. The old aeon under the power of evil has no essential purpose. This evil power (personified as Satan) is experienced in that which interferes and frustrates our desires and capacities to fulfill our lives. We are engaged in a "time-ful" era under the lordship of the Christ. This means that a chronological or calendrical criterion of evaluation is somewhat meaningless in that it is God and not the intrinsic dynamic of the thing which brings it to fruition.

The role of Jesus the Christ is absolutely essential in Paul's teleological pattern. The "golden age of Judaism" is not being restored, but God's plan is fulfilled in the divine and risen Lord. The wholeness of the created order makes sense only within the framework of the purposeful work of God. If the teleology were intrinsic and not divine, there would be no possibility for a non-teleological structure. An intrinsic teleology would have infinitesimal changes, but Christ's new age, although stable, is full of life oriented toward the maker of all life.

V TOTALITY IN PAUL: ANTHROPOLOGY

Modern man is faced with a bewildering array of studies on the human being. The current emphases on man - his predicament and possibilities - have been fostered by the behavioral scientists, the philosophers of existence and the theologians. His impulses and drives are catalogued; he sees himself as an uncontrolled package of passion or as an insensitive mass of existence. He learns from analysis that he is the product of his and other ages; indeed, his destiny not only involves him but he is inextricably bound to others.

To ascertain the manner by which Paul describes man one must, via exegesis, examine those passages where the Apostle devotes primary attention to mankind. This in itself will require a careful examination of many terms in order to attempt to understand the meaning of the words in their usage. Rather than adopt the methodology of examining one specific motif, e. g., εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ , the investigator will study how such terms as σάρξ , σῶμα , νοῦς , ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος , πνεῦμα , καρδία , ἐγώ , and ψυχή are used in describing the meaning and relationship of man.

The venerable Apostle, in Rom. 7, particularly verses 7-25, describes an unforgettably identifiable experience. Thus, his plight is vividly portrayed: ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ' ὃ μισῶ

τοῦτο ποιῶ. 16εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ,
σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός. 17νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ
κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐνοικοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ
ἁμαρτία. 18οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ'
ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειταί
μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὔ. 19οὐ γὰρ
ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν
τοῦτο πράσσω. 20εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω ἐγὼ τοῦτο ποιῶ,
οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ ἡ οἰκοῦσα
ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. (15-20).

The pressures and tendencies of life are irresistibly strong. A continuous struggle between ἁμαρτία, on the one hand, and κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον (22), on the other, ensues. All the members of the body are subject to this effort of capture.[1] The entire person is geared to the charge and counter-charge of this tension. The resultant state of Paul is hardly desirable: Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; (24).

Scholars have been divided in their opinions of the paragraph of 7:7-25. Many have argued cogently that this "soliloquy" reflects Paul's pre-Christian life, while others equally have insisted that this is a testimonium of his conversion.[2]

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1 ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου.

2 For example, both W. G. Kümmel, Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus, 1929, and A. F. N. Lekkerkerker,

Most of these works have been centered upon a discussion of biblical man in terms of his outstanding characteristics and features, his relationship (in the New Testament) to the concepts of Hebrew and Greek ideas of man, and in the case of Paul, his general preference for the Hebrew concept of man. The comparative study of the various anthropological terms of man has resulted in an amazing collection of data interspersed with a variety of interpretation. Most of the data concerning Paul's view of man may be assessed in terms of his dependency upon Greek or Hebrew sources. Methodologically, the greatest weakness

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Römer 7 und Römer 9 bei Augustin, 1942, present the disputatious history of interpretation of the paragraph as well as comprehensive bibliographies. Perhaps the citadel of Baur who emphasized the "pre-Christian versus Christian" arguments has been "de-ghosted" in the current contributions on the nature of man being submitted by the students of anthropology.

The interlocking areas of biblical, New Testament and Pauline anthropology have received considerable attention since Baur, and particularly in the last three decades. Among the materials are P. Dhorme, L'Emploi metaphorique des noms de parties des corp en hebreu et en accadien, first printed in separate articles in Revue Biblique, 1920-23; H. W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913, pp. 4-67; J. Pedersen, Israel, I-II (Copenhagen: Branner og Korch, 1926), passim; D. W. Eichrodt, Theologie des Alten Testaments (3te Auflage.; Teil 2, Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1950), pp. 65-77; L. Köhler, Der Hebräische Mensch, (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1953); E. T., 1955; Köhler, Theologie des Alten Testaments, (3te Auflage; Tübingen; J. C. B. Mohr, 1953); A. R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel (Cardiff: U. of Wales Press, 1949); E. C. Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), pp. 101-116; W. G. Kümmel, Das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament, pp. 21ff.; W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, 1956; E. Best, Body of Christ, 1955; Gutbrod, Die Paulinische Anthropologie, 1934; Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, pp. 191-269; J. A. T. Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (SBT 5), 1952.

of the studies has been the neglect of the structure of reality underlying the "doctrine" of man. The exegetical comparisons have not taken seriously the semantic implications of the way man is regarded in his relationships with God, the world, and himself.

For example, the argument in 7:7-25 has centered in the interpretation given to the relationship of σάρξ and ἁμαρτία, on the one hand, and ἔσω ἄνθρωπος and νοῦς, on the other. Lüdemann[1] has suggested that the more complex Hellenistic dichotomy of soul and body was combined with a simple Jewish stratum in Paul and this dualistic nature was the necessary cause of sin and corruption. Lüdemann's double doctrine of the nature of man was not uncommon for the latter half of the nineteenth century, but, apart, from H. H. Wendt,[2] most scholars preferred the interpretation that the Hellenistic notion overwhelmed the Jewish in most of Paul's writings. O. Pfleiderer[3] asserted that σάρξ is not morally neutral but has an active proclivity towards death, and a causality opposed to the spirit. Although he describes σάρξ as the seat of sin in an effort to avoid identification of σάρξ and ἁμαρτία, his discussion of Romans 7 obviates such an effort.[4]

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1 Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, 1872.

2 Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachegebrauch, 1878.

3 Paulinism, I, E. T., 1877, pp. 53ff.; Primitive Christianity, I, pp. 276ff.

4 Ibid.

Bousset was similarly disposed in his discussion of Christ's flesh not being sin.[1] Such a view defines sin essentially as sensuality, not rebellion or self-reliance.

But, is this the method by which to understand Paul's notion about man? Investigation of his anthropology again, although involving an evaluation of the primary terms analogate to man, will be directed not toward the origins but toward the manner in which Paul 1)relates man to a structure of reality, and 2)discusses the ontological principle of reality.

It appears from the foregoing that Paul is not using σάρξ as sinfulness in itself, but as representing that which is external and visible in man as opposed to that which is internal and invisible.[2] The term often may be substituted for a personal reference. In 2 Cor. 7:5[3]

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1 Kyrios Christos: Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenaeus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926), p. 127:

> In seinem irdischen Dasein, . . . hat Christus eben in Beziehung zur Sünde gestanden; mit dem einen Teil seines Wesens ist er in Dieser niederen Welt zu Hause gewesen (Rö. 1,1ff. κατὰ σάρκα). Es liegt hier ein furchtbares Geheimnis vor, das Paulus in die paradoxen Worte, Gott habe seinen Sohn gesandt ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας (Rö. 8, 3), zusammenfaBt. Dieser Christus, der Sohn Gottes, hat Sündenfleisch, Fleisch, das seinem Wesen nach notwendig sündig war, an sich getragen! . . . Fleisch ohne Sünde ist ein für Paulus unvollziehbarer Gedanke.

2 Cf. Rom. 7:5, 13, 18ff.; 2:27ff., 2 Cor. 4:16, 3:6.

3 ... οὐδεμίαν ἔσχηκεν ἄνεσιν ἡ σάρξ ἡμῶν.

ἡ σάρξ is a periphrasis for the first personal pronoun "I," as also exhibited in the parallel passage οὐκ ἔσχηκα ἄνεσιν τῷ πνεύματί μου in 2 Cor. 2:13.[1] Such a usage leads one to the conclusion that σάρξ does not refer to one particular anatomical designation, but, on the contrary, it refers to the whole man under the aspect of flesh. This "createdness" of man emphasizes his distance from God. He stands in the descent of Abraham,[2] and David was in the ancestry of Jesus (Rom. 1:3), as well as the Jews being Paul's συγγενῶν . . . κατὰ σάρκα .[3]

Σάρξ belongs to man and not to God. The weakness and mortality of man is exhibited in the σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί of 2 Cor. 12:7 and the ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς . . ., καὶ τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου of Gal. 4:13, 14.[4] The impotent and transitory qualities of created humanity are vividly portrayed in the contrast with God. Not only is man weak; he is mortal, i. e., he has the directionality of death.[5] The ambiguous κατὰ σάρκα not only refers to the natural, genealogical

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1 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:11, Col. 1:24, Gal. 1:16, Rom. 6:19, 7:18.

2 Rom. 4:1, 1 Cor. 10:18; cf. Gutbrod, op. cit., pp. 91ff.

3 Rom. 9:3; cf. 11:14; cf. Schweizer, "σάρξ," TWNT, VII, pp. 125f.

4 Cf. Col. 1:22, 1 Cor. 15:39.

5 Cf. Phil. 3:3, 1 Cor. 15:43f., 2 Cor. 10:2, 1:7, 4:16ff., Rom. 6:19, Gal. 6:8, 1 Cor. 5:5.

descent of man,[1] but it is used technically to state opposition to God and Christ.[2] The neutral and natural σάρξ becomes the epitome of sin, not as a corrupting but corrupted element, not as the criminal but as the involuntary accomplice to the act of sin.[3] This sinful existence or attitude[4] is realized in the direction and activities of the κόσμος ,[5] e. g., seeking those things of the earth,[6] or boasting in the flesh,[7] or turning away from the Creator to the created things.[8]

Σάρξ [9] is seen as the domain in which the reality of evil expressed as a power of sinfulness (ἁμαρτία) reigns. It is the figure employed by the Apostle to denote the essential characteristic of mankind as being a creature

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1 Rom. 4:1, 1 Cor. 10:18, Gal. 2:15.

2 Rom. 8:4-5; cf. parallel κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου in Eph. 2:2; contrast κατὰ πνεῦμα in Rom. 8:4f., κατὰ κύριον in 2 Cor. 11:17, and κατὰ ἀγάπην in Rom. 4:15; cf. J. A. T. Robinson, The Body, p. 24.

3 W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, rev. ed., 1955, p. 19.

4 Bultmann, op. cit., I, pp. 235ff.

5 Kümmel, op. cit., pp. 21f.

6 Col. 3:1f., Phil. 3:19.

7 Phil. 3:3f., Gal. 6:13, 2 Cor. 11:18; cf. 1 Cor. 3:21, 2 Cor. 1:9, 5:12.

8 2 Cor. 3:5f., 1:12, Rom. 1:18ff.; Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 235ff., 239, indicates that this self-reliance of man is really self-deluding.

9 Found ninety-six times in Pauline and deutero-Pauline writings, Moulton & Geden, A Concordance to the Greek Testament, pp. 887f.

subjected to the forces about it. It is acted upon rather than acts; it limits in identification rather than creates. It is the seat of the πνεῦμα, where ἁμαρτία is now abiding.

The power of ἁμαρτία τῇ σαρκί is contrasted with συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου in 7:22-23. As Jeremias[1] has indicated, the phrase ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is contrasted with ὁ ἔξω ἄνθρωπος, the intransitory aspect of man contrasted with his physical and transitory side.[2] Here, in Rom. 7:22, it appears to be synonymous with νοῦς, used in parallelism in 7:23. Bultmann[3] understands the phrase to be a formal designation for his "real self in distinction from his σῶμα, the self which has become objectivized in relation to himself." He sees the phrase as being derived from the anthropology of Hellenistic dualism. Plato has a sequel phrase in ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος,[4] using it as the rational soul as distinct from the lower parts of the soul, with the notion

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1 "ἄνθρωπος," TWNT, I, pp. 365ff.

2 The idiom ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is found only three times in the New Testament, all in Pauline or deutero-Pauline writings.

3 Op. cit., pp. 203, 212.

4 Republic, 589A.

of moral assessment plus the ability to think.

C. H. Dodd[1] interprets the phrase to be equal with νοῦς , which bears the meaning of "reason," common to Greek philosophers. This "reason" was related to the higher order which was spiritual, and "flesh" was related to the lower order. In the wider Romans context, ἔσω ἄνθρωπος , νοῦς , and πνεῦμα all appear on one side, sharply opposed to ἁμαρτία working through σάρξ , on the other.[2]

In Romans 7:22f. ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is used synonymously with νοῦς . In Rom. 12:2[3] the Apostle suggests that the νοῦς is directly and significantly related to Christian commitment and behavior. The term νοῦς is difficult to assess. It indicates divine life in the mysteries,[4] or man in his best expression, or even God the Father in Poimandres (XIII.21).[5] In the Old Testament it translates נֶפֶשׁ , emphasizing the sense of volition or will. Bultmann contends[6] that νοῦς is not only a contemplative

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1 The Epistle to the Romans, p. 114.

2 Cf. 2 Cor. 4:16, Eph. 3:16.

3 τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός , cf. 1 Cor. 1:10.

4 Reitzenstein, Die Hellenistischen Mysteriensreligionen, pp. 408ff.

5 Cf. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, pp. 118, 125.

6 Op. cit., I, pp. 211f.

attitude, but that it also reflects the Old Testament idea of volition. J. Behm[1] suggests that the philosophical or mystical usage is missing in the New Testament as is the notion of the divine element in man.

In Phil. 4:7, where he implies νοῦς is a universal human possession, and in 1 Cor. 14:14, where it is not regarded as one of the gifts of the believer, Paul portrays the fact that essentially the term is morally neutral. It may become a power for good under the aegis of the Spirit;[2] conversely, it may be dominated by the flesh and become corrupt.[3] Paul uses νοῦς not as a faculty of man, but as self-awareness.[4] The self is sensitive to either good direction by the Spirit, or disastrous guidance by sin residing in the flesh. Only as the person is sensitively aware can one respond effectively.

Biblical scholars have been obsessed in their efforts to determine the legacy which lies behind the Pauline σάρξ. Both in Greek literature and the LXX, as well as בָּשָׂר in the Hebrew text, the term has substantially the same physiological meaning.[5]

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1 "νοῦς," TWNT, IV, pp. 956f.

2 As in Rom. 11:36, 1 Cor. 2:16, or 2 Cor. 2:11.

3 As illustrated in Rom. 1:28ff., Eph. 4:16ff., and Col. 2:18.

4 Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., I, p. 213.

5 After considerable research in this area which is unnecessary for this work, the investigator concluded that there was no real fruit to be harvested in this venture.

The willing function of man may be best expressed in terms of καρδία which, morally neutral, desires both good (Rom. 10:1) and bad (Rom. 1:24) things, suffers sorrow (2 Cor. 2:4) and experiences love (2 Cor. 7:2). Although καρδία is the apparent root of emotional states of consciousness (e. g., Rom. 9:2), primarily, καρδία has reference to enlightenment rather than intellectualism per se as in Rom. 1:21 where moral foolishness and not intellectual weakness is described.[1] But its volitional aspect is seen in Rom. 2:5 where the impenitent heart is engaged entirely in doing wrong and bringing the wrath of God upon it. J. Behm[2] states "the heart is the central organ of the body and the seat of the physical vital energy." It is the seat of the emotions, of understanding, and of the will - the center of the religious life from which the moral attitude is determined.[3] Καρδία , rather than πνεῦμα , approximates the function of νοῦς . Unless 2 Cor. 3:2 is an exception, Paul never, in his fifty[4] uses of the word, employs καρδία in a purely physical or simply figurative manner. From his use of the term there appeared to be no reason for a discussion of the physiological aspects; what he knew about the blood circulatory system

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1 Cf. 2 Cor. 9:7.

2 TWNT, III, p. 614.

3 Ibid., p. 615; Gutbrod, op. cit., p. 75.

4 Fifty-two if 1 Tim. 1:5 and 2 Tim. 2:22 are included.

is a matter of conjecture. At the outset, it was used in a physiological sense.[1] Concomitantly, it was regarded as the seat of the spiritual life.[2]

The Hebrews used לֵב (לֵבָב) specifically as the "focal point of a whole range of psychical activity," as Aubrey Johnson points out.[3] Of the more than eighty terms which represent parts of the body, לֵב is the most important of the central organs.[4] Illustrations from Ruth 3:7, "when Boaz had eaten and drunk and his heart was glad" means "he was contented," and Prov. 15:15, "all the days of the afflicted are evil; and the good of heart has a continual feast," reveal the identification of the person as לֵב. The emotive characteristic is seen in Jeremiah's despairing cry: "I am beyond recovery because I am grief-stricken; my heart is faint."[5]

Both the noetic and volitional elements of לֵב are depicted in Samson telling Delilah "all his heart" (Judg. 16:17, 18) and subsequently losing his Nazirite power. When Jonathan went to the garrison of the Philistines and

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1 Homer, Iliad, 10.94 κραδίη δέ μοι ἔξω στηθέων ἐκθρώσκει, Plato, Symposium, 215d, ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ, cited in TWNT, III, p. 611.

2 Homer, Iliad, 9.646 ἀλλά μοι αἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ.

3 Op. cit., p. 77.

4 Found 850 times in the Old Testament, Koehler, L. and Baumgartner, W., Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros, p. 468.

5 8:18; cf. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 77f., for an impressive catalog of 94 examples.

consulted his armorbearer, the latter said, "Do all which is in your heart; go there, and behold, I am with you according to your heart."[1] In modern parlance, the idiom would be expressed something like "whatever is on your mind, go and do it; I agree with your thinking." "To lay something upon the heart" (שָׂם עַל-לֵב Isa. 57:1) is "to bear it in mind." When Moses turned the waters of the Nile to blood, and the Egyptian magicians had done the same with their incantations, Pharaoh no more "set his heart to this,"[2] i. e., he "dismissed it from his mind."

Without invalidating the primary physiological characteristic of καρδία , Paul uses the term psychically as the self which responds to the will of God. The actions of καρδία , as νοῦς , are not self-contained actions. These actions are the responsible involvements of man toward life. Enlightenment comes to him from God through his spirit, and in accord with his will.

In Rom. 7 and 8, Paul describes his spiritual pilgrimage. Particularly in 7:7-25, as pointed out earlier, the conflict of realistic and ideal Christian living is depicted.[3] There can be no doubt that the Apostle uses ἐγώ with reference to himself. The context of these

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1 1 Sam. 14:7 וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ נְשָׂא כֵלָיו עֲשֵׂה כָּל-אֲשֶׁר בִּלְבָבֶךָ
נְטֵה לָךְ הִנֵּנִי עִמְּךָ כִּלְבָבֶךָ

2 Exo. 7:3 וַאֲנִי אַקְשֶׁה אֶת-לֵב פַּרְעֹה

3 E. g., 7:19 οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω.
7:20 εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω ἐγὼ τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ
ἀλλὰ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία.

chapters suggests that ἐγώ is the spontaneous action of the individual, whether it be good or bad. At no place is the ἐγώ equated with God. It is not unexpected that the author of the Fourth Gospel uses ἐγώ and ἐγὼ εἰμί on the lips of Jesus more than any other New Testament writer. His appraisal of Jesus in terms of the structure of reality results in both a different methodology than that of the Synoptists and a more reflective analysis of the ontological principle of reality.

Paul relates the ἐγώ and ὁ θεός within the framework of πίστις, a central idea and relationship of the Apostle. The necessary harmony between ἐγώ and θεός is brought together in an intimate dependency of the "I" upon the Father of all. There is no fusion of the self-awareness of the ἐγώ into the reality of the divine. To know oneself is not the same as knowing God, nor is the methodology of finding objectivity in subjectivity necessarily commendable or correct. The current emphasis of subjective evaluation, whether of Freud or of Heidegger, as the way, mutatis mutandis, of engaging in a meaningful experience with true Reality neglects the dimension of reality which defies the positivistic criteria of assessment.

When νοῦς, καρδία, or ἐγώ, for example, portray self-contained entities, sin results. Independency from God, the Creator of all life who has a purpose for all of his creation, is rebellion against the teleological work

of God.[1] Self-reliance contradicts the will of God, and posits the origin and purpose of reality in the self.

It is interesting to observe Paul's semantic shift in Rom. 8:10-11 in that σῶμα apparently replaces σάρξ of the preceding discussion. J. A. T. Robinson[2] maintains that "the concept of the body forms the keystone of Paul's theology," in contrast to H. A. A. Kennedy's[3] contention that σῶμα in Paul is rather colorless. Occurring ninety-one times in the Pauline corpus,[4] σῶμα is the outward manifestation of the oneness of the individual. Bultmann[5] opines that man does not have a σῶμα ; σῶμα is man. "Man is called σῶμα in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens."[6] He seems to express the idea of παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν (Rom. 12:1), or ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματός ἐστιν (1 Cor. 6:19) as "self," that is to say, σῶμα is identified as the whole person, the self, the "I."[7]

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1 Cf. Rom. 1:21-30.

2 The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology, p. 9.

3 St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things, p. 146.

4 Moulton and Geden, op. cit., pp. 929ff.

5 Op. cit., I., pp. 194ff.

6 Ibid., p. 195.

7 Cf. Rom. 6:12f., 1 Cor. 6:15, 18, 13:3, 2 Cor. 4:10-12, Phil. 1:20.

The word σῶμα has a broad semantic range in Greek literature. The notion of "body" is expressed as a corpse in Homer,[1] as a living body in Xenophon,[2] or, periphrastically, as man, as in Herodotus 1.32,[3] or as a person.[4] It also denotes any sort of corporeal substance,[5] or the body or entirety of a thing, such as the complete parts of the body,[6] or the whole body or frame of a thing.[7] When looking at man as an individual, the Greek always regarded him as a dualistic being. The body (σῶμα) was the prison (σῆμα) of the soul (ψυχή). In Book XI of the Odyssey, Homer graphically paints the moving scene of the souls swarming up from Erebus. The House of Hades was inhabited by souls (ψυχαί) which were separated from their corpses. ψυχή is primarily an animating principle which survives death in the weary existence of a lifeless shade in the underworld.[8] This dualism is sharpened in Plato, who sees body and soul as inseparable

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1 ὣς τὸ λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρσας, Iliad, 3.23.

2 Memorabilia, 3.12.1 ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα κακῶς .

3 ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἓν οὐδέν .

4 Plato, Leges, 908A; Polybius, 2.6.6.

5 Plato, Phaedrus, 245E; Aristotle, Physics, 265b29.

6 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, 497a9.

7 Plato, Timaeus, 31B, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντός .; 32C τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου.

8 Cf. Iliad, 23.65.

until death intervenes.[1] Upon its release from the body and its concomitant undesirable limitations, the soul reaches out towards reality,[2] which is the reunion with other souls and the flight away from matter. True knowledge cannot be acquired apart from asseveration from the body,[3] nor can one be known as pure or have true existence.[4]

In Gorgias (524B, D) Plato conceives death to be little more than the disconnection of the soul and the body, both of which retain their conditions as if and when they were alive. The soul is prior to the body in birth and excellence.[5] This pre-existent, non-material soul is uncreated, indestructible, and immortal, as attested in Phaedrus.[6]

> Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the beginning is unregenerated. For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not generated from anything; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be generated from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also indestructible; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, since all things must be generated from

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1 Phaedo, 64C, 105Bff.; Republic, X, 610E-611A.

2 Phaedo, 65C; Timaeus, 81D; Cratylus, 399D-400A.

3 Phaedo, 66E.

4 Ibid., 67A.

5 Timaeus, 34C; cf. 44E-46A, 69C-D.

6 245C; translation from the Loeb Classic edition.

> a beginning. And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source or origin.

ψυχή is "the conscious self or personality as centre of emotions, desires, and affections,"[1] or as stated in philosophical categories of primary substance as the "source of life and consciousness," as the "spirit" of the universe, or as the immaterial principle of movement and life.[2]

Aristotle rejects[3] the Pythagorian concept that the soul is a harmony or adjustment of physical constituients in its emphasis upon movement. Nor does he agree[4] with Plato's assertion that the soul pervades the material universe in a sort of "world-soul."[5] ψυχή is virtually equivalent to "life" or "vital principle."[6] Incorporeal, it distinguishes organic from inorganic matter. It is the actuality (ἐντελέχεια) of the natural body whose potentiality (δυνάμει) has life. To put it succinctly, the soul is the essence of the body. As passive reason, ψυχή is the counterpart of νοῦς, active reason which, as the wholly spiritual, immortal, and uncreated being, has some resemblance to Plato's concept of ψυχή.

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1 Leges, 959A.

2 Liddell & Scott, op. cit., pp. 2026f.; cf. Phaedo, 105Bff.; Republic, X, 608D, 611B-C; Pindar, Fragmenta, 133; Xenophon, Anabasis, 3.2.20.

3 On The Soul, I.ii.404a15ff.; I.iv.407b28ff.

4 Ibid., I.ii.404b16ff.

5 Timaeus, 29E.

6 On The Soul, II, and especially II.iv.415b9f.

The use of σῶμα as "self" or "person" seems to be characteristic of the LXX translators. Found 141 times[1] in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha, it refers (with the exceptions of Job 40:32 and Gen. 15:11) to human beings, dead or alive. Generally, the personal pronoun can be substituted for σῶμα with the reflexive idea of "self" or the more objective reference of "person" as an adequate translation. E. g., in Lev. 15, σῶμα is found eleven times in reference to the cleansing of the individual person. The reference to καὶ πάντα τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν is a circumlocution for "the spoils of war" in Gen. 34:29. The "self" is similarly expressed seven times in 3(1) Kings 13.[2]

There is no term in biblical Hebrew which approximates our understanding of "body" apart from the infrequent גְּוִיָּה , but Rabbinic Hebrew has an equivalent in בָּשָׂר , which denotes flesh in the sense of body or person.[3]

It is somewhat striking that גְּוִיָּה , the closest approximation to "body" as prevalent in most Indo-European languages, is used infrequently. It refers to supranatural creatures in Eze. 1:11, 23 and Dan. 10:6, to dead corpses

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1 Hatch & Redpath, A Concordance to the LXX, II, p. 1330.

2 Cf. 4 Macc. 1:27, 28, 35, Bel 31, Dan. 1:15, 3:94, 95, 5:21 Theodotion.

3 Meyer, "σάρξ ," TWNT, VII, pp. 115f.

of animals in Judges 14:8f. and Saul's dead body in 1 Sam. 3:10,12 and to the self in Gen. 47:18. One is not certain what conclusion to make of the frequency of בָּשָׂר and infrequency of גְּוִיָּה . Rather than repeat the popular idea that the Old Testament Hebrews had no word for "body" - which is untrue - it is better to say that the Old Testament writers obviously preferred to speak of the person in categories other than those of our Western analytical vocabulary.[1] This type of unprofitable argument would, on the face of it, suggest that because the New Testament writers used ψυχή sparingly compared to the voluminous usage of its Old Testament counterpart of נֶפֶשׁ, the idea of a living person is not found in the New Testament. Or, because the word ἐκκλησία is found only three times in the Gospels, the idea of church is not present in the Gospels. Nothing could be further from the truth.

In 1 Cor. 15:35-44, Paul speaks of our receiving a spiritual σῶμα . Strikingly, σῶμα is not linked with human beings at all in this paragraph (the only other such Pauline use is Col. 2:17). The references to σῶμα [2]

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1 Against E. Best, One Body of Christ, p. 215, fn. 2, who maintains that there is no Hebrew word for "body."

2 ποίῳ δὲ σώματι ἔρχονται (35) . . . οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γενησόμενον σπείρεις (37) . . . ὁ δὲ θεὸς δίδωσιν αὐτῷ σῶμα καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα. (38) . . . καὶ σώματα ἐπουράνια, καὶ σώματα ἐπίγεια (40) . . . σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν (44).

seem to be concerned about the "form" of the σῶμα which appears in variety.[1] From the rhetorical question concerning the "type" or "form" (ποίῳ) of body to the assertion that the seed is sown ψυχικόν and raised πνευματικόν in nature, the implication is given that each expression of life will be corporeal.[2] The σῶμα embodies the characteristic nature of ἐπουράνια and ἐπιγεία, of ψυχικόν and πνευματικόν, and the transformation from one reality to another requires a new σῶμα, related yet different.

The sowing and raising of the seed is expressed in four parallel antithetical pairs.[3] Reference to the last pair is duplicated by a concluding postscript, as it were, Εἰ ἔστιν σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἔστιν καὶ πνευματικόν. From the context it appears that Paul is contrasting the pairs for the sake of emphasis, and uses four parallel sets to lead up to his discussion of Adam and Christ, whom he also contrasts.[4] This step parallelism finds particular expression in the ψυχικόν - πνευματικόν reiteration. ψυχικός here apparently means physical, the nature of an animated being apart from any

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1 Cf. Strack-Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, III, p. 475, where the Rabbinic simile of the sown seed is utilized to show the variety of σώματα.

2 καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν σπερμάτων ἴδιον σῶμα (38).

3 φθορᾷ - ἀφθαρσίᾳ, ἀτιμίᾳ - δόξῃ, ἀσθενείᾳ - δυνάμει, ψυχικόν - πνευματικόν.

4 Cf. Chapter VI for a discussion of the contrasts.

anima which empowers it. It has already been pointed out how significantly and extensively ψυχή expresses the soul of man - his true self - in contrast to his σῶμα in Greek thought. Furthermore, ψυχή is found almost 900 times in the LXX.[1] It is somewhat surprising to see that it is relatively rare in the New Testament, occurring only thirteen times in Pauline and deutero-Pauline writings.[2] Upon examination, one finds that five of the instances[3] have reference to life or the life-principle[4] without psychological overtures. The intensive usage of "person" or "self" is found in Rom. 2:9, 13:1, 1 Cor. 15:45 and 2 Cor. 12:15, and ψυχή is the seat of feeling, will and thought in Phil. 1:27, Eph. 6:6 and Col. 3:23. The most difficult and last ψυχή reference is that in 1 Thess. 5:23: Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης ἁγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τηρηθείη. This statement may be used to support a trichotomous view of man inasmuch as πνεῦμα - ψυχή - σῶμα appear to be distinctive from each other. However, this effect is somewhat nullified by the presence

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1 Hatch & Redpath, op. cit., pp. 1486-1490.

2 Moulton & Geden, op. cit., pp. 1022f.

3 Phil. 2:30, Rom. 16:4, 11:3, 2 Cor. 1:23, 1 Thess. 2:8.

4 Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., I, pp. 203f.

of ὁλοτελεῖς and ὁλόκληρον which weld the apparent disparity into a unified perspective.[1] The salutation is not from three orders or separate units,[2] but rather a plurality which suggests completeness.

ψυχή translates five basic Hebrew terms in the Old Testament with נֶפֶשׁ almost exclusively predominating. The fluidity and elusiveness of נֶפֶשׁ centers in the concept of a "living individual." In 1 Kings 3:11 and 2 Chron. 1:11, God commends Solomon because he [Solomon] has asked for wisdom and knowledge, rather than for material possessions or "long life." This same utility as life-principle may also be used to describe animals (Lev. 24:18) and God (Jer. 51:14). Johnson maintains[3] that ". . . the grasping of a totality reveals itself in the fact that the term נֶפֶשׁ may be used with more obvious reference to what is a comprehensive and unified manifestation of sentient life. . . ." As an example, "a righteous man understands the נֶפֶשׁ ("feelings") of his beast" (Prov. 12:10). The Jahwist and Elohim strata remind the Israelites to be hospitable and sensitive to strangers, remembering their own unpleasantness as aliens in Egypt (Exo. 23:9). A host of sensations are attributed to נֶפֶשׁ, all of which illumi-

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1 B. Rigaux, Les Épitres aux Thessaloniciens, pp. 595ff.

2 Cf. Deut. 6:5 which may lie in the background.

3 Op. cit., p. 14; cf. Eichrodt, op. cit., pp. 67f.

nate the notion of a living being.[1]

The locus classicus of the individual as a totality, and of נֶפֶשׁ as a "living individual" is the Yahwist's account in Gen. 2:7: "And Jehovah God formed man (הָאָדָם אֵת) from the dust of the ground (עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה), and he breathed into his nostrils the breath (נִשְׁמַת) of life; and man became a living person (לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה)." נֶפֶשׁ is not a part of man; it is the man, as E. C. Rust has perceptibly noted,[2]

> . . . We should not endeavor to read into the J usage any implication of a dichotomy or a trichotomy, as if the soul were distinct from the body, or a third with body and spirit. All J is really doing is to declare that, by the divine inbreathing, man became an individual living being. Nephesh stands for the living whole which arises when the body, shaped of the dust, is inspired by the divine breath. It describes the unity that we call man.

It appears that the later writings of the Old Testament echo the Yahwist's implication that נֶפֶשׁ is used in the sense of a "person." When Abram took his family and possessions, and the "persons which they had acquired" in Haran to go into Canaan (Gen. 12:5), the singular of נֶפֶשׁ is employed, as with the "seventy persons" going down into Egypt as Moses reminds the Israelites in Deut. 10:22.[3]

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1 Cf. Johnson, op. cit., p. 14, for an impressive catalog of references.

2 Op. cit., p. 105.

3 The Priestly writer, the Deuteronomist and Ezekiel use this pattern often.

Paul's use of σῶμα as the outward manifestation of the oneness of the individual is more closely akin to the Hebrew notion of בָּשָׂר because both are set basically within the same ontological structure. Man is responsible to God but he is not God. The Greek ψυχή - σῶμα relationship is different in that the ψυχή takes on the nature of the divine and co-exists with it. This in itself presents Paul with a different perspective to that of most of the Greeks.

Πνεῦμα is the most significant psychological term in Paul's vocabulary, occurring 146 times in the Corpus Paulinum.[1] Many of the occurrences are used to describe the functional operations of God as manifested in terms of Father or Creator,[2] as the Holy Spirit,[3] or as the Spirit of Christ.[4] Although reflective, Paul is not as analytical and speculative as the later Church which distinguished more precisely the functional, if not substantial, aspects. For example, in Romans 8 Paul vascillates somewhat between πνεῦμα θεοῦ and θεός, as do the writers of Ephesians 4 and 1 Cor. 12 in their references of Χριστός and θεός . . . δίδοται . . . τοῦ πνεύματος, respectively, bestowing spiritual gifts. E. Schweizer[5] suggests that πνεῦμα

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1 Moulton & Geden, op. cit., pp. 819ff.

2 Rom. 8:14, 1 Cor. 2:11, 3:16, 2 Cor. 3:3.

3 1 Thess. 4:8, Eph. 1:13, 4:30.

4 1 Cor. 15:45, Rom. 8:9, Gal. 4:6, Phil. 1:19.

5 Spirit of God, in Bible Key Words, Vol. 9, pp. 81ff.

τοῦ Χριστοῦ may be used in the notion of "power" rather than "person" when Paul employs the phrase. Such a usage would reflect a sense of cosmic reality whose primary function is to portray God, the source of all power. This would not be foreign to Paul's understanding of ontology, and would further illustrate his understanding of this world.

Mankind is the sphere of activity of πνεῦμα . Paul understands the spirit as the divine power which enters into the life of man. Paul in Romans 8:16 (αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν ὅτι ἐσμὲν τέκνα θεοῦ) and 1 Cor. 2:11 (τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ) suggests that πνεῦμα emanates from God, and empowers man to respond to the divine realities. The Spirit of God is seen ontologically as distinctive from the spirit residing in man,[1] just as the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ (8:9b-10) becomes a possession of man, which spirit also raised Jesus from the dead, abides in the believer (8:11), and transforms the death characteristic of mankind into life (ὁ ἐγείρας ἐκ νεκρῶν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν).[2]

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1 Rom. 8:12-14, 23, 26; cf. Schweizer, Spirit of God, pp. 69ff.

2 H. W. Robinson (The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 109; cf. D. Stacey, A Pauline View of Man, pp. 128ff., who, like

πνεῦμα , as most of the anthropological terms, often expresses the idea of self. Bultmann[1] maintains that πνεῦμα points up a special orientation of the will. The human self is both a willing and knowing self and approaches the sense of νοῦς , e. g., in 1 Cor. 14:14: ἐὰν γὰρ προσεύχωμαι γλώσσῃ , τὸ πνεῦμά μου προσεύχεται , ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστιν It does not necessarily hold that πνεῦμα and νοῦς here are used in a determinative sense of the will. That which is amenable to the divine (πνεῦμα) is neither necessarily opposed to nor synonymous with νοῦς .

In Romans 8:2 ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου effectively delineates the divergent forces operative upon the life of the person. In 8:4-6 κατὰ σάρκα suggests a sinful condition or the residence of ἁμαρτία , while κατὰ πνεῦμα is portrayed in contrast as τὰ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ or ζωή . In 8:9 ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν is a corollary statement of 8:2, suggesting that the πνεῦμα θεοῦ , as

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most biblical theologians, doggedly follows Robinson) suggests that πνεῦμα is used in this function 116 times in Paul, with the resultant experience of the divine penetration described variously as being "in Christ" (Eph. 1:3, 10, 12, 3:6, 1 Cor. 1:2), becoming "a new creation" (2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15; this has been aptly discussed by A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, pp. 160-176), or possessing various "gifts of the Spirit" (1 Cor. 12, Gal. 5:16-25, Rom. 8:1-4, 1 Cor. 2:4, 2 Cor. 4:13).

1 Op. cit., I, p. 207.

ἁμαρτία , also invades mankind from the outside. Pfleiderer[1] for example, opines that a supernatural Messianic πνεῦμα is imparted at baptism, which is distinctive from the natural spirit of man. Representatively, G. B. Stevens[2] and Sanday and Headlam[3] maintain, on the contrary, that the πνεῦμα recreates the human spirit, so that the believer has one, although qualitatively different, spirit as does the unbeliever. In either case, each illustrates the truth that the divine spirit does not fuse with man in order for man to become more than man (supra-natural).

Schweizer[4] has observed that many possible Gnostic parallels, if not sources, are evident in Paul's discussion of πνεῦμα . He not only has detected the influence of cosmic powers in Paul's thought, but he further contends that 1 Cor. 8:6, Eph. 4:5 and, especially, Col. 1:16 reflect Stoic influence. Such observations emphasize the necessity of ascertaining the structure of the reality of the various Gnostic and Stoic systems.[5]

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1 Paulinism, I, pp. 64f.; cf. Kennedy, The Theology of the Epistles, pp. 131f., and W. L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, p. 117, who apparently agree.

2 The Theology of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T & T Clark), p. 344.

3 The Epistle to the Romans, p. 196.

4 Spirit of God, pp. 56ff.; cf. Reitzenstein, op. cit., pp. 48ff.

5 Cf. Chapter III.

On the other hand, in the Old Testament רוח is conceived as emanating from God, whether in charismatic fashion in the early period, or as the capacity to perform the task for which man was created, evident in the exilic and post-exilic periods. A fitting example of the charismatic expression is seen in Isa. 11:2:[1]

> And there shall rest upon him the רוח of Yahweh,
> A רוח of wisdom and discernment,
> A רוח of counsel and might,
> A רוח of knowledge and the fear of Yahweh.

One of the most effective illustrations of the motive power of רוח is seen in Eze. 37:1-14, a post-exilic occurrence, where the valley of dry bones suddenly becomes an arena of walking skeletons, ready for battle. The רוח is more than "life" in general; it is an empowering from Yahweh which grants the capacity to fulfill a task. The connection between רוח and purpose is of such nature that רוח can be called "a holy spirit."[2]

Paul contrasts πνεῦμα and σάρξ, the former emphasizing a divine power which enables man to be himself and relate himself properly to his destiny, and the latter to portray the new humanity susceptible to all the powers and forces within him and those which come upon him from without. The physical or natural order of things is

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1 Cf. Ez. 3:12ff.; cf. Pedersen, Israel, I-II, p. 160.

2 Psa. 51:11; Isa. 63:10, 11; cf. 2 Chr. 21:16, Eze. 11:5, 36:26, 1 Chr. 28:12, Isa. 29:24, Psa. 32:2.

opposed to the spiritual or supernatural.[1] Man lives in a world which is replete with organized expressions of cosmic reality, both good and bad, and he is consciously and unconsciously intertwined with the execution of the orders. πνεῦμα asserts the possibility of his becoming wholesome man who finds his true humanity in reaching the goal for which he was created.

Paul telescopes the psychical and spiritual elements of man to provide an insight into the creaturely being oriented toward a dynamic and divine power. The contrast is not good versus evil, but, on the contrary, createdness with the possibility of finding one's role in the order of creation. It is the tension between the order of existence and the realm of fulfillment. The corruptible, dishonorable and weak being may be seen in terms of an incorruptible, glorified and powerful spiritual reality. The terrestrial moves toward the celestial. The transitory and incomplete can be thus determined only against the possibility of the eternal and complete.

What does all of this mean? It is readily apparent that Paul's vocabulary on anthropology reflects both a Hebraic and Greek cast. It is obvious that he borrows the terms and ideas from Hellenes, Hellenistic Jews, Rabbinic Jews, et al. We have seen that it is too risky to assert

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1 1 Cor. 1:26, Phil. 3:3; τὸν κύριον τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός SIG 1181.3 [2nd cent. B. C. Jewish].

precisely the area and degree of his dependency for most of the terms and concepts. Nevertheless, as Paul calls into use σάρξ and σῶμα, for example, one finds an overlapping of meaning, notwithstanding the peculiar usages in which the terms are employed. For example, in 2 Cor. 4:10f., the synonymous parallelism of members is vividly portrayed: "in order that the life of Jesus may become manifest in our body (ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν) . . . in order that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our mortal flesh (ἐν τῇ θνητῇ ἡμῶν)."[1] In Gal. 6:17, Paul bore the marks of Jesus on his body, which is paralleled in 4:13 as an ailment or weakness of the flesh.[2] An escape from involvement with sin is no more afforded to σῶμα than it was to σάρξ. τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας of Rom. 6:6 is paralleled by σάρξ ἁμαρτίας in Rom. 8:3.[3]

Paul exhibits man through the brush strokes of various schools of art. Despite the peculiarities of Greek and Hebrew emphases in anthropology - and there can be no doubt as to all kinds of distinctives - Paul conceives man as being dependent upon God and subject to sin.[4] The created

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1 Cf. the parallelism in 2 Cor. 2:13, 7:13, or the identity of "my spirit" with "me" in 1 Cor. 16:18, Gal. 6:28, Phlm. 25, Phil. 4:23, Rom. 13:14.

2 Cf. 2 Cor. 12:7.

3 Cf. Rom. 6:12, 16, 8:13, Col. 1:22; cf. 1 Cor. 7:34 where the sharp distinction between σῶμα and πνεῦμα is blunted, as also that between σάρξ and πνεῦμα in 2 Cor. 7:1, 5, 2:13, and πνεῦμα and ψυχή in Phil. 1:27 are obviously parallel expressions.

4 Cf. Gutbrod, op. cit., p. 245.

is presented in his distance from the Creator, and when the created fulfills its destiny it becomes its genuine self.

Paul's frame of reference is that of totality and not generality. Man does not live in a vacuum as a self-contained entity, nor is he a "primitive-soul." All of him who is, particularized in concreteness, is seen in the prospect of his proper relationships. The Apostle's interests are religious and practical, and he describes man in functional categories. Borrowing heavily and modifying according to necessity, he demonstrates an aptitude for relational identification. The descriptive and overlapping terms which portray ἄνθρωπος do not fully comprehend its reality. In a positive affirmation to the purposeful will of God ἄνθρωπος finds its true reality, that reality becoming articulate in this world.

An additional word about our understanding of these categories should be stated. As pointed out earlier our modern assessment of reality does rely essentially upon biblical realities, although in different categories. Today man is evaluated in terms of his personality. The "I" is seen in terms of relationships, and is assigned reality through its experiential involvement. No particular part of man is endowed with certain intrinsic qualities that obviate his being known as an integrated being. To be sure, his psychical manifestations are different from his physical features. He is subjected to forces both within

and outside himself, reacting in a variety of well-known patterns of behavior. No longer do we employ the biblical categories of ἁμαρτία invading the person and residing in the σάρξ ; we say the force of evil is pressed upon the person. We do not understand ἄνθρωπος solely in terms of the sum total of many parts, and neither can any part of him cogently represent him as the whole person. We see him as a highly conditioned being whose primary concern is for his existence and its meaning. The emotional, volitional, noetic and physical aspects of mankind are in delicate balance and imbalance each to the other. Illness or strength in any aspect grossly affects the others. Where there is tension and conflict, there also is the opportunity of harmony (שָׁלוֹם - εἰρήνη); where there is a tendency of egocentric display, there is also the possibility of the "Thou" being given true objectivity. That is to say, modern man cannot divide his person into disparate parts which dominate without suffering the subsequent ill effects. His life is subjected to the same conflicts found in Paul, but also open to the same teleological possibilities.

VI TOTALITY IN PAUL: TYPOLOGY

This chapter presupposes a definition of typology which is somewhat technical. A generally accepted definition of typology is premised upon an intrinsic connection between two entities. For example, it can be said that the Old Testament is intrinsically related to the New. The same God is depicted as working both in the events described in the records. The provisional points to the fulfillment; the Testaments are not simply analogates, but the "insufficiency" of the first one points to the "completeness" of the second. The definition of typology in this chapter presupposes an acceptance of the assumption that in the person of Jesus the Christ the persons of Adam and Moses are more clearly seen. Quite apart from the significance which each has in and of himself, the relationship between Adam and Christ and between Moses and Jesus points beyond themselves to the framework of God's purposeful work. A number of additional motifs could supplement this aspect of biblical reality, e. g., the seal of the Old and the sign of the New Covenant, Temple and Church, et., but each would point up the relationship between the provisional and the permanent seen herein.

Paul affirmed that the world is a creation of a personal God who acts purposefully in his world and in history. As contrasted with the Prime Mover of Aristotle, Paul's Creator God brought the world into being in order

that it might reveal his glory and fulfill its proper destiny. Neither dualistic in natural co-existence as in Plato nor pantheistic as in neo-Platonism, God is utterly distinctive from his creation. Enabled by such an understanding of God, the Apostle attempts to relate the temporal order of life to the eternal realities.

In the typology of Adam and Christ, Paul asserts that the earthly life and the heavenly life are importantly linked together. The Adam-Christ motif is found in the New Testament only in Paul, and then only in two specific passages, Rom. 5:12ff. and 1 Cor. 15:22.[1]

In Rom. 5:12, Paul begins the paragraph Διὰ τοῦτο ὥσπερ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον . His main apodosis, ὥσπερ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου . . . θάνατος , is subordinated as he interrupts himself to discuss the connection of sin and death with the fall of Adam. The logical οὕτως is missing, and the sentence ends with an anacoluthon. After the digression of verses 13-17, he returns to pick up the main argument of the section. However, a major bone of contention appears in the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον . After positing

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1 Allusion to Christ is made as ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ in 1 Cor. 15:45, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος in 15:47, as πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν in 15:45, and ἐπουράνιος in 15:48. Additionally, the typology may lie back of several other motifs, some of which will be mentioned later.

the connection between sin and death for all mankind, the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον [1] is an enigma both in syntax and in meaning. Suffice it to say, the Vulgate translation of in quo is inadequate and has led to a complicated series of interpretations of the Augustinian emphasis of Adam's sin corrupting his entire posterity.[2]

Most commentators have interpreted the paragraph of 5:12-21 as the locus classicus for the doctrine of original sin. Passages which might (!) have influenced Paul[3] and comments by searching scholars[4] have played the spotlight on the possibilities of the origin and transmission of sin and death. Yet, the Apostle does not discuss how the effects of Adam's fall were transmitted to his descendants, nor exactly what, if anything, was transmitted. The argument vascillates between an imposed transmission, on the one hand, and the supposition that every man sins for himself and is responsible only for his sins. Ἁμαρτία is interpreted either as that which arises within the person, or as that which invades a person from outside him, i. e., cosmic.

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1 Cf. 2 Cor. 5:4 and Phil. 3:12 for the other New Testament examples of ἐφ' ᾧ . Cf. Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 235.2.

2 Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, VII, IV; Augustine, De Peccatorum Meritas et Remissione, III, vii, 14; De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, II, v, 15; cf. Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, IV, iv, 6, 7; Enchiridion, I, xxvi; De Civitate Dei, XVI, xxvii.

3 Wisdom 2:23 ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ἀϊδιότητας ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, πειράζουσιν δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδες ὄντες.
Cf. 4 Ezra 3:7, 21-22, 30-32, Apk. of Baruch 12:3, 23:4, Psa. 51(50):7, Ecclestiasticus 25:24.

It appears to this investigator that all of these commendable arguments, heavily controlled by doctrinaire factors, are no longer necessary and valid. They ignore the larger contextual setting of the paragraph in Romans, where Paul is presenting the fact that life can be meaningful only in Jesus Christ. A self-centered life is opposed to God, and in Jesus Christ, the clearest example of God's revelation of himself, man finds that he as ἐγώ can find genuine life only within God's will. Furthermore, speculation on the possibilities of Paul's meaning without considering the entire paragraph of 5:12-21 at the outset, with its unusually numerous comparative contrasts between Adam and Christ, is to invite indifference to Paul's concern. Additionally, the details of syntax, interpretation, and semantics must be carefully assessed.

In From First Adam to Last,[1] C. K. Barrett rightly points out that the relationship of Adam and Christ to each other is Paul's primary interest. Barrett's purpose is to show how the figure of Adam[2] is employed by Paul in his understanding of mankind and its history. The contrast is sharply drawn:

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4 J. A. Bengel, Gnomon Novi Testament, III, p. 516; H. A. W. Meyer, Romans, I, in loco; Calvin, Institutes, ed. by McNeill, II, 1,5-6; Luther, Vorlesung über den Römerbrief 1515-1516, ed. by Ellwein, p. 211.

1 New York: Scribner's, 1962, pp. 14ff., 69.

2 One of five discussed in the book.

Ἀδὰμ (14)	ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (14)
τὸ παράπτωμα (15)	οὕτως [καὶ] τὸ χάρισμα (15)
τῷ τοῦ ἑνὸς παραπτώματι, οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον (15)	πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ... τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ (15)
τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα (16)	τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικαίωμα (16)
εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἑνὸς παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος... διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς (17)	πολλῷ μᾶλλον οἱ τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος ...βασιλεύσουσιν διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς Ἰ. Χ. (17)
δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος... εἰς κατάκριμα (18)	οὕτως καὶ δι' ἑνὸς δικαιώματος ... εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς (18)
διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ (19)	διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δίκαιοι (19).

The same contrast is similarly stated in 1 Cor. 15:22: ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ πάντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν...ἐν τῷ χριστῷ πάντες ζωοποιηθήσεται. It becomes readily apparent that the contrasts are not equal in value. For example, ὅς ἐστὶν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος designates the superiority of Christ over Adam.[1] χάρισμα cannot be adequately measured by παράπτωμα (5:15), nor can δώρημα by κατάκριμα (5:16). The logical connection between sin and pardon in 5:16b cannot be ascertained, but its practical aspects may be seen in the πολλῷ μᾶλλον of 9-10 and 15-17, where the

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1 K. Barth, Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5, p. 45: "Adam has no essential priority of status over other men. He cannot be their lord and head; he cannot determine their life and their destiny. He can anticipate their life and destiny in himself, only in so far as he is the first man among many others, only in so far as he is primus inter pares." Cf. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, IV:I, pp. 507ff.

terms are connected and subordinated in each couplet. πολλῷ μᾶλλον both presupposes and affirms the identity of the two sides, but keeps the disparity clear.[1]

It is to be remembered that the Apostle is not concerned with the origin and transmission of sin per se. His interest in the Fall[2] and human sinfulness is brief, indefinite, and incidental. Actually, it is the origin of death, not sin, which claims his brief attention. Rather, he addresses himself to the effects of Christ's redemptive work, and the certainty of Christian hope and the life obtained by Christ. In contrasting the earthly life and the resurrection life, he falls back on the analogy of Adam as the historical, not psychological, origin of sin. He does not finish the first sentence, relegating the main apodosis to a secondary role. Hastily moving from this description of the mythological beginnings, he becomes enmeshed in a discussion of mankind as seen in Adam-Christ typology. The utilization of Adam-Christ[3]

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1 Ibid., pp. 15ff.; cf. Strack-Billerbeck, op. cit., III, p. 230, where the Jews conceived good as being more powerful than evil, e. g., 4 Ezra 4:30-32, Sifre 5, 17.

2 M. D. Hooker, "Adam in Romans 1," New Testament Studies, 6(July 1960)4, 297-306, suggests that man not only exchanged the worship of the true God for that of idols, but he also exchanged his intimate fellowship with God plus his own reflection of the glory of God for a shadowy experience and an image of corruption. Miss Hooker, basing this on the use of εἰκὼν θεοῦ in Gen. 1-3, maintains that man took on the image of corruption and became subject to death.

3 Cf. L. Goppelt, Typos: Die typologische Deutung des Alten Testaments im Neuen, (Gütersloh, 1939), p. 155.

in no measure is to be evaluated as a systematic account of the genesis of evil, and certainly not an essay on how and what was transmitted.

Paul knew Jesus the Christ first, and from his understanding of the Christ he began to understand Adam.[1] Adam - mankind - is the true representation of the earthly life, and Christ - the anointed of God - is the true representative of the resurrection life. Paul met the resurrected Christ, not the pre-resurrection Christ, on the road to Damascus. The typological analogy may be carried further. Adam is the originator of mankind in the human species, and Christ is the originator of spiritual mankind. This Jewish typology[2] provided the convenient framework for a discussion of life as it is lived on earth and is to be lived after death.

It appears that the significance of Adam for sin and death has increased in importance throughout its historical development. Even details of the Fall take on an added colorful interpretation.[3]

No doubt both the descriptions of man at his worst or as an ideal grew in their luster. The original man had been presented as the ideal man, and was to be restored

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1 Barrett, op. cit., pp. 16f., 69-72, interprets the person and work of the Christ in Phil. 2:5-11 against the person and work of Adam.

2 Jeremias, "Ἀδάμ," TWNT, I, p. 142; Strack-Billerbeck, op. cit., III, pp. 227f.

3 For example, in 2 Cor. 11:2 (. . . ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐξηπάτησεν Εὔαν ἐν τῇ πανουργίᾳ αὐτοῦ . . .), Paul states that the serpent deceived Eve, which is not the case in Genesis 3:1-6.

from his fallen state through the Messiah, as Jeremias indicates.[1] He further suggests that the teaching about the pre-existent Messiah arose out of the blending of the Messiah-expectation with the teaching of the original man as deliverer. The precise origin and function of the original man may be debatable, but the prominence of the original man is unquestionable.

The importance of πᾶς in these passages cannot be underestimated. The phrase εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους occurs once in Rom. 5:12 and twice in 5:18. The plural πάντες is found once in 5:12, and twice in 1 Cor. 15:22, unaccompanied in each instance by a noun. This anarthrous usage is defined as embracing the whole of the substance to which it belongs and retains the sense as if a generic article were present. In fact, πάντες and οὗτος do not require articles for this notion as this describes "everything to which the term man is applicable."[2] Mankind (ἄνθρωπος), rather than angels or beasts, as a totality is that which is involved with sin and death. This implies that the Apostle is not concerned with every individual person as regards his possibilities, but Adam typifies death for sinful mankind and Christ exemplifies life. The Corinthians' statement in 15:22 locates the direction of mankind in its involvement in the phrases of ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ and ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ . These qualifiers indicate the

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1 Loc. cit.

2 Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 275.1.

spheres of life which are live options for mankind. It is evident that the contextual typology of Adam-Christ, the reference of πᾶς generically to the wholeness of mankind, and the meaning of ἄνθρωπος indicate that the idea of individualistic salvation is not the primary frame of reference in this paragraph.

One of the most important aspects of Rom. 5:12-21 is the employment of the figure of the one and the many, which occurs eight different times in the brief paragraph.[1] The numeral εἷς is used in each of the eight phrases as the genitive of agency, which phrases contain πάντας three times (5:12, 18) and the comparative of πολύς five times (the nominative πολλοί thrice (5:15, 19) and once each the genitive πολλῶν (5:16) and accusative πολλούς (5:15)) as complementing the doublet. Although the idea of the comparative is most often "generally" or "majority," Jeremias[2] has shown effectively that οἱ πολλοί is a Semitism which is equated with πάντες .[3] πᾶς may well suggest the potentiality of the πολλοί . In four of the five uses of πολλοί , only the genitive excepted, the

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1 5:12, 15², 16, 18², 19².

2 TWNT, VI, pp. 540ff.

3 For examples in Jewish writings, cf. Strack-Billerbeck, op. cit., III, pp. 227ff., where the Fall of one caused the death of all.

article modifies the adjective.[1] In each of these instances ἑνός also is articular, indicating specificity. "The many," in antithesis to "the one," comprehends the whole multitude or the entire species of mankind, and "the one" is its true expression.

As indicated earlier,[2] the one and the many is an impressive principle in biblical thought. With this principle Paul elucidates the significance of Adam and Christ upon mankind. One points in the direction of mortality, the other of life.

The principle of the one and the many is found in both Greek and Hebrew thought. The contrast between the one and the many was the foundation of most of the early Greek philosophical systems. The one was the ideal perfection; the many constituted imperfection. The many, as the variety of objects, of sense or as sensate species, was the result of the breaking up of the primal one. The Greek philosopher could look beyond the imperfect intimation of the species to the absolute existent one, as seen in Plato's Parmenides:[3]

> The one cannot be many, nor can there be parts of it, nor can it be a whole. The part is part of a whole, and the whole is that of which no part is lacking. In both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts. In both cases, then, the one would be many, not one. Yet it must not be many, but one. So the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts. The one has no beginning nor end, hence unlimited.

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1 Twice found in 5:15 and 5:19 each.

2 Supra, Chapter III, pp. 52f.

3 The summation of 10.137C-E; cf.22.158A; 22.158C-24. 160D; 27.166C. This translation is from the Loeb series.

The one is true existence, the idea. It cannot be expressed apart from the visibles which shadow the intelligible. The many species detected by sensible, if not rational, observations may be either wholes or parts. Only a limited perspective of that which is may be ascertained by man. This pattern of generality is typical of Greek thinking.[1]

Aristotle is more articulate than Plato in his Metaphysics, when he asserts that "the essence of one is to be a kind of starting point of number; for the first measure is a starting point, because that by which first we gain knowledge of a thing is the first measure of each class of objects. The one, then, is the starting point of what is knowable in respect of each particular thing."[2] The one and the many are the starting point for the elements of fire and earth, water and air. The many are the result of dissolution, and are more elementary (στοιχειωδέστερα) than the one.[3] The true nature of being is contrasted with becoming, exemplified in the world-soul and the cosmos. Aristotle, more than Plato, gave importance to the phenomenological world in his idea that substance achieves true reality only as it is embodied in material forms. Essence or substance he emphasized as over against Plato's emphasis on the doctrine of ideas.

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1 Plato, Republic, X, 596A-C; cf. Republic, VII, 524D-526C.

2 V.vi; cf.V.xiii; V.xxvi; Physics, I.1, Loeb translation.

3 Coming-To-Be and Passing Away, I.1. 315a5ff.

Greek thought is dominated by a dualism which is both metaphysical and moral. Two distinctive forms - spirit and matter - existed in the world. The first was eternal and good, the latter transitory and evil. The former was expressed in the ontological category of being, and given pertinent expression in Plato's doctrine of ideas and Aristotle's concept of substance. This is evidenced in the lofty description of the intelligible world, known by Reason as the mind pressed beyond the phenomena toward the noumena. The ideal gave all being true existence.

The moral dualism results in a kind of schizophrenic man who is comprised of both the evil matter and good spirit in his nature. Only that part of man on the side of the spirit had any eternal significance or destiny. The full realization of his potential could not be expressed until the matter of the body was expelled in death. His real being lay in the return of his soul to the ideal world-soul, and only then was life genuinely enjoyed and fulfilled. Man as the visible microcosm was the image of God, the invisible macrocosm.

Greek ontology was expressed in abstract terminology. Goodness can be seen in action only because the idea of "the good" was projected and observed sensibly. The essence or the idea existed prior to its concretization which merely points to its status.

The thought pattern of the Greeks was generality. The

individual thing is a manifestation of the general, even though the Greeks like the individual things. The relationship between the one and the many illustrates the perfection and imperfection, the unity and the disorderly. The differentiation of the species points to a general functional analysis. The total picture of the phenomena exhibited the image of the particular species. The particular has an intrinsic value by means of which a certain number of individuals are capable of forming a whole. Unity rather than diversity was desired.

The existence of a remarkable fluidity which facilitates rapid and unmarked transitions from the one to the many, and from the many to the one was also found in Hebrew thought.[1] This phenomenon has its classic example in the Suffering-Servant in Deutero-Isaiah,[2] which, along with the concept of the Son of Man,[3] is best understood

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1 H. W. Robinson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality," Werden und Wesen des Alten Testaments, ed. by Paul Volz, Friedrich Stummer und Johannes Hempel (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1936), pp. 49-62; "Hebrew Psychology," The People and the Book, A. S. Peake, ed., pp. 375ff. Cf. G. E. Wright, The Biblical Doctrine of Man in Society (London: SCM Press, 1954), pp. 18ff.

2 Cf. S. Mowinckel, Der Knecht Jahwäs (Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1921), and M. Noth, "Die Heiligen des Höchsten," Interpretationes ad Vetus Testamentum Pertinentes Sigmundo Mowinckel, ed. by N. A. Dahl and A. S. Kapelrud (Oslo: Fabritius & Sonner, 1955), pp. 146-161; C. R. North, The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah (London: Oxford University Press, 1948); O. Eissfeldt, "The Ebed-Jahwe in Isaiah xl-lv in the Light of the Israelite Conceptions of the Community and the Individual, the Ideal and the Real," Expository Times, xliv (Oct.-Sept.) 1932-33, 261-268; Zimmerli and Jeremias, The Servant of God (SBT 20), (London: SCM Press, 1957).

3 Cf. Dan. 7:13, 27; Enoch 46, 48-49, 51-52; IV Esdras

in the totality of the "one and the many" rather than as an either individual or societary figure. Often, a larger totality such as a nation is represented by one who belongs to it, e. g., Jacob as Israel (Hos. 11:1), Joshua the high priest (Zech. 3:1-10), or Nehemiah (Neh. 1:6). The higher purpose of any group is always expressed by a minority, sometimes of one, within it. A. R. Johnson has pointed out the oscillation between the יהוה and that of his servant who, as it were, is an "extension" of his master.[1] Not only would this be true of two human beings,[2] and the עבד was capable of indefinite extension, but also of Yahweh and his messenger[3] or word.[4]

The unity of its extension both into the past and into the future is another aspect of the undifferentiated notion of corporate personality. Life is obtained from

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v. 23-41; the "Remnant," as seen in 1 Kings 19, may also receive additional light from this principle.

1 The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God, (Cardiff; University of Wales Press, 1942), passim. E. g., Gen. 44:4ff., Num. 20:14-21.

2 Judg. 11:12, 13.

3 The "angel of Yahweh" in Gen. 16:7-14 and Judges 6: 11-24, and only slightly different in Genesis 18-19, where the "angels" are joined by Yahweh. In Jer. 23:22f., Hag. 1:13, and especially in the Psalms (e. g., 18:2, 16; 22: 1-6; 68:1ff.), the "I" for the nation or for the prophet, and Yahweh's address are interchanged throughout. This is not a confusion of members, but rather an explicit example of the one and the many conceived as a corporate totality.

4 Eze. 12:21-28.

the family, to be shared with the family, and is left to posterity. Life is not individual but communal. The totality of his father, of his family, of his tribe, of his nation, is bequeathed to him at birth, circumcision, and in the blessing. These wholes remain alive at the death of the וַיִּשָׁב, and the "body" is put into the grave of his kinsmen, which was often closely associated with the house.[1] Abraham bought the field of Machpelah for a "family plot" (Gen. 23:3ff.), while Joseph obtained a promise from his family before his death that his "body" would be brought back to Machpelah.[2] Some of the Hebrews seemed to believe that the dead continued to share in the destiny of the family, whether good or bad.

The Hebrews had an intense consciousness of corporate solidarity which pervaded all mankind and relationships. The experiences of the prophets who spoke for Yahweh, as well as the "frequent and early use of the personal pronouns in the rich variety of their forms, including suffixes and affixes,"[3] attest to a notion of the individual. Jeremiah[4]

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1 Samuel was buried in his own house in Ramah (1 Sam. 25:1). Cf. similar instance of Joab in 1 Kings 2:34.

2 Gen. 49:29ff.

3 Rust, op. cit., p. 115.

4 4:4, 7:9f., 11:20, 12:9, 17:9, 10, 31:30-34; cf. Isa. 1:16f.

and Ezekiel[1] were two prophets who were quite instrumental in accenting the prophet's individual communion with God, if not the worth of the individual soul. But it was precisely within the structure of the worshipping community that the corporateness was maintained with the individualistic tendency.[2] In the post-exilic period, the concepts were complementary and provided the framework for the Hebrew to relate himself purposefully to life. The many were necessary for the one to become truly and fully an individual.

Adam is the point of reference in the world of men as the beginning point of all history. "The history of Adam is the history of the origin of sins and their consequences which roll as a sinister avalance through the Weltgeschichte."[3] This is the work of the one. The collapse of Adam is described as an historical event which is reflected, at least, in the indiscriminate non-determination of mankind. The event of sin becomes the principle of sin. Therefore, all

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1 18:2f., 36:22ff., 11:19, 33:11. Cf. Eichrodt, Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 3 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1950), pp. 1-18, for a succinct discussion of "individualism and collectivism."

2 Wright, op. cit., p. 101, is wrong when he writes "The "individualism" of the prophets was a divine repudiation of the existing collectivism." Johannes Hempel, Das Ethos des Alten Testaments (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1938), pp. 32-67, discusses the "collectivism and individualism" of Israel against the background of other religions, concluding that these ideas flow into the idea of theodicy: "The personalism of the Yahweh-faith implies the ethical personalism also of the greatness of the people as the ethical personalism of the particular." (66)

3 Stauffer, op. cit., p. 435.

creation stands in a great community of fate, but the species of Adam stands beyond that in a community of sin. On the other hand, Christ is not only more of the line of Adam. He is unique and begins a new line. The particularity of Jesus was based on his historical and visible setting as the one for the many.[1] He is not simply a bare and obvious example; he is the point of particularity as ἐξ where all the lines of history interact.

In 1 Cor. 15:40-44, the Apostle contrasts the different σώματα , illuminating the heavenly bodies as over against those of earth. That which is provisional and threatens to destroy existence[2] will be finally realized in the life characterized by Christ.[3] We now are in the σῶμα τοῦ χριστοῦ .[4] In the σῶμα τοῦ χριστοῦ God and the individual are brought into one (σῶμα ψυχικόν).[5] This relationship is not one of self-containment, but is ἐν χριστῷ . At death when the σῶμα ψυχικόν is destroyed,

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1 Ibid., pp. 435ff.; cf. Gal. 3:16, Heb. 10:11-14, 2 Cor. 5:14f.

2 φθορᾷ (42), ἀτιμίᾳ (43), ἀσθενείᾳ (43), σῶμα ψυχικόν (44).

3 ἀφθαρσίᾳ (42), δόξῃ (43), δυνάμει (43), σῶμα πνευματικόν (44).

4 1 Cor. 10:11, 12:27, cf. 11:27; Eph. 4:12, cf. 1:23; Col. 2:17. The argument whether this is more Hellenistic (E. Käsemann, Leib und Leib Christi, (Tübingen, 1933) than Hebraic (T. Schmidt, Der Leib Christi, (Leipzig und Erlangen, 1919); Best, op. cit.) is somewhat a fruitless one; the major emphasis is the person of Christ as the qualifier.

5 Cf. Paul Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), pp. 173-220.

a new σῶμα - one given by God (σῶμα πνευματικόν) - allows us to retain our individuality in the wholeness.[1] Whereas the individual loses his σῶμα at death in Plato, in Paul, whether one lives or dies, he remains ἐν Χριστῷ. At death the individual loses everything, but the same structure of reality (ἐν Χριστῷ) guarantees, on the higher level of σῶμα πνευματικόν, the oneness of existence. The individuality is retained, and the person is no longer subject to the processes of deterioration, realizing the true purpose of his being created.

The accomplishment of this kind of life in a world of time is truly amazing. The provisional manifestation of the purpose of God occurs in the here and now. In Adam and in Christ, not only the power of God but also the redemptive dynamic is experienced in history. History is not simply the stream of human movements nor our conditioned surroundings, but a manifestation of intrinsic potentialities of things and people.

The typology of Paul is rooted in the purpose of God.

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1 M. E. Dahl (The Resurrection of the Body: A Study of 1 Corinthians 15. (SBT 36), (Naperville: A. R. Allenson & Son, Inc., 1962), interprets the resurrection within the framework of the Semitic totality-concept. He sees the "unitive notion of human personality" as peculiarly Semitic (59). Man is "self-conscious matter" who experiences successive stages of reality. The tension between light (a non-static and positive activity) and darkness (the attraction of the void and qualitatively an enemy called death) is seen in man's life before and after the fall (68). "Corruption is more than death; it is the totality of all that is opposed to God, monstrous, unholy, polluted. It absolutely excludes God: God can only rule it "from without"." (68f.)

This indicates that the work of Christ is not merely a restoration of Adam,[1] but the Christ is the final and complete manifestation of the redemptive dynamic of God seen ever so tentatively in Adam. The one reconciles the whole creation to its creator; the many share in the glory and joys of God himself. Man reaches his final destination not in his self-perfectability but in the σῶμα πνευματικόν given to him by God.

In 1 Cor. 15:45ff., the Apostle regards Adam and his mankind as living beings, natural and earthy.[2] He does not mention sin, and, while this may imply Adam and mankind were non-moral and sinless before the consciousness of the law which awakens the spiritual side,[3] more probably he has primary reference to the earthly nature of mankind and is not concerned with sin at all. His interest is primarily the contrast of the natural and earthy life with the pneumatic resurrection-body.[4] His "targum paraphrase"

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1 Davies, (op. cit., p. 49) interprets 1 Cor. 15 in the sense of the Endzeit corresponding with the Urzeit, i. e., in thinking of the Risen Lord Paul naturally thinks of the first Adam. Christ was to rectify the evils of the Fall as the counterpart of the first Adam, but he was not merely a second edition of the first Adam in his unfallen state. He was unique. The first Adam was of the earth, the second was the Lord from heaven, the inauguration of a new era of the Spirit, who had appeared ἐφάπαξ.

2 εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (45); ἐκ τῆς χοϊκός (47). Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 174, who interprets Paul as using Gnostic language here. Even though it may be common to Paul, the Gnostics and others, this particular typological context requires its own particular approach, not just general parallelism.

3 F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, pp. 269f.

4 Cf. Jeremias, "Ἀδάμ," TWNT, I, p. 142.

of the quotation from the LXX of Gen. 2:7, which he incorporates into his thought expressed in 15:45 (ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν),[1] allows him to set up further implications such as the messianic meaning of the history of creation, as exhibited in Colossians 1:15.[2] The typology is accentuated by the contrasting pairs: ὁ πρῶτος Ἀδάμ and ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, ψυχὴ ζῶσα and πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν in 15:45; ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος and ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος in 15:47;[3] ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός and ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπουράνιος in 15:47f.[4]

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1 Words underlined are from LXX.

2 Jeremias, ibid.; cf. LXX Gen. 1:26; 1 Cor. 6:17 and Eph. 5:31f.; LXX Gen. 2:24.

3 Cf., however, the discordant suggestion by Stauffer, TWNT, II, p. 436, fn. 17, that δεύτερος can hardly refer to ἔσχατος in 45.

4 In his Alexandrian methodology, Philo distinguished between a heavenly and an earthly man. The heavenly man was based on Gen. 1:27, and described one created in the image of God, devoid of sex and earthly substance. The earthly man was taken from Gen. 2:7, where man was composed of an earthly substance and a divine spirit, and differentiated as male and female. But, Philo perceives the heavenly man as being created first, as reversed in Paul. The question of whether Philo's speculations had influenced rabbinic theology in Paul's day is unavoidable and unanswerable. The primary passages of Philo's presentation are Legum Allegor., Lib. I, 12, and De Opificio Mundi, 46.

Leg. All. I, (12), 31: "Καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν" (Gen. 2,7). διττὴ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν οὐράνιος ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονὼς φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γενέσεως οὐσίας ἀμέτοχος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης, ἣν χοῦν εἰσήγαγεν, ἐπάγη· διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐράνιον φησὶν οὐ πεπλάσθαι, κατ' εἰκόνα δὲ τετυπῶσθαι θεοῦ, τὸν δὲ γήϊνον πλάσμα, ἀλλ' οὐ γέννημα, εἶναι τοῦ τεχνίτου.
Cf. I, (13), 32-38, 42, (16), 53-55, in Philonis Alexandrini, Vol. 1, Berolini, 1896.

In Adam one sees man as he is, and in Christ, man as he may become. The beginning and the end, the moribund and the eternal - in Adam and Christ the teleological framework of God is articulated by Paul. Although there are disparate elements of interpretation between Philo and Paul, they agree that Genesis 2:7 is to be seen out of the creation of Adam. They also concur that the heavenly man was created first.[1] Paul, however, distinguished himself from Philo in that he ascribed an eschatalogical role (ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ) to Christ, which grew out of the self-designation of Jesus as ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου . Adam stands as the first man in the beginning of αἰὼν οὗτος , while the resurrected Christ as the one who completes and redeems the creative work of God, ushers in the beginning of αἰὼν μέλλων.

One more illustration of Pauline typology will suffice. In 1 Cor. 10:1-13, the Apostle recounts an epoch of the history of the Israelites to keep the Corinthian Christians from becoming over-confident in their participation in the sacraments of the Church. In 10:1-5 Paul relates Moses

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De Op. Mundi, (46), 134: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησιν ὅτι "ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς" (Gen 2,7). ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησιν ὅτι διαφορά τις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἤδη κατέλαχεν ποιότητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστῶς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα, ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτ' ἄρσεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἄφθαρτος φύσει.

1 Cf. Col. 1:15.

and the Christ somewhat as types:[1]. . .

. . . ὅτι οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πάντες ὑπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν καὶ πάντες διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον, [2] καὶ πάντες εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, [3] καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν βρῶμα ἔφαγον, [4] καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα· ἔπινον γὰρ ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθούσης πέτρας, ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός. [5] Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν αὐτῶν εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός· κατεστρώθησαν γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ.

It is apparent that Paul has at least adapted the midrash to the Corinthian situation. His statements of ὑπὸ τὴν νεφέλην and διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης διῆλθον are hardly what is said or implied in the Old Testament narratives, but, no doubt, for Corinth they enforce the nature and significance of the sacraments.[2] The use of πάντες in 10:1 is generic, referring to the wholeness of the fathers. This totality frame of reference does not imply that literally all the fathers came out of

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1 One is aware that there is disagreement as to whether this paragraph is technically typological, and also that some scholars, e. g., Lietzmann, op. cit., pp. 44f., see this as a Pauline construction, and others e. g., Jeremias, "Μωυσῆς," TWNT, IV, p. 874, regard it as pre-Pauline. Because of the manner in which Paul handles his material, and the utilization of τύποι in 10:6 and τυπικῶς in 10:11, the typological relationship is assumed. As regards the literary source, little more can be said except to trace parallels and this is not very helpful, if at all, to an understanding of how Paul interprets the material.

2 "Die Speisung mit Manna ist Typ des Abendmahlsbrotes, der Trunk aus dem Felsen Horeb ist Typ des Abendmahlstrankes. Aber für Pls ist diese Typologie nicht bloß ein symbolisches Handeln Gottes, sondern sie gibt realen Tatsachen Ausdruck." Lietzmann, op. cit., p. 44.

Egypt[1] because all were not in Egypt. Used functionally in 10:2-4, πάντες refers to the fact that the fathers (folk?) were baptized, ate and drank.

The fathers were baptized[2] into Moses, the leader of the first and physical exodus. In a sense the Israelites were incorporated into him.[3] Moses is " . . . the deliverer who leads his people through the desert and across the Red Sea, and the dispenser of baptism, and of spiritual food and drink. His people are baptized into him, so as to become one with him, his property, and his obedient subjects and devotees."[4] It is not difficult to draw a parallel to Christ, the leader of the second and spiritual exodus. The Corinthian Christians were baptized ἐν Χριστῷ ,[5] their deliverer who leads his people through all the vicissitudes of life, and, in himself as ἡ πέτρα , provides stability beyond that of Moses at Massah. The The spiritual[6] food and drink in the wilderness[7] was only a

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1 Abraham and Jacob, for example, were dead, even though Jacob's body was brought out.

2 Nestle prefers the reading ἐβαπτίσαντο , the aorist middle which may suggest a dependency upon Jewish baptism, on the basis of P^{46} B Or principally, while the Hesychian text and D G Ir, among other and less valuable authorities, prefer ἐβαπτίσθησαν , the aorist passive.

3 Cf. Barrett, From First Adam To Last, pp. 49f.

4 Ibid., p. 54.

5 Cf. 1 Cor. 1:13.

6 Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44.

7 One wonders if the Acrocorinthus and Peirene enter into the imagistic associations here.

temporary sustenance; most of them were destroyed because they did not please God. Those events pointed beyond themselves toward the Christ, who did please God (Mark 1:11 and parallels). Only in the Christ is the redemptive dynamic of God fully manifested; deliverance from the evil age to the new age in Jesus Christ is accomplished. Their existence was one with him.

Paul's assertion that the rock[1] from which the Israelites drank in the wilderness and followed them and was Christ points up his emphasis that the events the fathers experienced in the Exodus directly correspond to the events of the Corinthian folk and him.[2] "Christ was the prime mover in both." The Old Covenant and the New Covenant are under him because he is God's true representative on earth, and both covenants coalesce in him. This explains both ταῦτα δὲ τύποι ἡμῶν ἐγενήθησαν in 10:6a, and ταῦτα δὲ τυπικῶς συνέβαινεν ἐκείνοις in 10:11a. The events of the Old Covenant become examples for those living under the New Covenant because the events point toward the goal for the whole creation, i. e., the will of God becoming operative throughout the entire creation. The facts and events of Israel's history

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1 Paul particularized the Rock as Christ, not σοφία as in Philo (Leg. Alleg., II,86), who identified σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ with πέτρα in Sap. 11:4 and applied it to Jesus.

2 K. J. Woollcombe, "The Biblical Origins and Patristic Development of Typology," Essays on Typology, (SBT 22), (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1957), p. 66.

anticipated and foreshadowed those things that were to come into being. For Christians these things have become partially real already.

Paul utilizes the technique of typology to portray the totality of mankind under the rubric of Adam and Christ. Every man is characterized by physical and historical features, i. e., he is the particularization of אָדָם mankind. To be a living human being is to possess the nature of אָדָם . Weakness and frailty, mortality and death are generic to mankind; the purpose of man can never be realized in and through Adam because Adam is man and not God. In Jesus Christ mankind is able to become fully man, i. e., to obey and serve God as the Creator and Redeemer. His life is oriented in love by the Spirit who makes man fit for God.

The typological balance of the Christ with Adam or Moses also emphasizes the totality of the teleological nature of God. The great events and folk are significant in themselves, but they also are proleptic signs which point to the full manifestation of God's power and purpose in Jesus Christ. The details of the typological (sometimes almost allegorical) figures are subordinated to the comparisons and contrasts which amplify the relationships with God and the world. In sharp relief against Christ, Adam and Moses are depicted as epochal entities in the plan and work of God. Against the silhouettes of Adam and Moses, the Christ embodies the life of God into which they and we are drawn. The reality of the oneness of existence, then, over and above the transitory categories of communication, transcends the world of time in which we live.

VII TOTALITY IN PAUL: SOTERIOLOGY

Modern man lives in a pluralistic and highly mobile society. In this rapidly-changing social order, patterns of thought fluctuate widely and institutions slowly reflect change. New categories of expression are substituted in lieu of once valid but now out-dated forms of communication. The methodologies by which reality is assessed are modified, if not superseded, and an amazing volume and variety of content are introduced. In this flux, confusion and instability seem to be the normal state of affairs, and modern man is confronted with the difficult task of finding order and stability in his existence.

In his anxiety modern man asks questions which penetrate to the heart of the Church. What is its true nature? How can it be relevant in our world? What is its message and structure in light of the urban, metropolitan and international age in which we live? Most of the current discussion which attempts to answer these and other queries concerns itself basically with sociological analyses, psychological reactions, and historical assessments of the validity, if any, of current structural forms. It is not uncommon to read of the highly relative demands of our complex systems; to find that religious experience must have depth feeling and meaning to become the primary exhibit of authentic existence; or to see the attraction to No-Church Movements, on the one hand, or to social agencies

purporting to deal with specific social needs of man in place of the alleged ineptitude of the Church, on the other.

The local expressions of the Church are heavily conditioned by forces of acculturation wherever the Church is located. Each particular denominational tradition has sociological beginnings,[1] and many continue to exist more because of sociological factors than for any other reason, including the religio-theological dimension. The ecumenical tour de force, strangely enough, is an innovation in the serious thought of church circles. The heritage of the Christian enterprise unfortunately has accentuated the diversity of forms and departure from existing structures rather than unity. Much of this separation and withdrawal has been occasioned by the change in mores and customs as well as the modification of societary structures. Historical and cultural factors of recent decades have precipitated in earnest and serious inquiry regarding the nature and purpose of the Church. Aspects of these and other factors, e. g., world wars, international relationships, technological accomplishments, mass media, booming standards of living, etc., have continued to exert pressures which assist the direction and intent of the ecumenical movement.

Current interest in the Church is largely negative in

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1 H. Richard Niebuhr, in The Social Sources of Denominationalism, 1929, has sharpened this aspect of the denominations.

character in that the institutional structures are regularly being criticized as being outmoded, moribund, or, at best, inept. This sort of evaluation and re-evaluation is necessary for the well-being of the Church. Indeed, it cannot live apart from a vigorous, constant, and devoted self-scrutinization regarding its essential nature and purpose. It is imperative, however, that the continuing discussion include the necessary dimension of the divine origin and purpose of the Church. Both its history and its message must be taken as seriously as its forms of expression, the nature of its membership, and the reality of the world in which it lives and dies.

This chapter is neither an investigation into the sociological character of the Church, as interesting and necessary as it would be, nor a study of the ways the Church has been interpreted historically, whether in denominations or sects or national religious bodies, etc. Rather, it is an evaluation of Paul's discussion of the significance of Jesus Christ to the Church, the relationship of the Church to Judaism, and the place the Church occupies within the work of God. In brief, this chapter is an effort to assess how the Church fits into Paul's pattern of thought, and to determine the ontological principle of reality inherent in the Church.

The origin of the Church in the New Testament is indissolubly bound up with the activity of God and the

ministry of Jesus. The Early Church interpreted its life as being directly related to the person of Jesus. It was more than a proclamation about him; in him the ground and orientation of their being was determined. Its true nature lay over and beyond any particular (or combination of) structural expression of itself.

One of the categories by which the Apostle described the divine activity was τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ .[1] Since Dodd's epochal The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments (1936), the kerygmatic content of the gospel has been strongly emphasized, particularly in light of the conclusion of Form-Criticism that the original materials circulated in pericopae. This emphasis has tended to regard the gospel essentially as a proclamation to be formulated, delivered and accepted. This focus on the articulation of a kerygmatic formula has dominated the interest of scholars in recent days. Bultmann and his followers have attempted to interpret the kerygma in terms of that which is acceptable to modern man, rejecting mythological formulations as invalid for our times. One

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1 The noun occurs 60 times in Pauline and deutero-Pauline writings. Elsewhere in the New Testament it is found 4 times in Matthew, 8 in Mark, twice in the Acts, and once each in 1 Peter and the Apocalypse of John. In Deutero-Isaiah and the Psalms, the verb is employed twenty times in connection with the news of the Great Deliverance or restoration from the captivity in Babylonia. In the New Testament the verb is found once in Matthew, ten times in Luke and fifteen times in the Acts (!). Paul uses it twenty times, the writer of Hebrews and the seer of the Apocalypse twice each, and the author of 1 Peter thrice (Moulton & Geden, op. cit., pp. 396ff.).

wonders, however, if Bultmann's conclusions of Form-Criticism have not become a primary guide for the formulation of his hermeneutics, i. e., incompatible theological statements and structures in the Gospels are deleted by his understanding of Form-Criticism.

Paul uses τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in three different ways. In Rom. 2:16[1] εὐαγγέλιον may be interpreted to refer to a definitive statement of Paul in reference to God's activity in Jesus Christ. Bishop Lightfoot,[2] for example, maintains that this is a reference to Paul's preaching of the Second Advent and the Judgment, the topics of his preaching in Thessalonica and Athens and the characteristics of the first stage of his preaching. The scanty evidence of his ministry to both Thessalonica and Athens does suggest a reflection of the eschatology in the categories of apocalyptic Judaism, but the evidence is insufficient to determine either what topics were actually presented in the cities in question or the basic characteristics of Paul's early preaching. At best only a partial picture is available in both cases. It is striking, however, to note that both I Thess. 1:5 and 2 Thess. 2:14 refer to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν, suggesting that Paul regards his gospel as an already

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1 ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κρίνει ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.

2 Notes on Epistles of St. Paul From Unpublished Commentaries, London: Macmillan & Co., 1895, p. 261.

delivered message.[1] Subsequently, to the Corinthian[2] and Roman Christians[3] Paul also refers to εὐαγγέλιον as a personal message already known.[4] In 2 Cor. 11:4 and Gal. 1:6 ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον suggests a different kind of report, but apparently contrasted with a known εὐαγγέλιον.

Even though εὐαγγέλιον may suggest in these references a codified presentation in somewhat the way Irenaeus uses the term in reference to the written Gospel,[5] Paul uses it almost exclusively in reference to Jesus Christ or God, i. e., the "good news" of God is particularized in Jesus Christ. The gospel[6] is characterized by power, glory, and peace, and has been heard and trusted throughout the churches established and visited by the Apostle. Εὐαγγέλιον is not merely a report, but it is the power of Christ dynamically active in the message concerning

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1 Cf. Phil. 2:22, cf. Friedrich, "εὐαγγέλιον," TWNT, II, p. 731.

2 2 Cor. 4:3, cf. 1 Cor. 15:1.

3 16:25, cf. 11:28.

4 The writer of the Pastorals (2 Tim. 2:8) portrays a similar reference in μνημόνευε Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐγηγερμένον ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυίδ, κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, cf. Eph. 3:6.

5 Adv. Haer. iii.II.8.

6 Rom. 1:9, 10:16, 1 Cor. 4:15, 9:14, 18, 23, 2 Cor. 4:4, 8:18, Gal. 2:7, Eph. 1:23, 6:15, 19, Phil. 1:5, 7, 12, 16, 2:22, 4:3, 15, Col. 1:23, 1 Th. 2:4, Phlm. 13, 2 Tim. 1:10.

him. Jesus Christ is not only the subject of the gospel; he is its origin and dynamic power. The Roman Christians (15:19) are urged to anticipate the fulfillment of the Christ's good news in Paul, and the Corinthians are exhorted to see that only Jesus the Christ can empower and sanctify the Church.[1] The gospel is not another report to be heard, nor is Jesus Christ just another leader to follow. This is the work of God as seen in his divine Son, and the only way for the Church to fulfill its ministry is to be empowered by the Spirit of the Risen Lord.[2]

Paul does not distinguish metaphysically between τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ. Functionally, God the Creator is the source of all life, the ground of all being, the determination of all ontic existence. Jesus is described mythologically as coming from God. Hence, the ultimate source of reality is God, and Paul does not hesitate to refer to εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ. In Rom. 1:1 εἰς εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ is linked with περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ in 1:3, indicating that the gospel of God, transmitted διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις (1:2) and generically ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα (1:4), is manifested most completely in Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν (1:4). This most adequate revelation of God is reiterated in Rom. 15:16 in Paul being a λειτουργὸν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ

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1 1 Cor. 9:12, 2 Cor. 9:13, 10:14, cf. 2 Cor. 2:12.

2 1 Thess. 3:2, 2 Thess. 1:8, Phil. 1:27, Col. 1:5.

εἰς τὰ ἔθνη so that τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ is made acceptable to the Gentiles. In correspondence with the Thessalonian Church, Paul remarks about his boldness in speaking the gospel of God amid much conflict (1 Thess. 2:2), as well as his willingness to toil and suffer among them on behalf of the good news of God (2:8-9). Similarly, he mentions his lowly role to the Corinthians in announcing the good news of God to them (2 Cor. 11:7), emphasizing the graciousness of the gospel of God.[1]

Rom. 1:16 illustrates the intrinsic relationship of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον to the dynamic of God.[2] The good news of God is directed toward the well-being and harmonious relationship of all peoples - Jews and Gentiles. The gospel is not an idea; it is the operation of a power at work for the salvation of mankind.

Further investigation of Paul's use of εὐαγγέλιον indicates that not only is the term employed 1)as a proclamation as well as 2)the presence of the dynamic Christ, but it also suggests 3)that the gospel demands a response. Paul became a life-witness (μάρτυς) and servant (ᾧ λατρεύω) of God in response to the εὐαγγελίου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (Rom. 1:9). Responses to the gospel are

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1 ὅτι δωρεὰν τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εὐαγγέλιον εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν ;

2 Although the Byzantine text has added τοῦ Χριστοῦ after τὸ εὐαγγέλιον , nearly all of the manuscripts omit the reference to Christ.

both affirmative (1:16) and negative (10:16).[1] The paragraph of 1 Cor. 9:13-23 indicates that the nature of the gospel produces a response which is calculated to portray the spirit of the Christ and the concern of God. The Corinthian Christians, as Paul, have received the gospel, taken their stand on it, and are being saved through it.[2] The tenses of the verbs indicate not only an occasion of their acceptance of Paul's ministry among them, but also the continued activity of the gospel (σώζεσθε) in their midst. Their affirmation to the gospel is an integral part of the dynamic activity of God in the world.[3]

Far from being the property of the Church, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον is the expression of the reality of the being of God in terms appropriate for mankind. Ontologically speaking, Paul conceives God as one who discloses himself purposefully in that mankind finds true existence in its awareness of and response to the reality which underlies all existence, i. e., God. The gospel encompasses the totality of the divine articulated and embodied in the human.

Jesus was sent not to individuals but to an historical

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1 As well as vascillation (Gal. 1:6ff.).

2 . . . . ὃ καὶ παρελάβετε, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἑστήκατε, δι' οὗ καὶ σώζεσθε 15:1b-2a.

3 Cf. Col. 1:23, Phlm. 13, Phil. 1:27.

collectivity. The historical framework within which he lived was Judaism, referred to consistently as Israel[1] in Paul's writings. Israel was the matrix out of which came the Church. The significance of Israel to the Church for Paul is best displayed in Rom. 9-11. Additionally, this section reveals the larger framework of reality into which both Israel and the Church are set.

The essential characteristics of Israel are listed in Rom. 9:4f.: οἵτινές εἰσιν Ἰσραηλῖται, ὧν ἡ υἱοθεσία καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ αἱ διαθῆκαι καὶ ἡ νομοθεσία καὶ ἡ λατρεία καὶ αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, ὧν οἱ πατέρες, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα· ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν.

Their background not only reflects a divine election, but also the heritage out of which came the Messiah. The credentials of the Israelites are impressive: they enjoy the status of sonship (υἱοθεσία) in which the will of God is disclosed; they have a peculiar destiny (δόξα); they have been continuously assured of God's sustaining mercy and purpose for them (διαθῆκαι); they have been characterized, particularly since the Exile, as a people who have been held together by God's teaching (νομοθεσία); they have

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1 Paul uses ὁ Ἰουδαῖος primarily to refer to the mass of Jews in terms of their habitat. The word is often contrasted (Rom. 1:16, 2:9, 10, 3:9, 10:12, 1 Cor. 1:24, 10:32, 12:13, Gal. 3:28, Col. 3:11) with Ἕλλην as the representative of Greece. Ἰσραήλ emphasizes the people of God as over against οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι as the Jewish rather than Hellenistic folk who inhabit certain countries and are known by ethnic and racial characteristics.

always worshipped God as God, refusing to use images[1] (λατρεία); God has affirmed that his redemptive purpose includes them (ἐπαγγελίαι); their leaders (πατέρες) are depicted as being the originators[2] of God's elect, epitomized by the Messiah who was also a Jew.

Even though Paul is quite concerned about the failure of the Israelites to fulfill their destiny, nevertheless, he asserts that they have not been forsaken by God. They still occupy a prominent place in the redemptive plan of God. Paul sees Israel as carrying out the purpose of God despite the unfaithfulness of many of the Israelites. The nation has been chosen by God; it must serve his purpose. In 11:2ff. he alludes to 1 Kings 19, which contains the story of the fidelity of Elijah and the seven thousand who, as it were, exemplify the remnant of God. In 11:5[3] Paul maintains that in this age of God's grace this remnant is still in existence, and still, as God's chosen, has the obligation to serve.

This is boldly proclaimed in 11:26a: καὶ οὕτως πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται . . . . . Semantically speaking, πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ refers to Israel as a totality and not to every individual Israelite.[4] The phrase πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ

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1 Cf. Chapter III, p. 68.

2 ἐξ ὧν.

3 οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ λεῖμμα κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος γέγονεν.

4 Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 275.4.

is illustrated elsewhere, e. g., in 1 Sam. 11:15: LXX, ... καὶ εὐφράνθη Σαμουηλ καὶ πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ ὥστε λίαν , but the Masoretic text has . . . וַיְשַׂמְּחוּ שָׁם שָׁאוּל וְכָל-אַנְשֵׁי יִשְׂרָאֵל עַד-מְאֹד. In the next verse (12:1), the Septuagint has καὶ εἶπεν Σαμουηλ πρὸς πάντα ἄνδρα Ἰσραήλ . . . , whereas the Masoretic text reads וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל אֶל-כָּל-יִשְׂרָאֵל .... The juxtaposition of these verses, and the interpretation of the Septuagint indicate that πᾶς Ἰσραήλ can hardly mean the number of all the individual Israelites, but rather indicates the nation as a whole. The term similarly refers to the collectivity in 2 Chr. 12:1: ... ἐγκατέλιπεν τὰς ἐντολὰς κυρίου καὶ πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ μετ' αὐτοῦ. The Masoretic text has וַיְהִי כְּהָכִין רְחַבְעָם וְכְחָזְקָתוֹ עָזַב אֶת-תּוֹרַת יְהוָה וְכָל-יִשְׂרָאֵל עִמּוֹ. In verse 5, Shemaiah, among others, is named as faithful to Jehovah; πᾶς may often, as in these examples, be functionally employed to devote the entirety without individuality.

Beyond the biological factors, Israel is an integral unity. It is not the action of a number of individuals which together comprise the total. Israel has been chosen, but not all Israelites believed (10:16a): ἀλλ' οὐ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ . οὐ πᾶς , here as in 9:6, 7, denotes "not everyone," i. e., "some were obedient to the gospel." When πᾶς is negated, the general or universal becomes particular, i. e., "not everyone" or "some." Although this appears to be a meiosis,

the latter half of the verse, κύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; which implies the answer "no one," might suggest otherwise. If οὐ negated ὑπήκουσαν rather than πάντες, the strong Hebrew idiom (לֹא . . . כֹל) would indicate "no one was obedient."[1] This idiom is used in 3:20, where "no flesh shall be justified before him."[2] However, the location of οὐ before πάντες and not before the verb indicates the former interpretation of "some." As in 10:3, the Jews did not "subject themselves to the righteousness of God." They already knew of this righteousness from the Old Testament days: Romans 9:31 alludes to Isa. 51:1, and 9:33 is quoted from Isa. 28:16. This is not new from Paul. The πάντες in 10:16 takes up the argument of πᾶσι in 10:11, disclosing the truth that "all have not been obedient," only "those who have believed." It is evident here that all are not indiscriminately the elect and salvation is not universal. In Paul's mind the functional use of πᾶσι does not refer to the sum total of individuals, but the destiny of the people as a totality. Although every nation is destined toward a goal in mankind, the fact of the presence of the

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1 Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 302.1. The idiom has the same force as οὐδείς with the indicative mood.

2 . . . οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ. Similarly, in 1 Cor. 1:29, Matt. 24:22// Mk. 13:20.

unfaithful in any given nation does not abrogate its destiny.

Israel's unbelief has made possible the election of the non-Jews to be made evident in history (11:11): . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῶν παραπτώματι ἡ σωτηρία τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, εἰς τὸ παραζηλῶσαι αὐτούς. Mankind is not to be converted to becoming Jewish or assuming the character of Judaism. The Gentiles (ἔθνη) as a "wild olive tree" (ἀγριέλαιος) have been grafted into the root and trunk of God's elect. Their election is not out of a meritorious nature (11:18ff.); God has elected them. The nations shall fulfill their destinies according to their elected goal, not on the basis of national characteristics and qualities. They are elected to special conditions of knowledge and responsibility. As the non-Jews are not to become Jews in the fulfillment of their purpose, so the Jews are to remain Jews and not be transformed into Gentiles (11:23ff.) as they take up their function in history.[1]

This is the difficult section for most Christian commentators. It is an historical fact, Paul asserts, that the disbelief of the Jews has removed them from the active engagement of carrying out God's purpose in history. The consensus of Christian interpreters has been and is that Israel has been permanently rejected, and is not fit to remain within the sphere of purposeful participation in

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1 Cf. O. A. Piper, "Church and Judaism in Holy History," Theology Today, XVIII(April 1961)1, 60-71.

history. However, Paul poignantly insists that the obduracy of Israel has resulted only in a temporary or delayed fulfillment of their purpose. They are still God's elect as Jews, and will accomplish the goal into which they are called.

Paul is not dealing with individuals or conversion but is thinking in terms of God's relationship with the nation as a whole to bear his name in the world and be his people. "Israel must be rejected that she may be accepted."[1] Her salvation goes from contingent rejection to final acceptance. Paul foresees the time when both the people of Israel (πᾶς Ἰσραήλ) as a totality and the nations of the Gentiles (11:25: τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν)[2] shall be united as carrying out the purposes of God.[3] The οὕτως of 11:26 indicates that the elect from

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1 Nygren, Commentary on Romans, p. 405. Cf. J. Munck, "Israel and the Gentiles in the New Testament," JTS, N. S., II, (1951), 9ff., where he interprets Paul as portraying a representative universalism in his consideration of the place of the Jews in history.

2 τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν refers to the full complementation of all kinds of paganism.

3 Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II.2, p. 300. "All Israel" is the community of those elected by God in and with Jesus Christ both from Jews and also from Gentiles, the whole Church which together with the holy root of Israel will consist in the totality of all the branches finally united with and drawing sustenance from it, in the totality constituted by the remnant continuing in and with the original stem Jesus Christ, by the wild roots added later from the Gentiles, and by the branches which were cut off and are finally grafted in again.

Israel share also in the plan of God for mankind - the plan which necessitates the participation both of Jews and Gentiles.

There is one Lord for all people (10:12): ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων. The same Lord has elected from all nations, and conferred upon all of his election his blessings. The fact that one is a Jew does not give him a claim on the righteousness of God; on the other hand, it does not mean that the Jew as Jew is excluded. J. Jocz[1] has maintained that the difference between Jew and non-Jew lies in the understanding of faith, not race nor tradition. The real line which divides the Church from the synagogue is the vertical line of faith - the actual, existential "yes" or "no." Moreover, he contends[2] that some Jews are potential Christians because, in their state of utter helplessness, they have turned toward another way of life via an inward disposition. At the same time, some staunch Christians who have adhered faithfully to traditional Christianity are potential Jews because of their assumed attitude of independence toward God, e. g., Pelagius.[3] No one nation, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, can abrogate

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1 The Jewish People and Jesus Christ, pp. 312, 322.

2 Ibid., p. 203.

3 Cf., however, Gal. 2:14ff. H. J. Schoeps, in Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History, pp. 219-258, shows profound insight into the similarities of Jewish and Christian Heilsgeschichte.

the purpose of God. The unlimited freedom of God removes arbitrariness from divine election.

When Paul affirms that πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται, one wonders what is meant by σωθήσεται. Our nineteenth century heritage of individualism has suggested that σώζειν and its cognates should be interpreted in individualistic tones of "conversion," i. e., a change of behavior interpreted basically as religious in nature. But πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται in its setting does not lend itself to such an interpretation. The chosen of God will fulfill their original purpose in history assigned to them by God, as has been noted.[1] Σωθήσεται is interpreted as the full realization of the purpose of the elect of God, the totality of God's work and their work with him. The passive voice suggests that this is not a work of their initiation, i. e., a changing of their minds only as to whether or not they desire to participate. Their response is couched within the framework of God both taking the initiative and empowering them to fulfill their task.

But, is σώζειν thus understood elsewhere? In Rom. 8:24,[2] Eph. 2:5[3] and 2:8,[4] the Apostle declares that a

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1 Supra, pp. 179ff.

2 τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν.

3 Χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι.

4 τῇ γὰρ χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ πίστεως.

"saving relationship" has already occurred, and those in the relationship are not the agents (ἐλπίς, χάρις) but the recipients of the action. In Romans 8 the whole order of creation is expectantly awaiting the real adoption of the sons of God. Deterioration will cease; bondage will be replaced by a liberty defined in God. The person will be freed from his anxieties under the leadership of the Spirit. The realization of the unity between the created order and the adopted sons of God is the hope which has delivered man from futility and suffering. Indeed, ἐσώθημεν implies a correlation between sons of God and the created order in that both will be harmoniously related to the God of all creation. That is to say, both will not only be restored to an original state, but will be brought to a completed and whole relationship of accomplishing the task assigned them.[1] Both the local and cosmic spheres of existence are under the sovereignty of God.

In Ephesians 2 the writer emphasizes the contrast of the significant life which finds its source and dynamic in Jesus Christ with the former life as characterized by a sinful and mortal stance. Having been delivered from that life of transgression through an active commital to the God of love and mercy is tantamount to becoming a completed entity (ποίημα) which produces good. Translated into

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1 The implication in Paul's writings of the redemption of the world structures and its inhabitants is not unlike that suggested in Apk. 21:1ff.

current parlance, this means that the deliverance which is still going on (perfect tense) is a deliverance from the anxiety concomitant with and resultant from a kind of life subject to broken relationships and incomplete fulfillment.[1]

When one is tempted to cast a glance at parallel uses of σώζειν and its cognates, one finds that the term is used of deliverance from death or destruction,[2] and the preservation and maintenance of good health, cities, status quo, etc.[3] Etymologically speaking, the σω- stem reflects a propensity toward integrity, wholeness, intactness, health.[4] It is apparent, from these examples,

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1 Cf. 2 Thess. 2:10.

2 Cf. Herodotus, 8.34, ἔσωζον πόλιν, Homer, Odyssey, 5.490, σπέρμα πυρὸς σώζων, cf. Plato, Republic, 417A, Gorgias, 512B; LXX Deut. 33:29 μακάριος σύ, Ἰσραήλ· τίς ὅμοιός σοι λαὸς σωζόμενος ὑπὸ κυρίου; ; Gen. 19:17 καὶ εἶπαν Σῴζων σῴζε τὴν σεαυτοῦ ψυχήν; P. Tebt.I.56:11, σῶσαι ψυχὰς πολλάς (from famine); Moulton and Milligan, op. cit., p. 620.

3 Aristotle, Politics, 1309b15, τὰς πολιτείας. LXX Judg. 2:16 καὶ ἤγειρεν αὐτοῖς κύριος κριτὰς καὶ ἔσωσεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν προνομευόντων αὐτούς. 2 Kings (2 Sam.) 8:6 καὶ ἔσωσεν κύριος τὸν Δαυὶδ ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς ἐπορεύετο.

4 For example, σω-words in the New Testament include σώζειν, σῶμα (and its cognates) - a unified being, σωρεύειν - an undiminished piling up, σωτήρ - the one who provides deliverance from death, sin, etc., and guidance toward the fulfillment of life, σωτηρία (σωτήριον, σωτήριος) - the deliverance or the state resultant from the deliverance, σωφρονεῖν (σωφρονίζειν, σωφρονισμός, σωφρόνως, σωφροσύνη, σώφρων) - all relating to a healthy, disciplined mind and its expressions. One must be wary here lest the general sense dictate a particular usage, and lest etymological nuances become theological or religious meanings.

that the Pauline usage thus far does not differ essentially in the non-religious and religious uses of the term.

Paul does not speak of salvation as being relegated solely to the past, as Rom. 8:24 and Eph. 2:5, 8 might imply. In 1 Cor. 1:18[1] and 2 Cor. 2:15[2] those who are finding that the true and integrating meaning of life is interpreted in the cross are contrasted with others who are deteriorating and falling apart in their confrontation with the cross. Although a σκάνδαλον to the Jews and μωρία to the Gentiles, the cross is the symbol by which the clue - Jesus Christ - to life in God is disclosed. Abhorence and pride result in a stance of self-containment and rejection.[3] Additionally, Paul speaks of salvation in a future sense, as in the already mentioned Rom. 11:26. In 1 Cor. 9:22 and 10:33, he sees that the Church is not comprised of one particular kind of folk, but that it resists all efforts to become an exclusivistic group.[4] Paul interprets salvation, not in terms of an individualistic choice to be "converted," but as the faithful response to the divine will at work in this world. That is to say,

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1 Ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῖς μὲν ἀπολλυμένοις μωρία ἐστίν, τοῖς δὲ σῳζομένοις ἡμῖν δύναμις θεοῦ ἐστιν.

2 . . . ἐν τοῖς σῳζομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις.

3 Cf. similar examples of salvation described as a present experience in 1 Cor. 15:2, Phil. 2:12.

4 Cf. e. g., 1 Thess. 2:16, 1 Cor. 3:15, Rom. 5:9.

πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων [1] refers to everyone who participates in the purposes of God. This generic usage[2] implies neither "each one" nor "all folk" in a delineation of individuals, but it refers to the collectivity of those who are committing themselves to serve the teleological work of God.

The Church is to be understood as the "good news" and salvation of God embodied in the body of Christ, made possible through the person and work of the Christ. The essential connection between the person of Jesus the Christ and the Church which worships him as her Lord is seen in the underlying teleology of God, who sent Jesus to the world and who empowers the Church with his Spirit.

The current discussions concerning the Church have neglected its spiritual unity to the detriment of a wholesome understanding of the Church.[3] In 1 Cor. 12-14 Paul elaborates on the human analogy to portray the diversity

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1 Rom. 10:11, 1:16, 3:22, 10:4, 2:1, 10, 4:11, 1 Thess. 1:7, 2 Thess. 1:10, 2:12, Gal. 3:10, 13, 2 Tim. 3:12, 4:8, Matt. 5:22, 28, Luke 6:30, Acts 10:43, etc.

2 Blass-Debrunner, op. cit., 413.2.

3 L. Newbiggen, The Household of God, L. S. Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, J. Robert Nelson, The Realm of Redemption, J. Knox, The Church and the Reality of Christ, for example, have been largely forgotten or overlooked in the present emphases on the ecumenical Church and its sociological structures. The more technical treatments of K. L. Schmidt, "ἐκκλησία," TWNT, III, pp. 502-539, G. Johnston, The Church in the New Testament, etc., disregard the semantic dimension in their historical-literary treatments.

of the gifts of the Church. In detail he calls attention to the unwise practice of one gift dominating another by stressing the necessity of a variety of gifts to serve the whole Church. The Church in its Corinthian ministry was confronted by a world which did not readily accept the Christian way. The Apostle clearly saw that the Corinthian community must minister in a variety of patterns, all of which were given by the Spirit of God and motivated by ἀγάπη . Diversity is to be encouraged, but the more important consideration is the inward unity manifested in Christ. It is he who is the head of the body, and in whom all the members of the body cohere.

The Church is limited neither to a geographical area, nor to a period of time, nor to a particular structural manifestation. The new collectivity is present where and when the Risen Lord calls it into existence; it is not a germination of the religious fervor of mankind. Those who participate in the discussion of God's purposeful activity in the world and act upon it are the people of God.[1]

Soteriology, in Paul's writings, is the redemptive work of God in this world. Particularly manifest in the person and work of Jesus the Christ, nevertheless, it is not confined to him. The historical collectivity of Israel

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1 This would explain Paul's missionary strategy as seen in Romans 14-15. Cf. J. Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, for an interesting interpretation of Paul's role as a missionary.

also shares the role of agent in the purposes of God. Yet, it is not the fact of intrinsic distinctives which determines the elect of God; it is God who purposes to create, empower, and bring to fruition that which exists. Salvation is the healthy, harmonious and integrating relationship of creatures with the Creator. This relationship goes to the heart of the reality of the Church and its task; the forms of her responsible obedience are expressed in categories appropriate to the temporal and spatial settings. But, in all the expressions, the totality of the teleological work of God is dominant.

VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter is not the repetition of the argumentation of the preceding chapters, but rather the brief recapitulation of A)the most significant findings presented in the dissertation, and B)an interpretation of those findings. The details and illustrative examples can be consulted at their location in the text, and, indeed, may be supplemented by numerous additions which shed further light on the thesis of the work.

The work has attempted to ascertain the structure of reality which governs the outlook and writings of the Apostle Paul. Emphasis has been placed on understanding the <u>way</u> he uses his language, with minimal attention given to the content and its sources. This does not indicate that origins and descriptions are unimportant, but it does suggest that the framework within which the ideas are discussed is the more important for assessing the meaning of his writings. The current concerns for hermeneutics have neglected the realism found in the Bible, and it is hoped that this work will serve as a reminder of this necessary dimension.

A. Three findings seem to be of particular importance. First, the structure of reality is more important than the expressions concerning that reality. The framework determines to a significant degree the meaning of the terms utilized, and provides the semantic field within which

the terms can be interpreted. All writings are set within some kind of structure, and the import of the writings are more clearly discernible if that structure is recognized and understood.

Second, the emphasis on semantics in biblical studies adds a new dimension for exegetical work. Comparative studies are invaluable for pointing out similarities and dissimilarities between/among linguistic patterns, but, at best, this method is quite limited in the assistance it really provides for the meaning of the particular linguistic structure under observation. Etymology and philology, for example, are useful tools, but they also only construct a broad frame of reference possibilities within which linguistic structures are to assessed. Exegesis, interpretation and semantics are indispensable for the understanding of the language being used.

Third, the structure of reality for Paul is firmly established in the being and work of a personal God. Out of God himself has originated all that really is. Creation is the pehnomenal display of his purposeful activity. Every facet of the created order points to its Creator. God is both the source and the goal of all life, the totality of all existence. In the person of Jesus the Christ the wholeness of existence is most clearly seen. In him the plan of God is focused - in creation, in redemption, in the consummation. It is he who gives

particular reference to the purpose of God in the entirety of his work.

Paul discusses man in terms of a whole person. Employing a multiplicity of terms, the words encompass and point beyond the strictly inherent physiological or psychological meanings. Man is not a compartmentalized being whose disparate parts are antithetical to or fused into each other. On the contrary, each aspect of the person is significantly and functionally related to every other aspect in terms of its basic purpose. Similarly, Adam and Christ sharpen the essential meaning and purpose of mankind. Both Adam and Christ point beyond themselves toward the meaning of mankind as it relates itself to the purpose of God. Adam is every man as he is; Christ reveals the possibilities of every man in that he is the personification of God's "good news," both to the Jew and to the Gentile.

Wholeness presents itself in Paul, not as a set of ideas but as an underlying principle in his discussions. His radical obedience to a personal God governs his entire outlook in that he is unable to perceive of life in general terms, on the one hand, or in a type of individualism, on the other. All beings and things proceed from God, and find their true expression in him. This structure of reality provides the setting of the contextual principle of totality by which the Apostle interprets all that exists.

It is readily apparent that the motifs selected in the chapters are among the central motifs of the Christian way of life. Furthermore, it must be noted that none of these motifs make any sense at all if taken in isolation. That is to say, Paul's vocabulary and interests substantially reflect his age and are hardly distinctive in themselves. But, structured within the totality framework of the active and purposeful work of God in this world, these motifs are seen as suggestions, not as exact and finished developments, by which to continue probing the Apostle's mind.

B. The implications of these findings are varied and extensive. 1) Modern man is able to find in Paul, if not elsewhere, a truth that the totalitarian systems of this world are temporary and self-defeating. All of life is seen as operative within God, and his consistent and teleological purpose presents a totality in which mankind can fulfill his destiny. God is a personal God who is actively concerned about his creation, and totalitarian systems capitulate unless it is the work of God. Furthermore, man is not just an atomized, self-contained being. He finds true objectivity in God and the world in which he lives. Purpose restores order to apparent chaos, and gives meaning to life characterized heretofore by futility.

2) The ramifications of adjusting to a methodology which stresses the structure of reality entail both a reflective epistemology and a disposition to think outside of scientific/positivistic analogates. One no longer subscribes to reality primarily via the formal creedal and doctrinal statements, but also through symbols, myths, and experiences. Reality is seen beyond the sentient expressions in phenomenological categories. The cosmic and the spiritual dimensions are valid realities of life, and, however articulated in a twentieth-century mode of communication, occupy a prominent role in one's experience.

3) The results of the study do suggest that there is more affinity between the way Paul and the Hebrews of the Old Testament conceive reality than the way Paul and many of the Greeks look upon life. This does not suggest that the dependence lies in the borrowing of the terms as much as it focuses upon the whole approach to the understanding of God and the world. For example, in Paul the sensible participates with the intelligible. This is characteristically biblical, whereas the sensible is a degradation from the intelligible in Plato. This does not imply that <u>all</u> of Paul agrees with <u>all</u> of the Old Testament, and with <u>none</u> of Greek thought. Nothing could be more inaccurate. It does mean, however, that Paul's frame of reference approaches that found elsewhere in the biblical expressions which affirm a dependence upon Yahweh.

4) This study implies that the categories suitable to Paul are not absolute. For example, a study of totality in The Epistle to the Hebrews, on the one hand, and in Luke-Acts, on the other, would be most beneficial for comparison. The categories employed by those writers and editors have strange resemblances with Paul as well as completely different representations. The more important factor of the same basic realities being discussed is often minimized by the disparate nomenclature. Not only should the various patterns of Christ, for example, be elucidated, but also the structure within which the Christ is depicted needs to be compared and contrasted. The frameworks most probably are more similar than the categories themselves.

5) The relationship between biblical theology and systematic theology needs to be strengthened in this age. The movement from texts, sources, and word-studies have hardly been encouraging to systematicians; on the other hand, the distilled propositions which reflect Scholasticism have hardly caused biblical exegetes to trust their findings to the systematicians, much less to engage in dialogue with them. The approach suggested in this investigation would not only encourage but require an encounter of the biblical exegetes, the systematic theologians, and the linguistic philosophers, for the dual purpose of producing a methodology by which to understand the structure of reality and to describe it in meaningful terms.

This work has not introduced any new material nor produced any novel interpretations. As a study in methodology, it has suggested another way by which to evaluate the materials common to scores of generations. Modern man and his successors can live meaningfully in this world because it is under the sovereignty of God, and is being brought by him to the goals for which it is destined.

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